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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The private provision of public goods is a much debated topic, both in the academic 
and the ‘real life’ literature. From an academic perspective, numerous potential pitfalls 
exist with respect to funding, willingness-to-pay, and the free rider problem. The 
logical solution to these problems has therefore always been government provision of 
public goods. In an era where governments withdraw from the market place as active 
providers of goods and services, however, there is a renewed interest in the private 
provision of these activities. This thesis takes a governmental perspective, asking how 
governments can encourage investments in the private provision of public goods. 
Since from an economic perspective the so-called ‘coercive’ measures (most 
noteworthy: regulation) are by definition inefficient, I focus on the non-coercive 
measures. Therewith, a trade-off is introduced between the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the government intervention—coercive measures are most predictable 
in their outcomes, but less efficient, whereas non-coercive measures are most efficient, 
but less predictable. 
   One of the basic assumptions is that firms will invest in whatever assets, as long as it 
‘participation constraint’). Still, however, even though it may be economically 
interesting to invest in the provision of public goods, there may exist so-called 
‘barriers to investment’. Chapter 2 of this study makes an inventory of these barriers, 
and introduces the concept op ‘underinvestment’. Altogether, the barriers to 
investment and their consequences in terms of underinvestment define the 
‘Influenceability Dilemma’ for a government. Suppose a government has identified 
the most important barriers to investment, and suppose the non-coercive measures 
should focus on the economic attractiveness of the investment opportunity. How then, 
can a government assure herself of a desired response by the private sector on the one 
hand, whilst not being too generous on the other? This nested optimisation problem 
(i.e., the private sector faces a profit maximisation problem, whereas government faces 
an expenditure minimisation problem) forms the basis of the ‘Smart Governance 
Dilemma’. Chapter 3 proposes a framework, floating on Tobin’s Q as the main 
evaluation criterion for the private sector’s economic attractiveness of investing. 
Having proposed a framework, the question arises how to turn a pecuniary transfer 
into a real policy. Chapter 4 analyses an empirical test of this ‘Policy Portfolio 
Dilemma’, of which the results suggest that only money matters—not the policy 
palette through which it is offered. Ultimately, there may exist cases where a 
government would not want the private sector do the job on its own. In cases of 
incomplete contracting (such as prisons or hospitals) or naturally monopolistic areas 
(infrastructure projects as roads), public-private partnerships may form a nice 
alternative to the measures described above. Chapter 5 analyses this so-called ‘Joint 
Ownership Dilemma’, and finds that PPPs are not necessarily welfare enhancing. 
 
is economically attractive to do so (i.e., the problem needs to meet the so-called 
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SAMENVATTING (SUMMARY IN DUTCH) 
Het privaat aanbieden van publieke goederen is een veelbesproken onderwerp, zowel 
binnen de academia als in de ‘echte wereld’. Vanuit een wetenschappelijk perspectief 
bestaan er vele drempels voor het fenomeen, zoals het financieringsprobleem, de 
bereidheid tot betalen bij eindgebruikers, en het zogenaamde ‘free rider’ probleem. 
Hierdoor wordt bij publieke goederen de overheid vrijwel altijd als logisch alternatief 
voor de markt wordt gezien. Met een zich uit de markt terugtrekkende overheid als 
actieve aanbieder van goederen en diensten, echter, ontstaat er een hernieuwde 
aandacht voor het thema ‘privaat aanbieden van publieke goederen’. Dit proefschrift 
beziet het perspectief van een overheid, en onderzoekt hoe overheden de private sector 
kunnen stimuleren om te investeren in het aanbieden van publieke goederen. 
Aangezien vanuit een economisch perspectief ‘dwingende’ maatregelen (lees: 
regulering) per definitie inefficiënt zijn, richt ik mij op de niet-dwingende 
maatregelen. Hiermee wordt automatisch een uitwisselingsprobleem geïntroduceerd—
dwingende maatregelen zijn het meest voorspelbaar qua uitkomsten, maar minder 
efficiënt, terwijl niet-dwingende maatregelen het meest efficiënt zijn, maar minder 
voorspelbaar uitpakken. Eén van de centrale vooronderstellingen is dat ondernemingen 
zullen investeren zo lang het economisch aantrekkelijk is (ofwel, er dient voldaan te 
worden aan de zogenaamde ‘participatie restrictie’). Desondanks kunnen er echter 
situaties zijn waarin het wel economisch aantrekkelijk is om te investeren, maar dat 
zogenaamde ‘investeringsbarrières’ dit verhinderen. Hoofdstuk 2 van dit proefschrift 
maakt een inventarisatie van deze barrières, en introduceert het begrip ‘onder-
investeringen’. Tezamen vormen deze twee begrippen het ‘Beïnvloedbaarheids-
dillemma’ voor een overheid. Stel nu dat een overheid heeft geïnventariseerd wat de 
belangrijkste investeringsbarrières zijn, en dat de niet-dwingende maatregelen zich op 
de economische aantrekkelijkheid van de investeringsbeslissing kunnen richten. Hoe 
kan een overheid zich dan enerzijds redelijkerwijs verzekeren van de gewenste 
respons door de private sector, terwijl ze anderzijds toch ook weer niet té scheutig wil 
zijn? Dit geneste optimalisatie probleem (de private sector wil winst maximaliseren 
terwijl een overheid haar uitgaven wil minimaliseren) vormt de basis van het ‘Slimme 
Bestuursdilemma’. Hoofdstuk 3 doet een voorstel voor een raamwerk, waarbij Tobin’s 
Q als evaluatiecriterium wordt genomen voor de economische aantrekkelijkheid van 
de investeringsbeslissing. Gegeven nu zo’n raamwerk, rijst de vraag hoe een overheid 
een berekende pecuniaire steun dient te vertalen naar concreet beleid. Hoofdstuk 4 
maakt een empirische analyse van dit ‘Beleidsinstrumentenmixdilemma’, waarvan de 
resultaten suggereren dat slechts de hoogte van de pecuniaire steun telt, en niet zozeer 
de typen van ingezette instrumenten. Tenslotte wordt aandacht gegeven aan gebieden 
waar het privaat aanbieden niet altijd even gewenst is. Bijvoorbeeld in het geval van 
incomplete contracten (bijvoorbeeld ziekenhuizen of gevangenissen), of natuurlijke 
monopolies (infrastructurele projecten als wegen) zouden publiek-private 
samenwerkingsverbanden een aardig alternatief op bovenstaande arrangementen 
kunnen vormen. Hoofdstuk 5 analyseert dit zogenaamde ‘Gemeenschappelijk 
eigendomsdilemma’ en stelt dat PPSen niet per se welvaart creëren. 
  
 
 
Part I: Introduction 
  
 3 
1 OBJECTIVES AND ORIENTATION 
 
 
 
This book is the result of a study that seeks to identify dilemmas for governments 
in the private provision of public goods, and to propose solutions to these 
dilemmas. In an era where governments increasingly withdraw from the economy 
as active providers of goods and services, and hence increasingly rely on the 
private sector for these provisions, this study investigates under what 
circumstances private sector investments coincide with the goals of governments. 
Though the benefits of a private sector economy is widely acclaimed in product-
market combinations with little externalities, it is by no means clear whether more 
complicated product-market combinations as drinking water provision, 
environmental protection, or even sewerage or integrated waste management may 
bear the same fruits from private sector provision as the production of jeans or 
biscuits. Particularly, it is unclear whether the investment decisions of private 
sector companies (possibly driven by the short-termism of the capital market) 
harmonise with the long-term interest of society, especially in cases of highly 
specific assets, that require large, sunk investments that are usually depreciated 
over longer time spans than average production equipments—the investments 
typically needed for the provision of many public goods. 
   Section 1.1 shortly introduces the context of the study. Since the early 1980s, 
governments around the world tend to withdraw from the economy as active 
providers of goods and services. Even in product-market combinations where 
competition is not ‘natural’, such as in the case of utility sectors, most economies 
try to rely on private sector companies. Section 1.2 signals some challenges for 
these private sector companies. Section 1.3 briefly reviews the literature on the 
private provision of public goods. What are the obstacles mentioned in the 
literature? Section 1.4 gives a short sketch of the mechanisms governments can 
use to influence the investment behaviour of private firms. These mechanisms will 
be discussed in more detail in the case study analysis (Part II of this book). Section 
1.5 defines the scope and structure of the book by introducing the problem 
statement and research questions. Lastly, section 1.6 specifies the relevance of the 
study. 
 
1.1 Inspiration for the study 
After two decades of structural reforms (embodying privatisation, trade 
liberalisation, investments liberalisation, and regulatory reforms) theory and 
practice often still seem to clash. In their seminal article, Kay and Thompson 
(1986) already complain about the variety of possible goals of the vague concept 
 4 
of privatisation. Consequently, they argue correctly, it is not only understandable 
that we can observe a large variety of ‘methods’ of privatisation, but it is also 
understandable that it is difficult to assess ‘the’ outcome of privatisation, since 
there exist multiple goals that can be achieved. Ramanadham (1989) provides an 
extensive list of possible privatisation measures, varying from ownership measures 
(in mainstream economics this is the sole dimension on which privatisation is 
based), to organisational measures (this is where organisation theory has not 
contributed substantially until the late 1990s), to even operational measures. 
Figure 1.1 gives a graphical interpretation of all of these possible interpretations of 
the concept of ‘privatisation.’  
   Identifying forms of privatisation is probably the easiest part for understanding 
the criticism of Kay and Thompson—when it comes to identifying rationales or 
objectives the hard part begins. Nevertheless, there are two important 
commonalities amongst the majority of all studies examining privatisation: 
1. Virtually all studies embrace an extremely negative view on public enterprise; 
2. Virtually all studies posit that there exists one broad spectrum where a public 
regulated monopolist appears on the one extreme, and the competitive 
efficiently operating private enterprise (in a deregulated contestable market) 
appears on the other extreme. 
 
These commonalities can be criticised as follows. First, what assumptions underlie 
the negative view on public enterprise? Section 1.1.1 tries to give an answer to that 
question in order to identify rationales for restructuring. A question related to the 
second commonality is whether (both in theory and empirical works) privatisation 
is modelled as a dummy variable (having two values ‘public’ and ‘private’) or 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Some possible interpretations of 'privatisation' measures 
Source: Inspired by Ramanadham (1989). 
 
Privatisation
Ownership measures
Organisational 
measures
Operational measures
•Denationalisation
•Joint venture
•Liquidation
•Org. restructuring
•Internal competition
•Contracting out
•Investment criteria
•Incentive rewards
•Pricing principles
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whether intermediate forms of organisation and market structures exist, and how 
these hybrids perform. Section 1.1.2 analyses how privatisation is but one element 
of market restructuring; section 1.1.3 analyses the expected gains of the reforms. 
1.1.1 The pessimist view on public enterprise 
In general, those adhering to the negative view on public enterprise rely on one (or 
more) of the following assumptions: 
x Public enterprises are inefficient because they address the objectives of 
politicians rather than maximise efficiency (Boycko et al. (1996); Shleifer 
and Vishny (1994)); 
x Public enterprises produce goods desired by politicans rather than by 
consumers (Shleifer and Vishny (1994)); 
x Excess employment is typical for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), mainly due 
to the fear of losing votes of the otherwise fired state-employees, and due to 
the political bargaining power of trade unions (Boycko et al. (1996); Shleifer 
and Vishny (1994)); 
x In the absence of the possibility (or threat) of bankruptcy (or take-overs), 
managers of public firms need not worry about the market value of the firm, 
and hence lack incentives to improve efficiency (Vickers and Yarrow (1988: 
15-26)); 
x Private firm’s management is constrained in its actions by the following 
actors that usually do not constrain management of public firms (Vickers and 
Yarrow (1988: 9-11)): 
x The firm’s shareholders; 
x Other investors or their agents; 
x The firm’s creditors. 
x Public enterprises are often located in politically desirable locations rather 
than in economically attractive regions (Shleifer and Vishny (1994)). 
 
Probably this list (without being extensive) can be labelled as ‘shocking’ to the 
uninitiated, being unfamiliar with the esothericism of mainstream economics. 
Furthermore, given that these assumptions were true, the uninitiated might ask 
‘Why would private enterprise be free of these problems apparently typical to 
public enterprise?’ Unfortunately, the answer to that latter question is not clear-
cut, as the bulk of empirical studies on privatisation shows: in some cases private 
enterprise is free of the aforementioned plagues, whereas in other cases it is not 
(see, for example, the extensive survey of Megginson and Netter (2001)). One of 
the many possible reasons for not finding a clear-cut explanation on the problems 
plaguing public enterprise is that all of the listed arguments implicitly state that 
ownership is determinative, whereas the ‘dummy switch’ from ‘public’ to ‘private’ 
takes place on one dimension only (ownership), and that this switch is costless and 
has immediate results. This ‘dummy’ view deserves to be nuanced. 
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1.1.2 Privatisation as one possible dimension of all structural reforms 
A typical way of analysing privatisation is by means of designing one spectrum 
where the public regulated monopolist is posed on the one extreme, and the private 
efficient competitive enterprise (operating in a deregulated market) is on the other. 
This is an inadequate comparison, since in fact some other dimensions have been 
included in the analysis as well. Apart from the asset transfer on the ownership 
dimension, for example, private enterprise is assumed to operate efficiently. 
Ownership is not the determinant of this change. If A hands over her car keys to 
somebody else (as a symbol of the ownership transfer), that car will not go faster 
or consume less fuel if the new owner behaves in the same fashion as A does (as a 
symbol of the performance of the object that has changed from owner). This also 
holds for public enterprise. In order to change the behaviour and performance of 
an enterprise that is privatised, additional measures have to be taken. Dependent 
on the degree of market imperfections in the economy, such additional measures 
include the establishment of financial institutions as catalysts for entrepreneurship 
(George and Prabu (2000)), legal protection of investors (La Porta et al. (1998);  
Shleifer and Vishny (1997)), the ability and necessity to innovate (Shleifer (1998); 
Baumol (1990)), elimination of corruption (Shleifer and Vishny (1994)), existence 
of competitive markets (Kole and Mulherin (1997)), external valuation (Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997)), or internal incentive mechanisms (cf. Prendergast (1999) or 
Gibbons (1998)). If privatisation encompasses a change of hats but not of tricks, 
everything else remains equal (except ownership of course).1 
   Another implicit dimension in the inadequate comparison is the change from a 
monopoly to a contestable market. Existence of a contestable market requires hit-
and-run competition (cf. Baumol et al. (1982)), in which multiple enterprises 
compete (resulting in increased allocative and productive efficiency). Such change 
from monopoly to contestability, however, requires that either the monopolist has 
been fragmentised, or that the market has been liberalised to new entrants. Lastly, 
it seems inadequate to treat public enterprise as heavily regulated while private 
enterprise would go unhindered by any regulatory interference. For modelling 
purposes it is probably easier not to constrain private preferences by external 
preferences (of government), but for analytical precision one must admit that this 
is an extra dimension. Figure 1.2 provides an illustration of the common 
simplification. 
                                                      
1 See Peltzman (1971), who addressed the question ‘If a privately owned firm is socialized, 
and nothing else happens, how will the ownership alone affect the firm’s behavior.’ Kole 
and Mulherin (1997) investigated this question for 17 Japanese and German firms located 
in the US, that were expropriated during WWII by the US government. In spite of the 
nationalisation, Kole and Mulherin could not find significant difference with the 
performance of private sector firms operating in the same market during the same era, 
suggesting that it is the competitiveness of the market that determines corporate 
performance rather than ownership. 
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   Privatisation is but one of the many changes that take place under the label of 
structural reforms. Since, however, in most cases of privatisation other changes (as 
liberalisation and regulatory reforms) take place simultaneously, it becomes 
extremely difficult to isolate benefits that can be attributed to privatisation alone. 
1.1.3 Expected gains of structural reforms 
Traditionally, two types of economic reforms can be distinguished: (1) 
macroeconomic reforms (as monetary policies, anti-inflation measures, and tax 
reforms), and (2) structural reforms (as privatisation, trade liberalisation, 
investments liberalisation, and regulatory reforms). As Rodrik (1996) argues, 
macroeconomic reforms not only have more solid theoretical rationales justifying 
change than structural reforms, but also empirical evidence is much more 
convincing. Mainstream growth theory shows how structural reforms may have a 
level effect on welfare, whereas macroeconomic reforms have an impact on 
growth (see, e.g., Krugman and Obstfeld (1994) for an elaboration of how sectoral 
barriers to trade may have a level effect). Rodrik (1996) extends this point, and 
shows (by comparing the policies and successes of the ‘Asian tigers’ versus some 
Latin American economies) how ‘poor’ industrial policies (as import-substitution 
industrialisation) need not have as dramatic effects as poor macroeconomic 
policies (as a poor fiscal regime). In the light of the current study, the 
consequences of Rodrik’s findings are far going—macroeconomic stability 
becomes a determinant (if not a precondition) for the success of sectoral policies.2 
                                                      
2 Two other important macro-level determinants of the success of structural reforms are the 
quality of the institutional framework and the efficiency of capital markets. A discussion of 
both issues is postponed to the next two chapters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Typical analysis of privatisation 
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   Structural reforms consist of privatisation, trade liberalisation, investment 
liberalisation, and regulatory reforms. Of all of these four measures, the costs and 
benefits of regulatory reforms seem to be worked out worst (see Hahn (1998) for a 
discussion for the US case). When assessing studies on the benefits (and costs) of 
liberalisation, trade liberalisation and investments liberalisation are usually 
grouped as if they were equal. The expected gains of privatisation may differ 
widely (since so many measures are grouped under the same denominator), but 
most authors seem to agree upon the fact that privatisation should increase 
efficiency. Efficiency, however, is a broad concept too. Kay and Thompson (1986) 
distinguish between privatisation (as an ownership measure) and liberalisation (as 
an introduction of competition), and argue that privatisation may increase 
allocative efficiency (producers satisfying the needs and wants of consumers, 
while prices equal marginal costs MC of production) whereas liberalisation may 
increase productive efficiency (whatever the choice of outputs, the total costs TC 
of production of the entire range of outputs is minimised).3 The combination of 
allocative and productive efficiency is the so-called ‘Pareto efficient production’. 
Figure 1.3 may clarify matters. 
   The standard reasoning why allocative efficiency increases after privatisation is 
that private entrepreneurs will only produce those goods for which there exists a 
market, and hence consumers are ready to pay. Consequently, scarce resources are 
                                                      
3 Note that other interpretations of the efficiency concept, as dynamic efficiency (with a 
focus on innovations in products or production methods) are often unmentioned. 
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used only for those goods that society values positively.4 Productive efficiency, on 
the other hand, increases because price competition encourages firms to produce 
efficiently over the entire range of outputs. As Megginson and Netter (2001: 23) 
state: ‘[...] private firms are not necessarily intrinsically more efficient, but [...] 
market pressures are more effective at weeding out poorly performing firms in the 
private sector than in the public.’ 
   At a first glance, the potential gains of privatisation and liberalisation seem 
attractive, but are they universally applicable? For example, do industry 
characteristics (as sunk costs, or a sub-additive total cost function which gives rise 
to the so-called natural monopoly) matter? Does any product-market combination 
fit with the predictions? What happens if firms engage in forms of competition 
other than price competition? Empirical studies show that these nuances do 
matter,5 and are most likely to affect the efficiency outcomes of structural reforms. 
                                                      
4 Though Kay and Thompson assume private ownership to be a necessary and sufficient 
condition for improving allocative efficiency, it seems odd for a private monopolist to set 
sales prices equal to marginal costs of production— it is much more logical if some 
competitive pressures would enhance this issue of price setting.  Consequently, however, 
privatisation seems a necessary condition only for improving allocative efficiency (when 
combined with competition, however, privatisation does become a necessary and sufficient 
condition for improving allocative efficiency). 
5 See, for example, the results of the 1990s ‘laboratory experiment’ of privatisation in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. This privatisation experiment is sometimes 
labelled a ‘laboratory’ experiment, since it represented one of the few chances economists 
had to try different arrangements in the macro economy at the same time under similar 
initial endowments. The results show nice contrasts between, e.g., Poland, the Czech 
Republic, and Russia. In each of these three countries, a mass privatisation programme was 
executed under the header of ‘social capitalism’, where ‘the people’ were given the option 
to buy shares in the former SOEs. The biggest differences lied in the manner of 
transferring shares to the public, and in the corporate governance systems. In the case of 
Poland, shares have usually been transferred to the workers, including management (see 
Hashi (2000)). For small- and medium-sized enterprises, such has proved to be a success, 
but for larger SOEs the process has become a disaster (Sachs (1992)). These latter firms 
have indeed seen a shift from ownership going down the hierarchy, but as an effect both 
managers and workers tend to show myopia, allow wage-increases, asset-stripping, and 
job-protection rather than long-run restructuring. In the case of Russia, voucher 
privatisation meant that despite the formal ownership-shift from state to workers (and 
others), no fundamental restructuring has been promoted with respect to the companies 
(Nelson and Kuzes (1994)). It appears that, following privatisation, most management 
teams have remained intact, most workers have retained their pre-privatisation job, and 
long-overdue modernisation has not begun (ibid.). The apparently initial promising effects 
of the Czech voucher privatisation scheme call for special attention. In the Czech mass 
privatisation programme, special investment funds (IFs) were set-up, as an intermediary 
between the public and the privatised SOEs, and where all Czech citizens were offered the 
opportunity to purchase vouchers (which entitled them to purchase shares). This 
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Consider the impact of industry characteristics, for example. In some sectors, or 
elements of a value chain, industry characteristics as sunk cost in specific assets, 
necessary scale and scope economies, and the presence of a subadditive cost 
function for total production6 may give rise to the characterisation of a so-called 
‘natural monopoly’. In a natural monopoly (usually found in infrastructure 
ownership and exploitation as rail networks, high-voltage electricity transportation 
grids, local distribution grids of lower voltage electricity, water distribution 
networks, natural gas networks) competition does not improve efficiency. For 
example, given the costs of a network and its enormous impact on urban planning 
and the environment, the societal benefits of multiple parallel competing networks 
potentially do not outpace the costs of such enforced competition (see Shah 
(1992), Gramlich (1994), or Crampes and Estache (1997)). Consequently, other 
co-ordination mechanisms are applied, as ‘competition for the monopoly’ (as in 
franchise bidding in privatisation)7, or price or profits regulations. If, however, 
there exist cases where it is more efficient for a single firm to produce a good or 
service, then there must exist other interpretations of other market organisation 
modes that provide Pareto efficient production. Contrasting with figure 1.3 (where 
the gains of structural reforms were presented for a naturally competitive market), 
figure 1.4 gives some examples of allocative and productive (in)efficiencies in the 
case of a naturally monopolistic market. Though the dimensions of allocative and 
productive efficiency remain equal, a market characterised by natural monopoly 
has a different solution to the Pareto efficient production—being one based on 
monopolistic production instead of a contestable market.8 
   Technical industry characteristics are not the only determinants of market 
modes; another important dimension that affects the potential for competition or 
the preference for monopoly is rooted in the nature of the good or service offered. 
For example, consider the applicability of the competition concept in various 
product-market combinations. Price competition of suppliers requires marginal 
utility and pricing—otherwise, consumer valuation would be impossible. 
Furthermore, consumption must be measurable (otherwise cost of production 
cannot be attributed to those who have most utility of it) and consumption must be 
exclusive. So-called private goods share all of these characteristics, and most 
                                                                                                                                      
programme was most successful, which is often attributed to the superior corporate 
governance practices (Marikova Leeds (1993)). See also George and Prabu (2000), 
Guislain (1997), Krueger (2000), Laffont and Tirole (1991), Parker (2000), Perotti (1995), 
Sappington and Stiglitz (1987), or Shleifer (1998). 
6 A subadditive cost function for total cost of production implies that it is more expensive 
for two or more firms to produce a good than it is for one single firm. 
7 More on privatisation and franchise bidding in the following chapters. 
8 A comparison would be much more instructive if the other three cells of each matrix 
would contain ‘real life’ examples. Unfortunately, figures 1.3 and 1.4 are but stylised 
representations of reality, so that only stylised examples fit the picture. 
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obvious examples are fast-moving consumer goods as jeans or biscuits. Another 
class of goods are the so-called public goods, where consumption is not exclusive 
or measurable, and where utility (and associated pricing) is immeasurable. Most 
classical examples of these goods are defence, and street lighting. A third and last 
category is formed by the in-between, labelled as mixed goods, sharing 
characteristics of both worlds.9  
   When assessing markets, industrial characteristics matter for the possibility of 
introducing competition. Consider on the one extreme the natural monopoly, 
which is an industry where it is cheaper if one firm produces total output than if 
more than one firm would produce that output (cf. the subadditivity concept of 
Baumol et al. (1982: 17)). Examples of natural monopolies are mainly found in 
infrastructure. On the other extreme there is natural competition, where an absence 
of entry and exit barriers leads to ‘hit-and-run’ competition. Figure 1.5 combines 
the typologies of products and markets. 
   If now either market or product characteristics are unfavourable to competition, 
how can structural reforms in that product-market combination lead to the 
aforementioned Pareto efficient production? If second-best solutions are allowed 
as well, then it may be clear that the striving for Pareto efficient production after 
privatisation may require more effort in the case of a natural monopoly industry 
for a club good (for example, the case of waste water transport) than for a 
naturally competitive market for a pure private good (for example, the case of 
electricity wholesale). In those cases where competition does not arise 
spontaneously (and is considered ‘unnatural’), complex combinations of 
                                                      
9 There exist other names for other ‘in-between’ categories, as for example ‘bundled 
goods, merit goods, or club goods. A further explanation of these goods would transcend 
the purpose of the current study. For more details on ‘public goods’, see chapter 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4: Naturally monopolistic market modes 
Pareto efficient production
(Efficient monopolist subject to price or profits 
regulation, or ‘competition for the monopoly’)
• TC are minimal
• P=MC
•TC are minimal
• P>MC
• TC are not minimal
• P=MC
• TC are not minimal
• P>MC
Allocative efficiency
Pr
od
uc
tiv
e 
ef
fi
ci
en
cy
Y N
Y
N
 12 
privatisation, liberalisation and regulation arise. An example is the ‘competition 
for the monopoly’ as in franchise bidding.10 For example, infrastructure projects as 
motorways, railways, or even high voltage power grids, would normally be 
classified as ‘naturally monopolistic’. Full private ownership would require heavy 
regulation, since market entry is not economic. As an alternative, however, a 
government may opt for concessions, where firms can bid for running the piece of 
infrastructure for a given period, and where all maintenance, investment, and 
usage prices are specified beforehand. This ‘competition for the monopoly’ is not 
only much more complex than the arrangements needed to set up, e.g., a 
competitive market for biscuits, but also the expectations about the benefits of 
private ownership are different. 
   Lastly, there may always exist a difference between theoretically normative 
expectations and empirical realisation. As Baumol et al. (1982) state: 
 
‘[…] it is by no means obvious in advance that actual market 
behaviour will (tend to) force any particular industry to adopt 
the market structure that is least costly. For example, an 
industry that is naturally competitive might conceivably be 
taken over by an oligopoly. Normatively speaking, then, the 
industry should be naturally competitive; but in its actual 
behavior it would be oligopolistic.’ (p. 9) 
 
                                                      
10 Franchise bidding will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.5: Some examples of applicability of competition arguments in some 
product-market typologies 
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Theory alone (and especially theories using one angle only to investigate a 
problem) may not be capable to predict or explain actual market behaviour or 
modes of organisation. Context-specific factors and regulatory regimes need to be 
included in an analysis that understands phenomena otherwise characterised as 
anomalies. 
 
1.2 Challenges for the private sector 
Since the 1980s, most utility sectors have faced a dramatic restructuring, with an 
overall tendency of private sector companies being the providers of goods and 
services instead of public enterprises. In the same time period, the performance of 
these restructured utility sectors is questioned as the quality of delivery or the price 
of the goods or services do not always meet the expectations of the public. Both in 
developing countries and developed countries, signs of underinvestment in assets, 
maintenance, or personnel become apparent. Some anecdotic examples include the 
following: 
x In August 2002, water supplies in the greater Glasgow area were contaminated 
by cryptosporidium (which comes from animal faeces) as the 140-year-old 
water treatment plant of Scottish Water proved incapable to filter the bacteria 
that entered into the water reservoir after heavy rainfalls. The problem has 
been blamed to delays in building a new water treatment plant. 
x By mid-2002, the privatised UK railway network operator Railtrack (once the 
darling of the stock market) is re-nationalised due to poor performance. The 
company is not only in serious financial troubles, but improving the network 
safety and punctuality requires large-scale investments—money not available 
to Railtrack. Its public successor Network Rail promised to spend some 20% 
more on operation, maintenance and renewal than Railtrack. 
x Throughout the early 2000s, the public health system in many EU(15) 
countries is under attack of criticism. Not only do many countries cope with 
unacceptable queues for even simple medical treatments, but also prices for 
drugs are often considered too high. 
x In the years 2000 to 2002, the Dutch railway operator NS has been heavily 
criticised for its passenger transport. Not only had the punctuality figures 
dropped to a historic minimum, but also the vulnerability of the system 
punctuality for external conditions increased enormously: in the summer, high 
temperatures caused electrical switches to malfunction; in autumn, fallen 
leaves on the track caused severe damages to the wheels; throughout the year, 
road-rail crossings still suffer from collusions. Furthermore, throughout the 
year the change of obtaining a seat dropped to rock bottom figures, and if these 
could be obtained for peak hours only, they would become more dramatic 
even. 
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In all examples, underinvestment in assets, maintenance or operation were 
mentioned as the major cause. To what extent are the issuing companies to be 
blamed? First, it must be mentioned that in the case of privatisation, the new 
private owners inherited assets that frequently suffered from decades of 
underinvestment, while still under public ownership. For example, before the 
massive privatisation wave in the UK back in the 1980s, many utility sectors were 
already in need of large-scale investments, but the government did not have the 
funds available and hoped the private sector would solve the problem. Neo-
classical economic theory predicts sub-optimal investment under public 
ownership, since the assets must serve social goals apart from a least-cost 
provision of goods and services (see Laffont and Tirole (1993: Section 1.9 and 
chapter 17)). Is privatisation the solution to solving underinvestment? 
   Another challenge for the private sector utility firms (both newcomers and 
privatised incumbents) is a more fundamental one. Utility sectors embody many 
economic activities that cannot be classified as a product-market combination of 
‘pure private goods’ sold in a ‘naturally competitive market’, as shown in figure 
1.5. Given furthermore the externalities associated with most utility sector 
activities, society is likely to have other goals (and another definition of the 
optimal investment decision) than a private sector investor. Nevertheless, 
following widespread privatisation and liberalisation, private sector companies do 
provide goods and services previously considered as ‘mixed’ or even ‘public’. 
This poses the following fundamental question: 
x Does private provision of public goods or mixed goods lead to 
underinvestment relative to the societally desirable levels and directions of 
investments? 
 
A challenge not investigated in the current study is related to marketing or 
communicative aspects of the current utility sector business. Under private sector 
provision of goods and services, it becomes clearer for consumers how much they 
pay for each service, whereas under public ownership indirect taxation and (cross) 
subsidisation effects camouflaged the exact price paid for a good or service. While 
some consumers may argue that the marginal cost of electricity, water, or transport 
has risen since privatisation, they may remain unconscious of the fact that this may 
represent the real price for delivering that service, whilst previously prices were 
distorted through complex social policies. If, however, the price paid directly for 
using a service or good increases then the expectations about the quality of that 
good or service may increase as well. For example, if—due to a removal of 
subsidies—the fare for a railway trip from A to B increases with 25 per cent 
following privatisation while the quality of the trip (chance of obtaining a seat, 
punctuality, additional services on board) remains equal, the average train 
passenger is most likely to be upset. Furthermore, the valuation of the trip might 
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be affected by halo-effects caused by extreme events. As Wil Whitehorn, non-
executive director of Virgin Rail Group, says: 
‘[…] Due to 30 years of massive underinvestment by 
successive governments it [the UK railway system, AM] is by 
no means one of the best systems in the world. Many readers 
might think it is one of the worst but that is not true. France 
may have the TGV but many of its regional and commuter 
services are run with 50-year-old trains on life-expired 
infrastructure and passenger complaints are at record levels. 
[…] It is not the case that Britain has the worst punctuality 
record in the world. In fact, we are quite well up in the top half 
of the international league table. The problem is our best train 
services are not the best in the world and our worst 
experiences of the infrastructure are awful. […]11 
 
Another challenge for the private sector is to respond to changing governmental 
policies, whilst the investments to be made in specific assets require a long-term 
commitment of private sector investors. Not only the expropriation risk following 
privatisation matters here, but also a changed attitude towards the externalities 
produced by the firms. Perotti (1995) shows how policy-sensitive firms have often 
been privatised gradually, while manufacturing firms have often privatised 
immediately. Once privatised, however, the risk of changing policies affecting the 
profitability of investment decisions may defer investments—this is the so-called 
‘hold-up risk’ and is explained in more detail in chapter 2. 
   A last challenge for the private sector is to come up with new organisational 
forms as under public-private partnerships (PPPs). Though the essence of PPPs is 
that society benefits from projects otherwise not realised (due to budget constraints 
of government) while the burden of the business opportunities given to private 
sector parties rests at the taxpayers’ accounts.  
1.3 Private provision of public goods: An overview 
The fundamentals underlying the literature on the private provision of public 
goods can be summarised as follows. First, since pure public goods are both non-
rival in consumption and non-excludable, there exists an ideal incentive for free 
riders. The bulk of the literature on the private provision of public goods therefore 
uses non-cooperative game theoretical approaches where the effect of non-
provision is examined. Second, most literature on the private provision of public 
goods assumes voluntary contribution. The rationale behind this assumption is that 
compulsory action is a limitation to the choice set of consumers, and is unlikely to 
result in Pareto efficient equilibria. Voluntary contributions thus mimic the 
individual valuation of the public good, which—from a welfare economic point of 
                                                      
11 ‘Our railways have a real future now’, The Express on Sunday, 21 July 2002. 
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view—is preferred over intervening schemes.12 Third, all consumers are usually 
assumed to be identical (eliminating the need for investigating demand revelation), 
and have linear utility in the benefits of the public good and in the cost of 
contribution (eliminating income effects). Since these assumptions are rather 
restrictive with respect to their reality content, much of the more recent literature 
aims at relaxing them. Below, I summarise some of these relaxations. 
   It is important to distinguish between discrete and continuous public goods. A 
bridge is an example of a discrete public good: it is there, or it is not there. If left 
uncompleted (e.g., some framework spans a river, but no road has been put on top) 
the public good cannot be accessed and could be considered worthless. The 
literature on the provision of costly discrete public goods emphasizes that they are 
realised if and only if the contributions of the consumers at least equal the costs of 
provision.13 Continuous goods form a completely different class. For example, the 
cadastral information on property is a continuous public good: a potential buyer 
can ask for the most recent purchase price of the desired house, but he can also ask 
for the registered prices of all property surrounding the object. The information is 
a public good (the fact that person A asks for it does not preclude person B from 
obtaining the same information), and it is continuous (everybody can ask for the 
amount of information he needs). Also, though the consumption of information 
can be measured, one cannot determine the utility each person derives from the 
information.14 
   The notion of discrete public goods (as opposed to continuous ones) is very 
important for an analysis of underinvestment. In case of discrete public goods, 
underprovision or underinvestment is equal to non-realisation of the provision of 
the public good. If the public good were a costly continuous one, its provision (a 
fraction between nothing and full) is a function of the amount of contributions. 
Underinvestment then occurs if society is unwilling to contribute as much as the 
optimum, though here difficult question arises what society should consider as 
‘optimal’. 
   Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) underscore the difference between contribution 
games and subscription games in the provision of a discrete public good. 
                                                      
12 Though the voluntary contributions are usually treated as if they yield free-rider 
behaviour, Coase (1974) already argued how in Britain public goods as lighthouses used to 
be supplied by private firms in the past. A major issue here, however, is that the owners of 
these lighthouses could couple that public good with a private good—which is the usage of 
a harbour. Each ship using a harbour paid not only for the harbour, but also had to 
contribute to the lighthouse. Thus, by coupling the public good with a private good, 
entrepreneurs tackled the funding problem of public goods in ancient times. 
13 If the provision of costly discrete goods would not be dependent on voluntary 
contributions but on taxation instead, the amount of taxes should optimally equal the cost 
of providing the public good. 
14 Strictly speaking, this is a continuous public good with costly access, since no Registry 
Office will provide the information for free. 
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Contributors do not get their money back if the public good is not provided, 
whereas subscribers get their money back if the good is not delivered. This 
distinction allows limiting contributors in their risk exposure (less risk in case of a 
subscription game). In their analysis, Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) show how 
multiple equilibria exist for both subscription and contribution games, so that 
efficient provision of a discrete public good is but one possible outcome. Given 
that they find always at least one pure strategy equilibrium where the public good 
is provided, regardless of the group size of contributors (subscribers), Palfrey and 
Rosenthal have difficulty predicting how group size relates to the actual provision 
of the public good. Gradstein (1998), Pecorino (1999), and Xu (2002) are recent 
examples of investigating this matter. They all show that with large group sizes, 
co-operation in the contribution to the public good provision is feasible. 
   One important aspect of voluntary contributions relates to the question of 
individual payoffs and group payoffs. Dickinson (1998) focuses on the case where, 
in spite of positive contributions non-provision may occur, provision uncertainty 
only has a weak effect on the amount of contribution, both at the level of the 
individual as of a group. Bergstrom et al. (1986) analyse the impact of several 
wealth transfers, amongst others the effect of government supply on private 
donations. Bergstrom et al. show how taxation may lead to a ‘crowding out’ of an
equal amount of private donations. Hence, though government support may 
increase the total supply of a continuous public good, it does not necessarily yield 
an efficient solution. That result is also obtained by Kirchsteiger and Puppe 
(1997), who conclude that government can only provide an efficient amount of 
public good if it has complete information about the individual characteristics of 
the tax-paying consumers (resulting in a non-uniform tax scheme).15 
   Whilst game theory is concerned with strategic action regarding participation 
and provision, another category of literature investigates demand revelation for 
public goods in order to determine social optimums. A discussion of that literature 
is beyond the purpose of this study. 
 
1.4 Some mechanisms for influencing private sector investments 
If governments observe or foresee that the private sector is unlikely to provide a 
public good at a desirable level, basically four classes of mechanisms are available 
for intervention:16 
x Ownership related measures: Governments may hold a (golden) share in a 
firm, managed by private entrepreneurs. By doing so, they can influence the 
                                                      
15 Menezes et al. (2001), for example, focus on the role of incomplete information in the 
private provision of a public good. 
16 This categorisation is inspired by Turner and Opschoor (1994); Verbruggen (1994); De 
Savorin Lohman (1994); Bromley (1995); Baumol (1990); Anderson (1995); Vickers and 
Yarrow (1988); Viscusi et al. (1995); Laffont and Tirole (1993); and Hall (1998). 
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investment behaviour directly by having a say. Examples include PPPs and 
privatised firms where government keeps a percentage of the shares, or 
government keeps a golden share. 
x Change the choice set available to firms: In economic terms, regulatory 
measures as standards, permits, and quotas alter the choice set available to 
firms, which may hinder private entrepreneurs to make the most efficient 
resource allocations. For example, suppose that the most profitable fuels for 
power generation are (in decreasing order) nuclear, brown-coal, charcoal, and 
natural gas. Suppose furthermore that renewable energy supplies (RES) is 
unprofitable if unsupported by subsidies or fiscal measures. Following the 
profit-maximisation rule, a private power producer would opt for nuclear 
power production, because it is most profitable. Nevertheless, if the regulation 
applying to this firm prohibits the use of nuclear inputs and coals, three 
profitable options are eliminated, and the firm will choose natural gas. If 
regulation also requires the firm to use a percentage of RES generation, it will 
have to, and it will see its profits lowered. 
x Change the costs and benefits associated with the available choices: 
Contrasting with the aforementioned regulatory measures, economic 
instruments as taxes or subsidies alter the costs and benefits associated with 
the choice set available, while leaving the choice set itself intact. From an 
economic perspective, the advantage of economic instruments is that private 
entrepreneurs have a better opportunity to optimise resource allocation than 
under regulation. For example, to avoid that a power producer heavily invests 
in nuclear power production, a government might tax non-renewable power 
generation. If investors still wish to invest in coal-fired power plants, they may 
do so, but then they have to pay an additional amount of taxes (which 
decreases the attractiveness of this investment option). 
x Persuasive or voluntary regulatory approaches: This is the ‘softest’ category 
of instruments available to government. Examples include ‘corporate social 
responsibility’ (CSR) programmes where firms design their own ‘code of 
conduct’ in order to avoid governments to intervene. This set of instruments is 
not further explored in the current study, since they provide too little 
guarantees for governments in the light of investment decisions in assets. 
Nevertheless, in other cases as working practices, fraud prevention, location 
decisions, these voluntary approaches may be very useful. For some good 
entries into CSR, see Wood (1991); Klassen (1996); Kolk et al. (1999); Van 
Tulder and Kolk (2001); Kolk and Van Tulder (2002); or Van Tulder and Van 
Der Zwart (2005). 
 
All classes of mechanisms may help to let firms internalise external preferences, 
but the way they function differs fundamentally. Without entering into the details 
of each class of mechanisms here (such is left to Part II of this book), it seems that 
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the choice for an intervening mechanism corresponds to a certain product-market 
combination. For example, economic instruments as taxes or subsidies are 
seemingly fine instruments in theory for encouraging investments in a product-
market combination where in essence the private sector would be apparent, but the 
financial attractiveness of the investment decision is not sufficiently high (yet).17 
   In a similar fashion, governments may want to encourage private sector 
investments in other product-markets as well, such as in infrastructure or markets 
characterised by enormous externalities as health care or drinking water supplies. 
In these cases, the optimal investment decision established by purely 
microeconomic considerations may not lead to the societally desired outcomes. 
For example, the aforementioned case of the 140-years-old Scottish drinking water 
treatment plant that was incapable of filtering certain types of pollution might be a 
financially attractive asset for the owner, but it is clear that some serious 
intervention schemes are needed here. Chapters 4 and 5 deal with these issues in 
more detail. 
                                                      
17 For example, the market for renewable energy production as through wind turbines, 
photovoltaic cells, or other forms a product-market combination where the product is 
essentially a private good (electricity is consumed exclusively, the consumption can be 
measured, and valued). The market for electricity production is naturally competitive—if 
there is one part of the economic value chain of electricity supplies that is competitive, it 
must be power generation. At present, however, power production based on renewable 
energy supplies (RES) is still hardly financially sustainable. Since RES-based power 
generation have significant positive externalities due to reduced emissions and a reduced 
demand for depletable resources, governments may want to encourage RES-based power 
generation. Chapter 4 analyses this case, analyses whether financial and fiscal incentives 
have boosted private sector investments indeed, and how a healthy and sustainable market 
for RES-based power generation can be created. 
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   As another distinction of the four classes of policy instruments, one can 
distinguish between generic and specific measures, as well as between the 
contractibility of the entrepreneurial action, as visualised in figure 1.6. When 
relating the non-coercive instruments to a particular type of investment that should 
be encouraged, it is inevitable to distinguish between tasks or services that can 
easily be specified and the ones that are hard to specify. As shown in figure 1.6, 
non-contractible tasks or goods are unlikely to be affected by generic economic 
instruments. In fact, there is no reason a priori to assume generic instruments will 
ever lead to the desired result in this area, given the nature of incomplete contracts. 
Thus, the only measures that might work here are complex regulation combined 
with ex post governance mechanisms. When analysing the case where private 
sector provision of public goods is contractible, then generic non-coercive 
instruments can readily be used. 
   The case-specific intervention mechanisms are most likely to arise in industries 
characterised by a high degree of concentration. For example, if a country has one 
oil company, or two automobile producers, it is cheaper for government to 
negotiate environmental standards with these specific companies directly, than to 
set up a generic regulation.  
   Note that public-private partnerships (PPPs) form a separate class of 
instruments. By giving private sector parties the opportunity to participate in areas 
that used to be the exclusive domain of government, PPPs expand the choice set 
for firms (which is distinct from economic instruments), but compared to coercive 
instruments (that reduce the choice set), private sector participation is still 
voluntary. 
1.5 Problem statement and research questions 
Since the 1980s, the dominant trend in economics has been to prefer market-based 
solutions to government-led ones. Combined with the withdrawal of governments 
as active providers of goods and services in the market place, one would 
necessarily conclude that the private sector safely takes over the provision of 
goods and services in all areas where government used to be active. Also one 
could assume that the often-claimed success stories on privatisation assure that 
society will benefit from the shift from public provision to private provision of 
goods and services. While I do not deny that much progress has been made in this 
area, I do not share the enthusiasm of the free-market advocates who suggest that 
the private provision of goods and services always yields the most efficient 
solution for society. Section 1.1 showed how that claim can be nuanced. In 
particular, I am concerned with the private provision of public goods. Mainstream 
economic theory mentions the funding problem as the biggest problem underlying 
the private provision of public goods (see section 1.3). Also, there seems to be 
widespread agreement that voluntary contributions to the private provision of a 
public good is preferred over other forms of funding, since the voluntary 
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mechanism ensures that all individual preferences can be reflected in the 
individual pecuniary contributions. Therefore, government funding of the private 
provision of public goods by means of transferring tax money is rejected, for 
uniform taxation foregoes the differences in individual preferences. Theoretically, 
this view is logically consistent, and worked out well. Nevertheless, I am very 
pessimistic regarding its practical applicability. 
   Of all policy instruments available to government (see section 1.4), the ones 
based on voluntary action are the least predictable with respect to their outcomes. 
Since this unpredictability holds for both the funding and the desired investment 
response, imagine how combined voluntarism should work. For example, suppose 
private sector companies are allowed but not obliged to provide street lighting, and 
that civilians are kindly asked to donate some money for this service whenever and 
how much they wish. From the viewpoint of a policy-maker, such situation does 
not quite sound like a predictable one: it is most likely that firms will not invest if 
they cannot assure themselves of the funding, but that does not imply the converse. 
By the same token, civilians may be willing to donate initially, but their 
willingness to pay for street lighting does not imply that their willingness to accept 
darkness is absent. Also, preferences may change over time, and the free-rider 
problem of civilians stopping to donate once the streetlights have been installed, 
imposes a serious threat on the entrepreneurial willingness to invest. 
   The three remaining categories of policy instruments mentioned in section 1.4 
that governments may use for guiding the private provision of public goods are 
regulation, economic instruments, and ownership related measures. Though 
regulation (or ‘command-and-control’ measures) has often been popular amongst 
bureaucrats, economists have developed a deep-grounded scepticism against it. 
Stavins (1998) mentions multiple reasons why bureaucrats would have preferred 
regulatory mechanisms over market-based ones. For economists, however, 
regulatory or ‘coercive’ measures are not preferred because they are not market-
based. As a consequence, coercive measures are likely to yield an economically 
suboptimal outcome.18 Consequently, it would be very challenging to identify non-
coercive, market-based policy instruments that (a) result in the desired behaviour, 
and (b) yield a (near) Pareto efficient solution. This is the central problem for the 
current study, as reflected in the overall problem statement. 
 
Problem statement: How can governments encourage investment in the 
private provision of public goods by means of non-coercive instruments? 
 
This problem statement will be answered by means of a framework based on the 
overall research model given in figure 1.7. This simple model floats on two basic 
assumptions, each worked out below. 
                                                      
18 The debate on environmental standards gives a fine example here. See, for example, 
Hahn (1989), Jaffe et al. (1995), Bromley (1995), Hahn (1998), or Stavins (1998). 
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Definition 1.1: Firms only invest if it is economically attractive to do so. (participation 
constraint) 
 
In this definition, all economic benefits (direct pecuniary, but also the indirect 
strategic long-run non-pecuniary benefits), are included. This standard 
‘participation constraint’ (see Laffont and Martimort (2002)) has the nature of a 
prerequisite, and therewith forms a necessary condition for investment.19 A second 
definition concerns the nature of the intervention by government. 
 
Definition 1.2: Non-coercive government instruments transfer some of the government’s 
external payoff to the private sector, altering the costs and benefits associated with the 
choice set available to that private sector in such a manner that the targeted behaviour is 
given an additional reward upon potentially existing rewards given by the market and for 
which holds that the total utility of the targeted behaviour of the private sector participant 
becomes higher than the non-targetted behaviour. (incentive compatibility constraint) 
 
This definition is based upon the large stream of literature that investigates the 
effect of market-based instruments, that all boil down to the essence given by 
Baumol (1990): The allocation of entrepreneurial activities between the ones that 
are productive for society and others (unproductive or even destructive) is heavily 
influenced by the relative payoffs society offers to these activities.20 Long (1996) 
                                                      
19 A more narrow definition would be ‘Firms only invest if it is financially attractive to do 
so’, which is the standard microeconomic reasoning underlying all texts on corporate 
finance (see, e.g., Ross et al. (1999(1989): Chapter 3)). 
20 As Baumol cited Hobsbawm (1968) in the light of innovative entrepreneurial activities: 
‘The puzzle lies in the relationship between making profit and technological innovation. It 
is often assumed that an economy of private enterprise has an automatic bias towards 
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Figure 1.7: Overall research model 
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adds to this argument that the total utility of the recipient must be ‘substantially 
positive’ (p.80).21 When analysing the impact of the incentive compatibility 
constraint on the participation constraint, we see that definition 1.2 is not sufficient 
to ensure 1.1. In words, the fact that government support for private sector 
investment is positive, and that the firm’s total utility from the targeted behaviour 
is higher than its utility from the non-targeted behaviour does not imply 
automatically that this utility is positive (as was used in definition 1.1). The 
combination of the participation and incentive compatibility constraints, however, 
does form a logical necessary and sufficient condition for self-enforcing 
contracts.22 
   Nevertheless, the choice for non-coercive instruments may be risky: After all, 
although coercive instruments are inefficient in an economic sense, they seem 
much more predictable (see, e.g., Stavins (1998)). The fact that the private sector 
remains with considerable degrees of freedom implies that their behaviour is 
necessarily unpredictable—at least, up to some extent. Although the game-
theoretical literature on incentives provides a logical framework within which 
contracts almost seem self-enforceable, there may exist other factors at work that 
prevent firms from making the actions targeted by government.23 Also, the fact 
that we can calculate payoff structures or even optimal subsidy schemes does not 
automatically imply that we have a set of operational guidelines. As Drèze (1995) 
                                                                                                                                      
innovation, but this is not so. It has a bias only toward profit. It will revolutionize 
manufactures only if greater profits are to be made in this way than otherwise.’  (p. 25) 
21 Long focuses on total and not marginal utility, since the marginal utility of an incentive 
is almost always declining. 
22 See Laffont and Martimort (2002) for a formal and much more rigorous notation of the 
participation and incentive compatibility constraints. 
23 Here I recall John von Neumann: ‘As a mathematical discipline travels far from its 
empirical source, or still more, if it is a second and third generation only indirectly inspired 
from ideas coming from 'reality', it is beset with very grave dangers. It becomes more and 
more purely aestheticizing, more and more purely l’art pour l’art. This need not be bad, if 
the field is surrounded by correlated subjects, which still have closer empirical 
connections, or if the discipline is under the influence of men with an exceptionally well-
developed taste. But there is a grave danger that the subject will develop along the line of 
least resistance, that the stream, so far from its source, will separate into a multitude of 
insignificant branches, and that the discipline will become a disorganized mass of details 
and complexities. In other words, at a great distance from its empirical source, or after 
much ‘abstract’ inbreeding, a mathematical subject is in danger of degeneration. At the 
inception the style is usually classical; when it shows signs of becoming baroque the 
danger signal is up. It would be easy to give examples, to trace specific evolutions into the 
baroque and the very high baroque, but this would be too technical. In any event, whenever 
this stage is reached, the only remedy seems to me to be the rejuvenating return to the 
source: the reinjection of more or less directly empirical ideas. I am convinced that this is a 
necessary condition to conserve the freshness and the vitality of the subject, and that this 
will remain so in the future.’ (Von Neumann (1947)) 
 24 
laments: ‘Few economists will object to the research agenda of developing 
operational guidelines, but fewer still will pursue it themselves’ (p. 122). Also, 
when it comes to analysing recent developments already observed in ‘the real 
world’, the academia is often lagging behind with the theoretical foundations of 
these empirical phenomena.24 
   Applying non-coercive instruments raises a number of dilemmas, of which some 
are specified in the next four research questions. These research questions help to 
answer the overall problem statement. 
  
Research question 1: What factors might prevent firms from making investments 
in the provision of public goods, even if such investment were financially 
attractive?
(Influenceability Dilemma)   
 
Given that non-coercive instruments leave important degrees of freedom for 
entrepreneurs in their investment process, one might perceive underinvestment as 
a deliberate strategy of firms. Such need not be the case.  In fact, there may exist 
numerous reasons that can be labelled under the header ‘barriers to investment’. 
These barriers can act as an intervening variable between ‘financial attractiveness 
of investing’ and ‘investment’. An inventory and analysis of the relevant barriers 
to investment improves our understanding of the possibilities for governments to 
positively affect corporate investment behaviour through non-coercive 
instruments. I will call this dilemma the Influenceability Dilemma, for it deals 
with the possibility of the combined definitions 1.1 and 1.2. Chapter 2 will 
investigate the literature on barriers to investment, underinvestment, and—since 
underinvestment is an incremental concept—the existing literature on benchmarks. 
Altogether, the Influenceability Dilemma deals with the effectiveness of policy 
instruments. 
   A second dilemma deals with the ‘generosity’ of government. How much 
resources must be sacrificed in order to affect the payoff structure of the 
entrepreneurial investment process in such a manner that private sector investment 
meets the goals of government. 
 
Research question 2: How can governments determine the minimum level of 
support needed to make the private sector invest according to government goals, 
and how can they design such a mixture of policy instruments that meets these 
criteria?
(Smart Governance Dilemma) 
 
                                                      
24 A nice example here is given by Kay and Thompson (1986) with their article named: 
‘Privatisation: A policy in search of a rationale’. 
 25 
Given that potential barriers to investment have been identified, and preferably 
eliminated or overcome in another manner, the question rises how much support a 
government should give in order to make the private sector invest. I call this the 
Smart Governance Dilemma, after Van Tulder (1998) and Van Tulder (1999).25 
For example, suppose a government makes investment extremely interesting for 
the private sector, by providing large subsidies or fiscal arrangements. Even 
though the measures can then be considered effective (the private sector is most 
likely to respond according to the plan), one can raise serious doubts regarding the 
efficiency of these measures. If, however, it is possible to design a policy 
framework where the trigger of investment is specified in more detail (which is 
also measurable), then it may become possible to calculate the optimal ‘dose’ of 
financial support. Chapter 3 proposes a methodological framework for designing a 
support scheme. Building a general framework implies the use of general 
instruments—that is, instruments with a generic nature as fiscal measures or 
subsidies.26 In sum, the Smart Governance Dilemma deals with the efficiency of 
policy instruments.27 
   A third dilemma is that—even if it were possible to design a ‘smart’ support 
scheme and calculate the height of support in pecuniary terms—it is unclear 
beforehand whether all non-coercive policy instruments yield the same effect. For 
example, Single (1999) shows that companies investing in developing countries 
prefer direct cash measures as subsidies to long-term fiscal arrangements. In more 
volatile, or unstable economies, laws can easily change, just as administrations. 
Nevertheless, even in stable economies as found in the OECD countries, there is 
very little empirical evidence that suggests that non-coercive measures work in 
practice. In addition, even if non-coercive instruments work, it may well be that 
some instruments work better than others. 28 
                                                      
25 I underscore that I do not refer here to the acronym SMART sometimes found in the 
literature, where ‘SMART governance’ refers to Simple, Moral, Accountable, Responsive 
and Transparent governance. 
26 A general optimising framework for a specific case would become a logical 
impossibility. 
27 Another, related dilemma here concerns the distributional effects of the measures taken, 
as well as the distributional effects of the provision of public goods. This is a very 
technical discussion, largely summarised by Roberts (1987). 
28 For example, Bloom et al. (2002) analyse the effects of R&D tax credits, and find that 
fiscal incentives matter, although they have serious questions regarding the efficiency of 
these instruments. Pearce and Palmer (2001) analyse public and private spending in 
environmental protection. Amongst others, they find little evidence for the ‘environmental 
drag’ hypothesis (where countries with heavy regulatory environmental restrictions scare 
off firms, so that tighter regulation would negatively affect economic growth). 
Simultaneously, however, they neither find evidence for a shift from public to private 
spending on environmental protection, which gives little support for governments that wish 
to rely on the private provision of such public good. Devereux and Griffith (1998) analyse 
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Research question 3: How do non-coercive instruments work in encouraging the 
private sector to invest in the provision of a public good, and are there differences 
in the effectiveness of various different instruments? 
(Policy Portfolio Dilemma) 
 
To answer this question, chapter 4 will make use of the optimisation scheme 
proposed in chapter 3. As in chapter 3, the empirical tests performed in chapter 4 
make use of instruments with general applicability. This research question aims at 
contributing to the implementability debate of policy instrument. 
   A last dilemma still untouched is the response of firms to more specific non-
coercive measures.  Whereas research questions 2 and 3 dealt with the more 
generic measures, still there is much to be investigated in the area of specific 
measures. In section 1.4, I mentioned ownership-related measures as an alternative 
non-coercive approach. Public-private partnerships (PPPs) serve as a particular 
case here. 
 
Research question 4: How can governments encourage private sector 
participants to invest in joint ownership projects as public-private partnerships? 
(Joint Ownership Dilemma) 
 
One the one hand, PPPs seem an attractive instrument to governments, as firms 
take over a share of the investment costs, as well as a portion of the risks 
associated with the project, and they may even improve the technical or cost 
efficiency of the issuing project. In addition, as opposed to measures where the 
private sector holds full ownership, government retains a stake in the project 
vehicle, which allows it to exercise power even on those issues that cannot be 
specified ex ante. Therewith, for more complex product-market combinations or 
for unique large-scale projects, PPPs seem an interesting alternative to other policy 
instruments. There exists, however, a big problem: Although many PPPs can be 
observed in the empirical reality, the academic literature on PPPs is very limited—
both in amount and depth. Optimisation-like models, as called for in the Smart 
Governance Dilemma, are therewith far from our academic reality. Chapter 5 of 
                                                                                                                                      
whether favourable profit tax regimes affect the decision of US multinationals to invest in 
production within Europe, and find that there exists a relationship—albeit that the effective 
average tax rate does influence location choice, it does not affect the choice of whether to 
invest in Europe. As a last example, Lewis and Mackinnon (1987) have analysed the 
impact of government loan guarantees in the case of the Canadian Northern Railway. They 
found that despite of the fact that such loan guarantees did help the railway company in her 
investment, these guarantees also provided the perverse incentive to over-rely on debt 
(which ultimately triggered bankruptcy). 
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this study will analyse the status quo of the literature on PPPs, as well as making 
an attempt in the direction of a smart governance system in this area. 
 
1.6 Purpose of the study 
Government support for the private provision of public goods has predominantly 
been worked out in the theoretical literature. Studies in the areas of public 
economics or public finance have already provided theoretically sound and 
consistent directions for research in this area. Nevertheless, much still has to be 
learnt. The four dilemmas sketched in the previous section form a mere example 
of serious gaps still present in the literature. If at present we do not know how the 
private sector will respond to government support, and if we cannot pre-specify 
the optimal policy mix, then it may appear pretentious to provide unambiguous 
policy descriptions in this study. Rather, it seems more realistic to formulate 
propositions, and try to specify hypothesis in the last phase of this research. 
Therewith, the ultimate goal of the study is to formulate testable hypotheses. 
1.7 Relevance of the study 
Since the 1980s, privatisation spreads around the globe.29 Particularly in the utility 
sectors (as electricity, natural gas, water, rail, or bus services) where either market 
or product characteristics may form a barrier to competition, the ideas of structural 
reforms have received far going attention. Private entrepreneurs once established 
most of these utility firms, as a means of supporting the more productive sectors. 
During the 1880-1930 era of macroeconomic growth,30 firms internationalised 
rapidly, and economic activities nowadays classified as ‘industries’ (such as 
railways, banking system, or energy supplies) were financed by multinational 
firms in order to improve or secure their ‘core activities’ (see Jones (1996), Miller 
(1993) or Bulmer-Thomas (1994) for a nice overview). From the 1930s to the 
1950s, however, most of these ‘supporting’ activities were nationalised—usually 
justified by nation-state arguments,31 where a nation had a strong desire for 
autonomy from other countries with respect to its energy and water supplies, and 
public transportation. A rival argument for the same era was that the state had to 
                                                      
29 Most studies start with the 1980s as the U-turn in economics (e.g., Megginson and 
Netter (2001), Krueger (2000), or Oecd (1996)). Sometimes an individual case of the early 
1970s is mentioned, such as the (often-praised) privatisation of the Chilean pension funds 
(see Estache and Rodriguez-Pardina (1998), Cline (1995), or Bates and Krueger (1993)) or 
the 1979 start of the massive UK privatisation policies (see Parker (2000), Ramanadham 
(1989), or Jenkinson and Mayer (1988)). 
30 Many authors use the 1880-1930 era. Schumpeter (1954), however, lets this era start in 
1870. 
31 See Galbraith (1994). 
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recover the economy, in a Keynesian sense.32 From 1950 to 1980 (the era Jones 
(1996) labels ‘Resurgence’) the private sector gradually recuperates from the 
period Ruigrok and Van Tulder (1995) label the ‘inter-bellum’. In that era, the 
private sector invests more, and becomes a more dominant ‘player’ in the 
economy (see Jones (1996), Dunning (1993)). Then comes the modern era of ‘the 
retreat of the state’ (see Strange (1996)), characterised by massive privatisation. 
By the change of the millennium, however, the Oecd (2002) signals a decline in 
privatisation figures: 
‘After peaking in 1998, the OECD privatisation proceeds have 
been declining; however, with the most pronounced drop 
taking place in 2001. [...] After two decades of privatisation, 
and in particular following the hectic pace of activity in the 
1990s, governments with maturing privatisation programmes 
are left with assets that are more difficult to sell, both in terms 
of their regulatory and contracting requirements, and in terms 
of public preference for retention of state ownership and 
accountability.’ (pp. 53-4). 
 
This notion is backed by the data given in Megginson and Netter (2001). So if the 
privatisation peak is over indeed, what is next? The OECD signals that public-
private partnerships (PPPs) can readily be seen as an alternative approach to 
privatisation (Oecd (2002)). When combining these eras, it seems that the 
movements of private ownership to public ownership, followed by privatisation 
occur in a wave. This is depicted in figure 1.8.33 From the end of the 20th century 
onwards, some first signs show that re-nationalisation is a fact for poor performing 
privatised firms. For example, by mid-1998, the financial crisis in Hong Kong led 
the Hong Kong government to prevent speculation against its currency peg with 
the US dollar, and purchased an estimated UCS 15 billion of shares on the Hong 
Kong stock market.34 By early September 2001, the Mexican government 
announced to re-nationalise its heavily indebted sugar mills in order to save them 
from bankruptcy and in a move to force the USA to lift restrictions on sugar 
imports.35 In October 2001, the UK government announced to re-nationalise 
                                                      
32 As Helm (2000) labels this period the ‘The 1930s Debate’ (pp.26-7), which was a 
response to the growing economic ‘crisis of capitalism’. The state secured not only welfare 
(re)distributions, but as Dunning (1993) mentions, since market became increasingly 
insecure and many firms collapsed, governments became important employers and 
investors in the economy. See also Keynes (1936). 
33 The idea of ‘waves’ in privatisation or nationalisation is not new. For example, the 
OECD emphasizes the notion of privatisation waves in multiple publications (see, e.g., 
Oecd (1996), Oecd (2002)). To mention but a few references on the nationalisation wave, 
see Jones (1996) or Krueger (2000). 
34 Financial Times, 04 September 1998. 
35 Financial Times, 04 September 2001. 
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Railtrack, due to a dramatically poor performance of the rail network owner.36 
However anecdotic they may seem, all of these cases do show that nationalisation 
may indeed occur after a period of (poorly performing) private ownership. 
   Of course, figure 1.8 is misleading: though ownership indeed did change over 
time in a cyclical behaviour, the underlying objects of study (i.e., the issuing utility 
firms) changed dramatically over time. At the macro-level, each of the utilities 
have a different role in society now when compared with the early 1900s. For 
example, electricity used to be a luxury good for some households, whereas 
nowadays it is generally considered a basic need. At the meso-level, all utility 
sectors are organised in a completely different fashion than in the early days. 
   For example, vertical disintegration of the value chain is a commonly accepted 
feature, and in some utility markets (as in electricity wholesale) the financial 
operations are even completely being separated from the physical operations.37 At 
the micro-level, professional managers have replaced (or are replacing) engineers. 
Working methods have changed drastically. Finance and marketing have become 
important areas within the firms previously being dominated by production and 
maintenance planners. Poor investment behaviour of privatised utility firms may 
                                                      
36 Het Financieele Dagblad, 01 October 2001. 
37 It even seems that the financial market for ‘energy products’ may become more lucrative 
than the physical market. Trading in options, futures, forwards, but even weather 
derivatives has become a separate business that has nothing to do with the physical 
delivery. 
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Figure 1.8: Privatisation-nationalisation cycles 
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lead to, for example, a loss of consumers, a welfare loss for society in case of 
disruptions of supplies, takeovers, bankruptcy, or re-nationalisation. 
1.7.1 Societal relevance 
The privatisation literature shows that under specific circumstances society 
benefits from the private provision of private goods. When it comes to public 
goods, additional problems arise, of which the existent literature mentions the 
funding problem as a central one. Of all policy instruments available to 
government, regulatory (or ‘coercive’) ones have the clear advantage of being 
quite predictable in terms of outcomes. A major drawback of coercive instruments 
is, however, their economic inefficiency. Thus, though being effective, the 
question rises whether these measures are efficient. As Pollit (1995) questioned 
after studying the efficiency gains following the massive privatisation of the 
British power industry: Was it worth it? As Michael Pollit concludes, a maximum 
5 per cent efficiency gain (most favourable result of various econometric 
estimation methods) can hardly justify the costs of the whole transition process—
instead, he questioned, that money might have been better spent on improving the 
management skills of the management of the state-owned enterprises. For the use 
of coercive measures one can ask the same question as Michael Pollit did—would 
it be worth it to ‘outsource’ the provision of public goods to the private sector, if 
the use of coercive instruments would eliminate all potential efficiency gains at the 
macro-level? 
   As an alternative to coercive instruments, mainstream economic theory provides 
a number of market-based, or ‘non-coercive’ instruments. Instead of changing the 
choice set available to firms (as coercive instruments do), non-coercive 
instruments change the costs and benefits associated with the choice set, whilst 
leaving the set intact. William Baumol provides very interesting insights in this 
area (see, e.g., Baumol (1990)). Thus, if society pays a high value to certain goods 
or services whereas the market does not provide sufficient return on investment in 
these areas, government support or funding for the private provision of these 
goods or services seems a logical alternative. Unfortunately, the literature 
summarised in section 1.3 shows reluctance with respect to government support 
for efficiency reasons. Since uniform taxation (needed to fund the government 
support measures) is not based upon individual preferences, there is always some 
degree of macroeconomic inefficiency. The literature summarised in section 1.4 
even adds a predictability or effectiveness problem. Since market-led instruments 
are non-coercive, firms can and must decide themselves whether the offered 
payoff structure is sufficiently interesting to make investments. This characteristic 
inherently embodies some degrees of freedom for the private sector that reduce the 
predictability of the policy instruments in terms of effectiveness. 
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   The underinvestment problem is but one of the many ‘worst case scenarios’ that 
may occur. 38 If the private sector underinvests relative to the societal optimum or 
relative to the policy target, then the potential benefits of the entire ‘outsourcing 
process’ are most likely to vanish. From a societal point of view, especially for 
those goods and services that can reasonably be defined as ‘basic needs’ (such as 
water, energy, transport, and communications), it is extremely important to gain 
more insight in the underinvestment phenomenon. If we know better what 
circumstances encourage underinvestment, then prevention and correction 
mechanisms are more likely to be effective. For example, not all underinvestment 
behaviour has to reflect a deliberate corporate strategy—if laws or imperfect 
capital markets restrict firms in their investment pattern, then who is to blame? 
   The underinvestment problem can also be analysed from a developmental or 
economic growth perspective. For example, when taking a look at privatised 
utilities in developing countries, underinvestment is a real fact threatening further 
economic development of entire regions. Exhibit 1.1 serves as anecdotal evidence 
for this point. 
1.7.2 Scientific relevance 
The private provision of public goods is a relatively neglected field in the 
literature. In the light of governments withdrawing from the market place as active 
                                                      
38 Alternative terms to ‘optimal investment’ that can be applied here are societally 
‘adequate’ or ‘desirable’ levels of investments, or adequate or desirable investment 
opportunities. 
Exhibit 1.1: Power outage in Buenos Aires 
 
In February 1999, a substantial part of Buenos Aires faced an electricity blackout. At this 
summer peak, some 156,000 people were without electricity for one day, some 60,000 for 
several days, whereas some tens of thousands of that group were left without electricity for 
some 10 days. This situation implied no drinking water (water pumps operate on 
electricity), no refrigerators or air-conditioning working, no elevators, no ATMs operating, 
no electric security systems, no supermarkets because there were no cashiers functioning, 
no automated working force since all computers were down, no underground operating, and 
so on. The cause of this drama was that the Chilean owner of the responsible distribution 
company EDESUR had not invested enough in cables, wiring, connectors and transformers. 
In the annual report over the year 1999, the company underscores that it had met the 
required levels of investments as negotiated in the concession deal with the government—
unfortunately, however, that concession did not specify the direction of investments, so that 
an ‘Internet firewall’ can also be found in the investments categories. A possible cause why 
the EDESUR drama could have taken place might be rooted in the fact that the regulatory 
entity had very little power in enforcing repercussions (and did hence not have a ‘credible 
threat’). 
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providers of goods and services, it can at least be called ‘strange’ that the 
academia still has to tackle numerous gaps in the literature whilst the empirical 
reality has already embraced the phenomenon of private provision of public goods. 
In the entire ‘outsourcing’ process initiated by the massive market restructuring 
waves of the early 1980s, the early critique of Kay and Thompson (1986) in their 
article ‘Privatisation: A policy in search of a rationale’ seems to bear generalisable 
characteristics that can readily be applied to the private provision of public goods. 
If it is unknown how large the efficiency benefits will be if government uses 
coercive instruments for streamlining entrepreneurial investment behaviour with 
policy goals, whilst it is uncertain how the private sector will respond to non-
coercive instruments, then it seems a plausible question to ask if we are ready for 
this outsourcing process. 
   When assessing the literature, at least two important topics of scientific interest 
seem to be lacking. First, the investment behaviour of private sector companies in 
the provision of public goods seems virtually absent. Even in the privatisation 
literature (which is still being enriched) there is limited knowledge about the 
performance and conduct of privatised enterprises. More general ideas about the 
willingness and ability of the private sector to invest in projects yielding public 
goods seem to be lacking. Many questions are still unanswered. For example do 
government incentives indeed encourage the private sector to invest in the 
provision of non-private goods? Do these incentives create white elephants or do 
they vanish over time? A second topic deals with selecting the right policy 
instruments. Does it matter whether a specific type of instrument is chosen, or is 
any policy alike? 
   The broader context for this study is about the proper scope of government. 
Authors as Hart et al. (1997) or Blank (2000) have made interesting steps in 
answering that question, but still much work has to be done. 
1.7.3 Managerial relevance 
With the withdrawal of governments from many economic activities, all kinds of 
new market opportunities arise for the private sector. Although one might expect a 
particular attention from the management sciences in privatisation and its 
consequences, surprisingly little has been written from an entrepreneurial 
perspective.39 The same holds for the private provision of public goods, which 
seems a domain exclusively reserved for scholars of public economic and public 
finance.40 
                                                      
39 One big exception—albeit a stand-alone one—is the July 2000 issue of the Academy of 
Management Review, with a special topic forum on ‘Privatization and Entrepreurial 
Transformation’. 
40 In particular, it seems that the debate has predominantly appeared in journals as The 
Journal of Public Economics and The Economic Journal. 
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   It is a pity that the insights of management scholars and practitioners are 
currently not included in the debate of policy design, the conditions for market 
functioning, or on the development of new organisational forms as public-private 
partnerships. Returning to the privatisation debate, economists do not seem to find 
the ultimate answers to fundamental questions as ‘does privatisation deliver?’ (see 
Basañes et al. (1999)), since variations in performance are deviations in their 
models. In management studies, on the other extreme, variances in performance of 
privatisation are the starting point of analysing sources of comparative or 
competitive advantages (see Cuervo and Villalonga (2000), or Doh (2000)). 
 
1.8 Organisation of the study 
The four dilemmas formulated in section 1.5 are interrelated, and worked out in 
part II of the study (chapters 2 to 5). Chapter 2 investigates the potential 
effectiveness of non-coercive policy instruments by analysing barriers to 
investment, as well as the underinvestment dilemma. Chapter 3 proposes a 
methodological framework for calculating the wealth transfer necessary in the 
application of non-coercive policies. In chapter 4, I analyse how such a wealth 
transfer has been translated into concrete policy measures, and analyse whether the 
type of policy instrument matters in encouraging investment. Chapter 5 analyses 
investment and efficiency incentives public-private partnerships, and surveys the 
literature on PPPs. In each chapter, I formulate some hypotheses, and try to come 
up with additional insights for constructing a smart governance framework for the 
private provision of public goods. Part III of the book translates the propositions to 
testable hypotheses, and discusses some—albeit preliminary—policy implications. 
Chapter 6 proposes the aforementioned hypotheses and smart governance 
framework, whereas chapter 7 puts the results of the study in a broader 
perspective. 
  
 
 
 
Part II: Four dilemmas 
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2 THE INFLUENCEABILITY DILEMMA 
 
 
 
The Influenceability Dilemma lies at the heart of any effectiveness analysis of 
non-coercive policy instruments. In fact, this dilemma consists of two interrelated 
issues. First, since non-coercive instruments necessarily leave considerable degree 
of freedom to the private sector (in this case with respect to the decision to invest 
or not), there exists a serious risk that the private sector does not respond 
according to the plan.41 In particular, there exists a serious risk of underinvestment 
where firms do not invest as much as government would want them to do. The 
second issue deals with the determinants of underinvestment. Sticking to the logic 
proposed in hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2, firms would only invest if it were financially 
attractive to do so. Suppose, however, an investment decision is financially 
attractive—would this guarantee an investment response? The answer is of course 
negative, but the question rises why. Any potential barriers to investment must be 
carefully analysed, and where possible overcome, in order to improve the 
predictability of non-coercive instruments. 
   The overall purpose of this chapter is to analyse factors that prevent firms from 
making investments, even if it were financially attractive to make these 
investments (research question 1). In addition, this chapter analyses the potential 
effect of these barriers to investment, which is the concept of underinvestment. 
Efficient production requires an ‘optimal level’ of investments, from which firms 
can deviate in two directions: overinvestment and underinvestment. Although 
from a static efficiency point of view it may seem contradictory, firms can 
rationally decide to overinvest, for example, as an anticipation on future demand, 
as a strategic ‘signal’ to competitors or potential market entrants, or as a perverse 
side-effect of regulation (see Averch and Johnson (1962), and Viscusi et al. (1995: 
390) for a discussion). In case of overinvestment, productive efficiency is sub-
optimal, but output quality and quantity are capable of meeting demand. When 
investments, however, diverge to the opposite side of the spectrum (i.e., 
underinvestment), then supplies may not be capable to meet demand. Worst-case 
scenarios such as the California electricity crisis (with frequent power blackouts 
above a certain threshold of demand), or the British water sector (where supplies 
                                                      
41 In fact, there still exists a much fundamental debate in the literature that deals with the 
philosophical question whether incentives work at all. That question is raised at all levels 
of analysis, from inter-governmental relations to human resources. For a recent overview 
see for example Beer and Katz (2003) or Bénabou and Tirole (2002). See also Hart (1989). 
Regarding the specific question ‘do government subsidies increase the private provision of 
public goods?’ it seems that the answer is a definite ‘yes’ (see Bergstrom and Andreoni 
(1996), Falkinger et al. (2000), or Bernheim (1986)). 
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are frequently below the socially desirable in terms of both quantity and quality) 
show how underinvestment by firms can have dramatic impact on society. This 
chapter gives a survey of the literature on underinvestment. The structure of this 
chapter is as follows. 
   Section 2.1 puts the concept of underinvestment in perspective. The term 
‘underinvestment’ underscores the incremental nature of a concept compared to a 
benchmark of optimal/adequate/relevant/desirable investment behaviour. If for the 
sake of simplicity the mainstream term ‘optimal’ is used, then one can think of a 
maximisation function, some critical assumptions, and worked-out ideas on the 
preferences behind that investment behaviour. The section shows how these 
dimensions of characterising investment behaviour differ when applying a 
different level of analysis (macro, meso, micro). Since this study deals with the 
investment behaviour of private sector companies, the focus will be on the micro-
level interpretation of underinvestment. 
   Section 2.2 investigates the theoretical causes of underinvestment behaviour of 
firms by categorising determinants from the micro-, meso-, and macro-levels that 
may constrain corporate investment behaviour. Sections 2.3 to 2.5 work out these 
determinants at these respective levels of analysis. Since this results in a rather 
lengthy overview, section 2.6 gives a brief intermediate summary and analysis of 
the status quo of the theoretical literature on underinvestment. 
   Section 2.7 briefly introduces the empirical concepts of ‘measurement’ and 
‘existence’ of underinvestment, and gives an overview of some empirical studies 
on underinvestment. One of the striking results of that section is that most of the 
theoretical determinants summarised in sections 2.3 to 2.5 have very little practical 
value. Virtually all empirical studies reviewed use proxies to ‘determine’ some 
degree of underinvestment. 
 
2.1 The concept of underinvestment 
In the previous chapter, definitions 1.1 and 1.2 postulated that firms only invest if 
it is financially attractive to do so. A first, technical interpretation would then be 
the following: If current investment yields insufficient levels of public goods, 
whilst it is financially attractive to invest, then there is underinvestment. 
Investment Capital stock
Amount of 
public good
Economic attractiveness 
of investing
 
 
Figure 2.1: Technical interpretation of underinvestment in the provision of a public 
good 
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   Figure 2.1 illustrates the mechanics. Investment yields an amount of capital 
stock (e.g., a number of wind turbines, computers, or bridges). The amount of that 
capital stock determines how much public good is produced. The issue of 
underinvestment in a technical sense would focus on how much firms should have 
invested, given the attractiveness of the investment. This technical notion is in line 
with the microeconomic ‘optimal investment decision’ benchmark investigated in 
this chapter. In the figure, it is the ‘financial attractiveness’ variable that 
determines this technical interpretation of underinvestment. The feedback loop 
determines whether there is underinvestment or not –that is, one can assess how 
much public good there is provided (and ergo, how much capital stock was 
needed), and how attractive it was to invest. If it was financially attractive to 
invest, but still the level of public good provided is too low (given another 
benchmark), then there is underinvestment in a technical sense. This is a first 
important step in isolating the problem. 
   The next step in analysing underinvestment lies in the recognition of its 
incremental nature, and that is relative to ‘optimal investment’. Optimal 
investment, in its turn, is a concept that can be defined at various levels of 
analysis. This section distinguishes between the firm (or ‘micro’) level, the 
sectoral (or ‘meso’) level, and the (inter)national (or ‘macro’) level. That 
distinction underscores the importance of the following points: (a) the different 
interpretations of ‘optimal investment’; (b) the main assumptions underlying these 
concepts of ‘optimal investment’; (c) a recognition of the preferences for ‘optimal 
investment’ and an explicit separation of different goal functions; and (d) the 
consequences of the aforementioned points for interpreting ‘underinvestment’. 
Table 2.1 summarises these points. 
   From the mainstream microeconomic point of view, the firm is a set of 
production possibilities. In a similar fashion, it is assumed that there exists an 
investment opportunity set, out of which a firm can pick that optimal investment 
decision that maximises the firm’s profits, or utility (see, e.g., Friedman (1985); 
Hart (1995); Long and Malitz (1985); Milgrom and Roberts (1992: Chapter 8); 
Modigliani and Miller (1958); Myers (1984)). Given the existence of an 
investment opportunity set, the firm (its owners or management) develops ex ante 
criteria for choosing amongst the opportunities available. In each case, the choice 
for the optimal investment decision derives from internal preferences that exist 
within the firm (assuming both the owners and managers as internal decision-
makers). 
   At the sectoral or meso level, the optimal investment is not one executed by a 
single firm, but by the entire population of firms inhabiting the sector. Such 
optimum is of a much more complex nature, since its optimality depends upon the 
decisions of multiple, interacting actors. From an economic point of view, the 
optimal investment decision (of the aggregate) results in both allocative and 
productive efficiency. Hence, this optimal investment decision is not only placed 
at a higher level of aggregation, it inevitably becomes constructed as a result of
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interacting individual investment decisions. This underscores a first notion on the 
problem of underinvestment. Given existence (not to mention measurability) of the 
Pareto efficient investment decision (where all consumer demand is met in such a 
way that all consumers face maximum utility, and where all other production 
allocations would harm at least one consumer in his utility), it becomes clear that 
the optimal investment decision is one based on the preferences of the social 
planner (government) which need not match with those of the individual firms. 
   Firms interacting in a market may obtain an equilibrium in, e.g., supply capacity, 
but the investments used to obtain that equilibrium need not be optimal from the 
perspective of the social planner. For example, according to game theoretical 
approaches in the industrial organisation literature, firms may decide to overinvest 
in certain ‘strategic’ assets for which other market participants can pay high usage 
tariffs, or decide to overinvest in assets as a signal for potential competitors. On 
the other hand, these firms may also decide to underinvest if there are no market 
forces present that encourage them to innovate or expand their asset base. 
   At the macro level, the goal function for maximising utility is again different, 
due to a different perspective on the most desirable investment behaviour and 
spin-offs. Here, it is not so much the individual sector that matters, but much more 
the interaction between the various sectors, and the spin-off effects of aggregate 
investments to macroeconomic growth. Assuming that there exists a relationship 
between investments in assets, labour, or equity, and macroeconomic growth, the 
government tends to balance consumption and investments. The various optima of 
all sectors together should lead to macroeconomic growth, or wealth in another 
sense. Furthermore, one can think of optimal investment patterns in a Keynesian 
sense, where in times of macroeconomic woes, firms (and government) should 
invest more in order to overcome crises. Such investment pattern certainly serves 
governmental goals, and in the long-run it will serve the entrepreneurial goals as 
well, but for a short-run oriented micro-level investor, anti-cyclical investment 
behaviour need not be optimal. 
   Based on these three interpretations of the optimal investment decision, it 
becomes clear that at each level of analysis, deviations from the optimum may 
occur, but also that the sources behind these deviations will differ per aggregation 
level. When turning to the investment behaviour of private sector companies in the 
provision of public goods, table 2.1 gives some intuition for the 
incommensurability of goals of the three levels of analysis. The most profitable 
investment strategy for a firm need not harmonise with the goals of government or 
society. Particularly in the case of large externalities associated, such a clash of 
goals is likely to occur, which is reflected in the free-rider problem of public goods 
provision. The key problem in choosing an ‘optimal provision’ of the public good 
is summarised by Drèze (1995). Ideally, there should exist a level or a quantity of 
public goods provision, for which the marginal cost of provision equals the sum of 
the individual ‘marginal willingness-to-pay’ of all users. Suppose user charges are 
based on reported preferences, then there is an incentive to underreport these 
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preferences. Therefore, mainstream economic theory pays considerable attention 
to revealing the true preferences, but this seems particularly a theoretical, or highly 
stylised exercise, which is very difficult to put into practice. 
   If the optimal level of public good were independent of reported preferences, 
then we may come closer to a pragmatic solution, although we have to sacrifice 
some of the theoretical consistency with respect to Pareto efficiency. As such, this 
problem is not unique to investigating possibilities for non-coercive government 
instruments—in fact the same problem holds for regulatory solutions. For 
example, a popular instrument in environmental economics is the standard (see 
Cropper and Oates (1992)). To set a standard, however, also depends on some 
underlying optimum, which inevitably suffers from the same problems as 
described above. Thus, for the current study, the choice for a benchmark is not a 
unique problem—instead, it is a problem inherent to public goods analysis. 
Section 2.7 will explore the issue of benchmarks in more detail. 
 
2.2 Sources of underinvestment: Barriers to corporate 
investment 
Firms may underinvest, but the causes behind underinvestment need not be 
deliberate corporate action. Sometimes, firms can be constrained on financial 
grounds, if debt or equity providers are unwilling to provide further cash. 
Uncertainty about the future may make investments too risky to conduct. On the 
other hand, underinvestment may be a strategic tool in a bargaining situation with 
buyers, suppliers, or with government. Figure 2.2 shows how the various ‘barriers 
to investment’ intervene in the relationship between economic attractiveness to 
invest and actual investment, which is also reflected in the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2.1: Even though it may seem economically attractive to invest for firms 
(including both pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits), there may exist barriers to 
Investment
Economic attractiveness 
of investing
Definition 1.1
Barriers to 
investment
H
yp
ot
he
si
s 
2.
1
 
 
Figure 2.2: The role of barriers to investment 
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investment acting as an intervening variable between ‘economic attractiveness’ and actual 
‘investment’ that hamper firms from investing. 
 
The number of potential barriers to investment is large—table 2.2 gives a brief 
overview of the most important determinants that may constrain corporate 
investment behaviour. 
   In table 2.2, each row (representing the issuing level of analysis of the causes) is 
worked out in the associated section, whereas each cell (representing a theoretical 
cause to underinvestment) is worked out in a separate subsection. 
 
2.3 Micro-level barriers to investment 
In some cases, internal organisational matters may negatively affect the firm’s 
investment behaviour. Underinvestment, in this terminology, is investment 
behaviour relative to other investment possibilities. Hence, the choice for an 
investment project is conditional upon the other investment opportunities 
available. In such perspective, the firm has to be seen as a set of possible 
production functions, or investment projects. This is precisely what neoclassical 
microeconomics does. In this reasoning, firms (or managers) are assumed to be 
willing to maximise the firm’s utility (or profits), but they are restricted in 
obtaining their goals. Hence, though acting rationally, managers do not necessarily 
 
Table 2.2: Barriers to investment 
Level of analysis Source of underinvestment Section 
Wrong incentives for management to invest 2.3.1 
Uncertainty on ROI with an option to wait 2.3.2 
Debt-to-equity ratio 2.3.3 
Stock-market performance of the firm 2.3.4 
‘Micro’ or firm 
level 
Agency approaches to underinvestment 2.3.5 
Strategic underinvestment and the signalling game 2.4.1 
Incomplete contracts and the hold-up problem 2.4.2 
Contract renegotiation and the hold-up problem 2.4.3 
The role of competition 2.4.4 
‘Meso’ or 
sectoral level 
Declining product-market 2.4.5 
Savings gap, hyperinflation, and capital flight 2.5.1 
Profits and price cap regulation 2.5.2 
Liberalisation, regulatory reforms, and the vertical 
separation of the value chain 
2.5.3 
Franchise bidding, concessions, and licensing 2.5.4 
‘Macro’ or 
country level 
Policy reforms, and the expropriation risk 2.5.5 
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succeed in realising the optimal investment decisions due to certain constraints. 
On the one hand, these constraints can be analysed at the level of the investment 
project itself: criteria as a minimally required net present value (NPV) of any 
investment project, or avoidance of the associated uncertainty may prevent 
managers from investing in a particular project. Furthermore, constraints may be 
analysed at the management level: wrong incentives for managers may result in 
the case where the optimal investment decision for the firm is sub-optimal for the 
manager involved; furthermore issues of informal organisation may prevent well-
willing managers to undertake projects that are optimal for the formal 
organisation. Common in all of these approaches is that the firm can control for 
these sources of underinvestment. 
2.3.1 Wrong incentives for managers to invest 
As argued by Jensen and Murphy (1990), managerial compensation can be rather 
pervasive in providing the right signals to invest. On the one hand, one can 
advocate aligning management’s interests with those of the shareholders by 
coupling (part of) managerial pay to the firm’s stock price. Suppose managers will 
direct their efforts at increasing the firm’s value (which is debatable as argued by 
Milgrom and Roberts (1992: 441-3)) but simultaneously, they are exposed to non-
diversifiable risk, which may cause them to underinvest in risky projects (Jensen 
and Murphy (1990); Prendergast (1999)). In an Anglo-Saxon perspective, 
shareholders are usually assumed to be the owners of the firm who wish to see the 
firm’s profits being maximised, and who have diversified their investments (and 
hence the associated risks) because they are most likely to hold a portfolio of 
investments. Consequently, shareholders will be less risk-averse than the manager. 
The latter has no possibility to diversify the risks of his income (which was 
performance-based).42 
2.3.2 Uncertainty on ROI with an option to wait 
In real options theory (cf. Dixit and Pindyck (1994); Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994); 
Trigeorgis (1996); Pindyck (1999); Brennan and Trigeorgis (2000)), waiting has a 
value. If one invests under uncertainty about the future, then one is likely to obtain 
more valuable information over time, and is hence more capable of making the 
right decisions. Meanwhile, risk-averse firms operating in markets too turbulent to 
invest at present will tend to defer investments. This need not imply 
underinvestment in the long run, but in the short run it may indeed result in 
underinvestment. Sources of uncertainty can be (a) systematic (that is, market-
                                                      
42 For a more detailed discussion, see Mcconaughy and Mishra (1997); or for a somewhat 
broader discussion on the effect of incentives in order to align management’s interests with 
those of the owners, see Gibbons (1998); Milgrom and Roberts (1992); Prendergast 
(1999). 
45
specific risk, to which all participants are exposed and which cannot be diversified 
within that product-market combination), such as changes in a fiscal regime, or (b) 
unsystematic (that is, firm-specific risk, that can be diversified). 
   Furthermore, next period’s opportunities may be conditional upon the present 
period’s investments. In this time series view, tomorrow’s chance of obtaining 
profits depends on today’s investments, which implies that today’s investments 
may be made under the expectation that they will create profitable opportunities 
tomorrow, although they are loss making in the current period. Furthermore, there 
exists no guarantee that indeed current investments do become profitable in a next 
period. To some extent, firm-specific investments in future opportunities or utility 
can be compared with investments in intangibles, such as R&D or brand name. 
The prospects of these investments are often highly unpredictable, and it is hard 
for investors to observe the chances that lead to profitability. Chan et al. (2001) 
show how companies with poor past returns (due to high investments in R&D) 
may earn large excess returns in later periods; how the stock market does value 
R&D unbiased; but also that R&D intensity is associated with return volatility. 
Especially the last point underscores the probability range of actually obtaining a 
positive return on projects for which the next period’s gains are conditional upon 
the current period’s investments. In this case of R&D expenditures, both the firm 
and its investors are uncertain about the future profitability of these investments. 
Acemoglu (1993) looks at the uncertainty part for the firm, where the spin-off of 
investments is accelerated by the aggregate level of investments in the sector. 
2.3.3 Debt-to-equity ratio 
The capital structure of the firm partially determines the ability to invest. Ever 
since about the 1960s, a substantial part of the corporate finance literature has 
been dedicated to the capital structure of the firm, in particular the choice between 
debt and equity on the firm’s balance sheet. It seems that an unambiguous theory 
on the choice between debt and equity is still lacking. The most important theories 
are summarised by Myers (2001): 
x Trade-off theory: Firms trade off the tax deductibility advantages of additional 
debt against the associated interest costs; 
x Pecking order theory: Firms usually prefer internal funding, but when internal 
cash flows are insufficient to cover financial expenditures, they tend to prefer 
debt over equity;43 
x Free cash flow theory: Mature firms are prone to overinvest and diversify, 
when the operating cash flow exceeds the profitable investment opportunities 
of the firm;44 
                                                      
43 Section 2.3.4 gives more intuition for the pecking order theory. 
44 See also section 2.3.5 on the agency problems related to free cash flows. 
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x Efficient market hypothesis: In a perfect and frictionless capital market 
financing does not matter, so the choice between debt and equity financing has 
no material effect on the value of the firm or on the cost or availability of 
capital (cf. Modigliani and Miller (1958)). 
 
Though the Modigliani-Miller propositions are widely accepted, corporate finance 
and corporate governance research suggests that the capital structure of the firm 
(and the context within which the firm is located) does matter. For example, not 
only the leverage aspects of the debt-to-equity ratio are analysed, but also the 
extent to which the interests of debt- or equity-holders streamline with those of the 
firm at stake (Friedman (1985)). Following Modigliani and Miller (1958), the 
market value of the firm is a function of (a) the present value of (earnings 
generated by) assets-in-place, and (b) the present value of growth opportunities. 
Myers (1977) first noticed the risk of underinvestment in the light of these two 
determinants of the market value of firms as follows. Consider a firm with equity-
holders and debt-holders. In case of bankruptcy, debt-holders have preference over 
equity-holders. Furthermore, in case of prosperity of the firm, both debt-holders 
and equity-holders see a positive return. Hence, equity-holders tend to be more 
risk-averse towards investing in risky projects than debt-holders. As Mauer and 
Ott (2000) show, equity-holders tend to underinvest in the growth option of the 
firm; a problem which can be overcome by partially financing the growth option 
with a new debt issue that has the same priority in bankruptcy as the currently 
outstanding debt. As Long and Malitz (1985) show, firms whose assets are 
weighted in the presence of intangible assets and growth opportunities (e.g., 
pharmaceuticals for whom the value of the firm predominantly relies on R&D 
success and on the exploitation of intellectual property rights) on average borrow 
significantly less than firms holding mostly tangible assets in place (e.g., a hotel 
chain). This notion confirms the idea that complex debt contracts are effective 
only when the firm’s investment opportunity set is observable. Long and Malitz 
therewith turn the underinvestment problem into one of information asymmetry 
and moral hazard. If a firm faces many firm-specific investment opportunities, 
owners may relatively easy increase firm risk over time. Since outsiders have more 
difficulty estimating the risk and return of these investment opportunities, it is 
almost for debt-holders impossible to monitor such investments (Long and Malitz 
(1985)). 
2.3.4 Stock market performance of the firm 
Stock market valuation may affect corporate investment behaviour in two ways. 
First, there exists the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders on 
how to value the firm’s investments and associated prospects. This is the valuation 
problem under asymmetric information (Greenwald et al. (1984)). Second, there 
may exist a deviation between the allowed time horizons of getting a return on 
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investment between the short-term driven stock market and longer run profitability 
of investments made by the firm. This is the debate on economic ‘short-termism’ 
(Laverty (1996)), or on intertemporal choices. 
   The valuation problem (under asymmetric information) is especially worked out 
for intangibles, such as R&D expenditures, or advertisement campaigns in 
strengthening corporate brand names. Though in neoclassical economics all firms 
are alike, and technology is determinative to profits, organisation theory45 assumes 
that it is the uniqueness of the firm (and hence heterogeneity) that creates a 
competitive advantage (Barney (2001); Wernerfelt (1984)). Especially the firm-
specific assets (of which many are intangibles) contribute to that competitive 
advantage (Balakrishnan and Fox (1993)). The basic idea behind the valuation 
problem of intangibles is twofold (Greenwald et al. (1984)): either (a) the firm 
wishes to leverage more, but is constrained by the willingness of outsiders to 
provide capital (especially debtholders fear risky projects) which reduces the 
capital sources available, or (b) those firms that are not credit constrained may 
face an increase in the effective cost of capital, which reduces their investment 
possibilities. 
   The leverage problem, which is based upon James Tobin’s seminal article 
analysing the substitutability of debt and equity (Tobin (1961)), has led to a large 
stream of corporate finance literature. Amongst others, the ‘pecking order of 
capital’ (Donaldson (1961); Myers (1977)) shows us how corporate financing and 
investment behaviour is affected by this information asymmetry (Myers and 
Maljuf (1984)). Take R&D expenditures. Suppose that an optimal level of R&D 
expenditures exists for an individual firm (taking the direction of investments as 
given). The research process inhabits a lot of uncertainty already, but coupled with 
the information asymmetry (between in- and outsiders) it could have a first-order 
effect on resource allocation (Jones and Williams (2000)). Given the pecking order 
of capital, R&D-intensive firms must especially rely upon equity, for which the 
question arises to what extent the stock market has unbiased beliefs about returns. 
The empirical evidence on this topic is hampered by the fact that firms are not 
obliged to report on R&D expenditures, which leaves both investors and 
researchers with an estimation problem (see, for example, Carey et al. (1998)). 
Chan et al. (2001) find that firms investing in R&D face similar rates of return 
compared to firms not investing in R&D, but they also find that on average there 
exists some volatility of that return for R&D-intensive firms, which may impose a 
real cost on investors which ultimately may increase the cost of capital for R&D-
intensive firms. Lastly, citing Chan et al. (2001), ‘The benefits [of R&D], if any 
are likely to materialize only much later [than the investment momentum], and the 
life-cycles of resulting products may be quite short.’ This shifts the attention to the 
general problem of differences in time horizons. 
                                                      
45 Particularly the resource-based view of the firm and the population ecology streams 
stress this view. 
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   The short-termism problem of stock markets is that short-run investments (with 
direct spin-off) are preferred over long-run investments (since shareholders would 
prefer short-run payoff). Therefore, listed firms may become unable to commit 
themselves to long-run investments that are necessary for the future. In a worst-
case scenario, long-run investments are not made, and both manufacturing 
capabilities and workforce skills enter into a downward spiral. Laverty (1996) 
investigates this spiral for US firms (as opposed to their Japanese and German 
counterparts), and mainly comes to the conclusion that the monodisciplinary 
economic perspective prevails in analyses, but that—if we want to offer managers 
a solution to overcome the intertemporal choice problem—more angles have to be 
studied. Bebchuk and Stole (1993) take a different approach and study the impact 
of management’s informational advantage over the stock market on corporate 
investment behaviour. They argue that the investment level may be distorted either 
through underinvestment (when the market has incomplete information about the 
level of investment undertaken), but also through overinvestment (when the 
market observes the level of investment, but not its productivity). This approach 
seems similar to the one applied by Laffont and Tirole (1993: 87), who state that a 
societally optimal investment level includes a condition that minimises the ex post 
costs of an investment project through an efficiency parameter. 
   Lastly, there exists a stream of literature that focuses on the role of internal 
funding of investments. The idea is that imperfect capital markets may drive firms 
to use internal funds rather than external ones, Goergen and Renneboog (2001) 
find that a high concentration of control in the hands of executive directors reduces 
the underinvestment problem.46 
2.3.5 Agency approaches to underinvestment 
In the light of corporate investment behaviour, agency theories may predict both 
under- and overinvestment. On the one hand, Jensen (1986) shows how managers 
prefer to overinvest free cash flows into unprofitable assets instead of paying out 
to stockholders.47 This behaviour leads to the growth of the diversified firm, and to 
overinvestment. Furthermore, once the diversified firm is reality, the internal 
capital market of the firm may also lead to inefficient resource allocations, see, for 
a recent example Whited (2001). On the other hand, Myers and Maljuf (1984), for 
example, show how agency problems (as asymmetric information, adverse 
selection, moral hazard, signalling) are in line with the pecking order theory of 
finance (Myers (2001)), which may put constraints on funding possibilities for 
investments. In this subsection I will not focus on the free cash flow problem, but 
on the approaches associated with the pecking order theory instead. 
                                                      
46 For more literature on this topic see Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Cleary (1999). 
47 The assumptions applied here is that the status of a manager depends on the size of the 
firm he controls—a growth of the firm (in terms of assets) then leads to a growth of the 
manager’s status. 
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   Agency theory states that the higher the variance of the firm’s returns, the less 
the underinvestment problem, which is explained as follows. Recall the pecking 
order of capital, as outlined by Donaldson (1961). Firms prefer internal funding 
for their investments. Target dividend payout ratios are adapted to the investment 
requirements of the firm. In general, dividend levels are stable, and payout targets 
are only adjusted gradually to shifts in investment opportunities. If external 
funding is required, then the safest security (read: debt) is issued first, then come 
hybrid securities (such as convertible bonds), and then comes equity. Following 
Myers (1977), the value of a firm (consisting of assets in place and growth 
opportunities, the latter treated as call options on real assets) funded with risky 
debt is almost per definition lower than the value of the equity financed firm. 
Firms will issue risky debt instead of safe debt in case firm-specific investments 
(including maintenance), intangibles, or other investments hard to value for 
outsiders. If the firm’s management acts in the interest of its shareholders, then it 
will not engage in these investments (since these would lower shareholders’ 
wealth), which might lead to underinvestment in, e.g., maintenance. A logical 
consequence would be that firms with valuable growth opportunities would never 
issue risky debt, but unfortunately equity is not a panacea (see Jensen and 
Meckling (1976)). Another way of avoiding the problem would be to write out 
complex debt contracts that would require the firm to take on any investment 
project in all states in which its NPV is positive. For as far as these complex 
contracts would be feasible at all, a major requirement is that the firm’s investment 
opportunity set is observable. Long and Malitz (1985) then show that: 
 
‘[…] because intangible, firm-specific, and therefore 
unobservable growth opportunities reduce the effectiveness of 
bond covenants, the only way in which owners of firms with a 
high proportion of intangible investment opportunities can 
control the agency costs of debt is by limiting the amount of 
risky debt outstanding’ (p. 326). 
 
It is the type of investment opportunities that determine financial leverage. This is 
in line with the information asymmetry problems in stock market valuation, as 
described in section 2.3.4. 
 
2.4 Sector analysis and investment barriers 
In section 2.3, theoretical determinants of corporate investment behaviour were 
endogenous to corporate behaviour. When analysing the firm within its 
competitive space (i.e., the markets within which it operates), corporate behaviour 
(and hence corporate investment behaviour) becomes subject to external stimuli. 
This section pays attention to the theoretical determinants deriving from the 
competitive space that may lead to the underinvestment of an individual firm. In 
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this attempt, interaction effects of competition are analysed (a horizontal 
dimension of value chain analysis), as well as transactions, contracts, and sales 
within the vertical value chain. 
2.4.1 Strategic underinvestment and the signalling game 
A dominant firm may deliberately underinvest as a strategy for obtaining a strong 
bargaining position vis-à-vis, e.g., government. If, for example, government sets 
the standard for production, and a monopolist responds with poor demand due to a 
relative underinvestment, then we may apply a ‘signalling game’48 in terms of 
Gibbons (1992: 183-90) or Tirole (1988: 447-53). Due to the fact that the 
monopolist has private information on its investment function and associated 
returns, it may use this information to let government provide more favourable 
conditions for the firm. Vickers and Yarrow (1988: 88ff) and Vagstad (2001) show 
how underinvestment may occur if a firm tries to obtain a more favourable 
regulatory regime. Myers and Maljuf (1984) use the signalling game in the 
relationship between the firm (needing finance for a new project) and its (existing 
and potential future) investors. For both applications of the signalling game (other 
applications include the advertising problem (Martin (1993: 151ff)), or entry 
deterrence (Dixit (1980))), the informational asymmetry and the two-stage 
modelling are crucial elements.49 As the next sections will show, information 
asymmetry lies at the heart of many analyses of potential underinvestment. 
2.4.2 Incomplete contracts and the hold-up problem 
The essence of the hold-up problem (following Williamson (1975) and Joskow 
(1985)), is that there exists an incentive for firms to commit to long-term 
contracting or even vertical integration when the transaction between buyer and 
supplier requires investments in specific assets. In the absence of the 
aforementioned relationships, the firm that needs to invest in specific assets may 
(temporarily) hold up investment until more certainty is gained on its long-run 
profitability. This ‘hold-up’ problem of investments (as shown by Armstrong et al. 
(1994: 138ff)) can be overcome by, for example, (1) contracting or vertical 
integration (as aforementioned), or (2) competition (since the presence of multiple 
buyers and suppliers makes the investing firm less dependent upon its buyer for 
the specific asset). 
                                                      
48 The basis of a signalling game is information-asymmetry. Whilst in screening games the 
focus is on how to obtain private information of others (in order to overcome the 
asymmetry), signalling games deal with communicating your own private information. 
Heavy investments in specific assets, for example, may ‘communicate’ the willingness and 
intention of a firm to stay within a market. 
49 If the analysis is made in a single time period (stage) only, it is very difficult to check 
the credibility of a signal. As soon as two or multiple time periods are considered, 
economic actors build up a reputation, which informs on the credibility of signals. 
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   The hold-up problem of transaction-specific investment was first described by 
Klein et al. (1978) and Williamson (1975). It derives from the transaction cost 
economics approach where two activities A and B can either be organised within a 
single firm or in a market. As Williamson (1985) suggests, the choice between 
markets and hierarchies is especially determined by the transaction frequency, 
uncertainty, and asset specificity.50 The logic applied is as follows: the higher the 
levels of uncertainty, and the higher the degree of asset specificity, the more 
complex is the contract that should safeguard the interests of both parties, and the 
more likely it is that this ex ante written contract has to be adjusted ex post (after 
investments and commitments have been made) through a governance mechanism. 
If the two activities are not integrated within a single firm, then there exists the 
risk that—due to the inevitable incompleteness of the contract—the party that has 
to make relation-specific investments that are sunk may hold-up this investment 
until it has more certainty on the long-run profitability of its investments. In other 
words, problems typically tend to arise in the case of transaction specific 
investments: investments that have a smaller value outside the contractual 
relationship than within that relationship (Grossman and Hart (1986)). A large 
stream of literature focuses on the question of relying on markets or hierarchies, 
and aims at setting the boundaries of the firm via a principal-agent framework. 
   Two major critiques can be distinguished with respect to the incomplete 
contracts approach. First, investment incentives are not provided by ownership 
alone. As Holmström and Roberts (1998) correctly notice, ‘hold-up problems do 
not get resolved solely by integration of buyer and seller.’ Though the hold-up 
problem is real, there exist more motives to alter the boundaries of the firm than 
described by the principal-agent framework, just as investment incentives can be 
provided by many other sources than ownership rights. 
   A second critique is that though the hold-up problem (as a special case of 
underinvestment) typically arises in the incomplete contracts context, incomplete 
contracts per se need not lead to underinvestment only. As Hart and Moore (1990) 
show, for example, the fact whether the principal or the agent overinvests or 
underinvests depends upon, amongst others, whether the investment is more 
important to the principal or the agent, whether the future benefits for the investor 
are assured, and whether investments made by both parties are complementary or 
not.  
2.4.3 Contract renegotiation and the hold-up problem 
Section 2.4.2 discussed the standard model of the hold-up problem, where 
incomplete contracts were the main cause. In that standard case, the scope of the 
                                                      
50 As Walter Powell argues, the non-co-operative TCE approach of Williamson only 
focuses on either the market or the hierarchy, whilst the same conditions might as well lead 
firms into more co-operative forms within a network, based on reciprocity, but also on 
interdependence and mutual benefits of that co-operation (Powell (1990)). 
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contract was limited in terms of content, due to ex ante information asymmetries 
inherent in complex transactions. There exists, however, a special case of a limited 
scope of a contract, where the governance failure does not stem from incomplete 
content but rather from a limited time scope. This is the case where contracts have 
a limited life span and are renegotiated after investments have been made and 
parties have become committed. Contract renegotiation may be necessary if—in 
order to achieve an efficient resource allocation—the choice process depends on 
exogenous events that occur after a relationship has started but these events are not 
themselves verifiable because they are too complex or too multidimensional 
(Malcomson (1997)). The renegotiation process may reduce transaction costs (by 
allowing contracts to be renegotiated instead of dedicating too much effort in 
specifying unverifiable events), but simultaneously renegotiation may adversely 
affect investment decisions, because at the writing of the contract, parties know ex 
ante that the rents of the relationship may be redistributed ex post which may 
reduce their incentives to invest in relation-specific assets (see Aghion et al. 
(1994) for a discussion on the use of renegotiation for overcoming 
underinvestment). 
   Virtually all worked-out solutions to this dynamic setting of the contracting 
approach to the hold-up problem rely on the silent premise that ownership 
overcomes the hold-up problem. Since uncertainties increase when the time 
horizon is expanded, dynamic solutions virtually all propose option-like contracts 
to overcome the side effects of renegotiation. The basic option scheme (without 
renegotiation) allows the agent to initially have the ownership of an asset, while 
the principal holds an option-to-own for the period after the agent has made his 
investments. This gives the agent an incentive to perform in the interest of the 
principal, because (given the relation-specific investment) otherwise he would be 
stuck with the investment. To some extent, this seems like the franchise bidding 
process following privatisation (see Armstrong et al. (1994) or Vickers and 
Yarrow (1988)). Once, however, renegotiation of the contract terms comes in as a 
relevant threat, an opportunistic principal will let his option expire or delay 
investing even when the agent performs well, because then the principal would 
increase his bargaining power to demand a lower price in the renegotiation process 
(Edlin and Hermalin (2000)). The agent, however, knows that the principal will 
exercise his option if the underlying value of that option (i.e., the investment) is at 
least as high as the negotiated option exercise price. Hence, the threat 
renegotiation gives the agent incentives to perform well, and the option now even 
serves guard against overinvestment by the agent (Edlin and Hermalin (2000)). 
Nöldeke and Schmidt (1998) argue that neither the agent (in the first stage) nor the 
principal (in the second stage) will overinvest, so that the option contract provides 
a first-best solution. Edlin and Hermalin (2000) provide more nuances in the 
assumptions and show that under some conditions, no option contract is efficient 
at all. 
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2.4.4 The role of competition 
Competition may affect corporate investment behaviour in two (opposite) ways: 
(1) an absence of competition may put a firm in a vacuum where little incentives 
to invest exist, whereas (2) fierce competition (especially on price) may lead 
companies to save costs, which might imply investments to be reduced. It seems 
that some competition is needed, but too much of a good thing can have similar 
effects on corporate investment behaviour. Furthermore, competition not only may 
affect the investment levels of firms competing in the same market, it also 
potentially affects the return of the investments made by an individual firm. As a 
result, firms not only do not know ex ante whether it pays off to try to innovate or 
imitate (when focusing on R&D investments), or what levels of investments in 
R&D might be appropriate, but also the potential payoff of these investment 
depends on the choices (and performance) of other firms (Nelson and Winter 
(1982: 286)). Competition does seem to matter, but the question how to define 
causality between competition and corporate investment behaviour (if any) is still 
unanswered. That question is analysed in the following three cases of (a) no 
competition, (b) price competition, and (c) other forms of competition on 
corporate investment behaviour. 
 
No competition 
In mainstream economics, (potential) competition is a powerful tool to provide 
incentives to firms to innovate, set competitive prices, and so on. In 
Schumpetarian economics, however, industry concentration is a fine catalyst for 
investments in innovative activities (such as R&D). Actually, as noticed by Nelson 
and Winter (1982: 279), Schumpeter ‘stressed the advantages for innovation of 
large firm size, and was not focused on market structure per se.’ The original idea 
was that large firms had a better financial position that would enable them to 
internalise an industrial research laboratory (assumed to be central to the 
innovation process). The corresponding levels of profitability for large firms were 
later on associated with industry concentration. Hence, what would matter was 
firm size, not market power per se (which, by the way, has become an often raised 
question in the empirical literature). In fact, this idea reflects internal finance 
hypothesis: large firms (and firms operating in a concentrated market) may obtain 
larger levels of internal cash availability, which enables them to spend more on, 
e.g., R&D. As Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) notice, ‘if firms are forced to finance 
their R&D expenditure from internal funds there is a clear presumption that 
industrial concentration is positively correlated with R&D activity.’ If capital 
markets work perfectly, however, this presumption may be challenged (as they do 
in their model). Interesting features in the Dasgupta-Stiglitz model include the 
attention for the speed with which firms carry out R&D work, and the rapidity 
with which technological innovations take place, as well as the role of entry 
barriers and price elasticity of demand. 
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Price competition 
When firms engage in price competition, their products (or services) must be alike. 
This assumption usually lies at the heart of mainstream economic analysis: not 
only are firms alike in terms of technology, but also would they engage in equal 
R&D activities, for example. In the real world we may question how many firms 
are actually engaged in competing R&D activities, but the bulk of literature 
focussing on price competition goes unhindered by this technicality. Stiglitz 
(1981), for example, assumes that potential market entrants can engage in R&D 
activity which will result in their having a lower cost or a better product, which 
relies upon substitutability of the outputs of the issuing firms. Though entry and 
contestability  do affect investment in the price competition literature (Baumol et 
al. (1982)), more nuances can be found. For example, Joglekar and Hamburg 
(1989) mention how industries with (a) greater investable resources; (b) greater 
inter-industry competition; (c) less inter-firm competition; and (d) greater risk 
aversion, display relatively less underinvestment in their basic research. 
   In its simplest form, (short-run) price competition assumes homogeneity on 
many dimensions, most noteworthy on the product space (if products were not 
substitutable, price competition were difficult). In the somewhat more complicated 
model that does allow for product differentiation, the product may still be 
physically the same, but other features as sales location may differ (see Tirole 
(1988: Ch. 5, 7, and 8) for a discussion). In price competition, firms first choose 
capacity (requiring investments) after which in a later stage they will enter into the 
price competition game. 
   The following metaphors are used to describe the price competition game. First, 
there is the idea that identical firms compete for procurement: in the first period, 
two identical firms invest, they learn about their cost function in the second period, 
and so does their principal who then grants the contract to the lowest cost firm 
(see, e.g., Dasgupta (1990), or Tirole (1986)). In fact, this stream derives from the 
incomplete contracts approach. The second approach also departs from the 
incomplete contracts approach, but this one assumes that it is the threat of 
renegotiation in the second period (after the investment has been made) between 
principal and agent that causes the hold-up problem (see, for example, Malcomson 
(1997)). A third way of analysing the relation between competition and investment 
is by changing the level of analysis towards the one of input production factors. 
This deals with the question to what extent different types of K, L, and M of the 
Cobb-Douglas function can be substituted (see, for example, Dewan and Min 
(1997)). A fourth interpretation of the competition issue is located at the level of 
the individual investment project. That discussion assumes imperfect capital 
markets external to the firm so that the firm must use internal funding to realise 
project. Consequently, interdependence is suggested amongst otherwise 
completely unrelated investment projects that just happened to be executed by the 
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same firm, ands therefore have to compete for the internal funds available (see, for 
example, Hubbard (1998), Lamont (1997), or Stein (1997)). 
   In the above discussion, the competition element focused on the firms engaging 
in investments. Price competition can, however, also take place at the supply side 
of capital, for example if banks (or capital providing intermediaries in general) 
compete for the borrower. For a recent entry into that literature, see Yanelle 
(1997). Lastly, recall that other governance mechanisms than the price mechanism 
can be used in order to streamline investments, such as in the case of (price-) 
competing firms that (nevertheless) co-operate in innovative activities. The 
interested reader is referred to Jorde and Teece (1990) or Ciccotello and Hornyak 
(2000). 
 
Other forms of competition 
From a standard economic point of view, where firms are all alike so that 
competition automatically implies price competition, any form of non-price 
competition is related to the case where apparently price competition is impossible 
as, for example, in the case of regulated prices (see, e.g., Viscusi et al. (1995: 
529ff)). In management literature, however, these assumptions of all firms being 
equal and about price competition being the base case are often defined 
differently. When looking at the resource-based view of the firm, for example, 
firms derive their competitive advantage over other firms from the fact that they 
are not equal. Especially investments in intangibles (such as R&D, human capital, 
or brand name) may create unique advantages that allow firms to differentiate 
themselves. In his seminal article on the resource-based view of the firm, Barney 
(1991) defines a sustained competitive advantage as ‘[…] a value creating strategy 
not simultaneously being implemented by any current or potential competitors and 
[for which] these other firms are unable to duplicate the benefits of this strategy’ 
(emphasis in original work). Hence, what matters for a competitive advantage to 
be sustainable is to be imperfectly imitable. When assessing the literature on the 
relationship between competition (or industry structure) and corporate investment, 
it appears that especially the allocation of resources to these firm-specific assets 
(as R&D, or human capital) matters. 
2.4.5 Declining product-market 
When expressing a product-market combination in terms of demand, then one 
possible (and actually quite popular) way of putting things in an evolutionary 
perspective is by means of the product lifecycle (as in the seminal work of Vernon 
(1971)). The theory of the product lifecycle states that a product-market 
combination develops through a sequential path of multiple stages, where the 
combination is premature, developing, mature, and finally declines. If we combine 
this cycle with some thoughts about possible forms of product-market competition, 
then the idea is that in the premature phase, firms compete for setting the standard; 
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in the developing phase, firms compete on quality and other product 
characteristics; in the mature phase, competition focuses on price; and in the 
declining phase, firms are pure price takers that try to extract as much profit as 
they can before they withdraw from this market. In other words, since firms know 
that demand is declining, the industry starts to face excess supply capacity. 
Industrial organisation then predicts that such situation would lead to the 
emergence of a price war (Martin (1993: 127)). In this phase of the lifecycle, some 
first signs of divestments or even firm closures may be noticed (since this phase 
may be less interesting or profitable to some market players), up to such level that 
demand even (temporarily) exceeds supplies. In this phase, one cannot expect 
firms to invest in improvements of production quality (except for innovations that 
create new product-market combinations) or in expansions of production facilities. 
The issuing product-market combination may face underinvestment. In fact, the 
discussion slightly shifts towards the one on industry dynamics, where on the one 
hand we can question whether technological progress indeed is the key 
determinant of industry dynamics (as neoclassical analysis suggests), or how 
contestability evolves over time. This last question is addressed by Ormerod et al. 
(2001), who develop a model based on entry over time, where price decrease over 
time (close towards the competitive minimum), and products become more 
differentiated (which leaves consumers more choice over time). These price 
developments are consistent with the findings of Caballero and Pindyck (1996), 
who find that negative demand shocks decrease price along the existing supply 
curve, whereas positive demand shocks induce entry or expansion of the 
incumbents’ supply capacity. In a variety of setting, Ormerod et al. find that there 
exists no relationship between market price and the number of firms; hence, 
contestability is and remains a matter of potential entrants (cf. the definition posed 
by Baumol et al. (1982)). An interesting implication is the following. Given a 
certain necessary payback period, the threat of entry in an industry characterised 
by sunk costs declines once the product-market combination approaches the 
mature phase in the aforementioned model. In fact then, not only competition but 
also potential competition evolve over time. From the mature phase onwards, a 
product-market combination may become less attractive to invest in due to the fact 
that firms may not have the time to recuperate their specific investments. In this 
dynamic setting, contestability decreases over time; price is still not a first-order 
determinant, but may then reflect another process, and that is the following. If 
price declines, then competition has shifted towards ‘price competition’, which (in 
the aforementioned industry setting) lowers incentives for potential entrants, and 
hence (as a second-order effect) decreases potential entry (and so contestability). 
   A second paper related to the industry dynamics, is one by Ghosal (2001), who 
studies firm survival rates and industry structure developments over time, using a 
model based on sunk costs, uncertainty and real options. He finds that it is not so 
much technological change being the key driver of industry dynamics, but instead 
it is (price and profits) uncertainty and sunk costs that play a crucial role. 
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2.5 The macro-level context 
This section underscores the role of macro-level phenomena that influence 
corporate investment behaviour. The current section (as the previous) studies 
phenomena exogenous to the firm. In section 2.4, the theoretical determinants of 
underinvestment were predominantly the result of the direct (and usually non-co-
operative) interaction between firms. The macro-level determinants mentioned in 
the current section are predominantly outside the direct influence of firms, such as 
inflation. On the other hand, situations exist where firms may indeed have a direct 
impact on macro-level phenomena, including regulatory issues, or the shape of 
structural reforms. Examples of situations can be found in Dunning (1993); 
Dunning and Narula (1996); Ruigrok and Van Tulder (1995); or Stopford et al. 
(1991). 
   Before starting, let me state what this section is not about. A first interesting 
discussion that is nevertheless considered outside the scope of the current chapter 
concerns the measures to correct the aforementioned macro-level phenomena, 
such as predominantly found in stabilisation programmes or regulatory or political 
reforms. Another possible approach in the relationship between macro-level 
phenomena and corporate investment behaviour which is considered outside the 
scope of the current chapter is to reverse causality—i.e., the studies that analyse 
the impact of corporate investment behaviour on macroeconomic performance. 
The interested read for that relationship is referred to Romer (1996: Chapter 8). 
2.5.1 Savings gap, hyperinflation, and capital flight 
In traditional development economics, three structural gaps constrain 
macroeconomic growth (see Cline (1995: 156-7) for a discussion): the savings gap 
(total investments minus domestic savings), the trade gap (total spending on 
imports minus total earnings from exports), and the fiscal gap (governments 
revenues minus expenditures). The savings gap indicates that at the macro-level 
domestic savings cannot finance the need for investments (and hence, that the 
capital market is imperfect and that access to international capital markets is 
limited). Usually two phenomena precede the lack of domestic savings: 
hyperinflation and capital flight. If inflation exceeds certain threshold levels, 
saving does not pay off (or the financial system does not generate the necessary 
faith people need before depositing their money). Usually, capital flight is the 
response: people tend to convert their money into a foreign currency (e.g., the US 
dollar) or deposit their savings directly on a foreign account. Adding these pieces 
together, there remains too little capital available domestically, and domestic 
banks do not have many funds available for lending. Two scenarios seem viable: 
(1) in the light of an imperfect capital market, the savings gap constrains private 
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sector investments, or (2) deficiencies in the domestic availability are overcome by 
means of attracting foreign direct investments (FDI). 
   In the former scenario, domestic banks have limited capital available. This 
implies they are reluctant to lending to risky projects (since they can hardly 
diversify these risks), and hence tend to lend only to low-risk low-return projects. 
Examples of such projects are governmental infrastructure projects. If all lending 
is concentrated in these areas, high-risk high-return projects (i.e., the innovative 
projects with a high potential spin-off) show underinvestment. In the second 
scenario mentioned, FDI may be attracted to fill the gap between capital needs and 
availability (see Dunning (1993); Dunning (1994); Dunning and Narula (1996); 
Dunning (1997) and Unctad (1999) for a discussion). 
   An alternative explanation for capital flight comes from the so-called ‘tragedy of 
the commons’: the case where property rights over a productive asset are ill 
defined or cannot be reinforced (Tornell and Velasco (1992)). The idea is that 
common access leads to overconsumption and underinvestment. Hence, in a (poor) 
country with weak property rights, the fruits of private investments may be 
unintentionally born by third parties. As a consequence, the private investor only 
captures a fraction of the rents. In contrast, if he would make private investments 
in a country with strong property rights, then his rents are also private (and 
presumed to be higher). 
   The role of inflation on corporate investment behaviour is clear. Given a long-
term but finite horizon of an investor, the optimal investment portfolio should 
match the investor’s risk-averseness, whereas the maturity of the investment 
projects should match the investment horizon. Brennan and Xia (2002) investigate 
this investment optimisation problem for financial investments (i.e., bonds and 
stocks). Standard results show that if the risk averseness of the investor increases, 
then the bond-stock ratio (in the investment portfolio) increases, and the maturity 
of the optimal bond decreases. An interesting finding is that Brennan and Xia 
show how risk averseness of the investor affects the optimal investment portfolio 
(i.e., the constraints used in their empirical model are not binding for large enough 
risk averseness). 
2.5.2 Profits and price cap regulation 
The regulated firm is a thorn in an economist’s side, since such firm has 
incorporated external preferences that would normally not be internalised. 
Consequently, it may react different (relative to the profit-maximising, price-
taking firm), and hence may not fit within the standard microeconomic models. 
Regulation of economic activity can take many forms, varying from regulation on 
static indicators (as profits, price, etc.) or be it behavioural (e.g., safety regulations, 
labour conditions). This subsection outlines the effect of two types of static 
regulation on corporate investment behaviour: price cap regulation, and profits 
regulation. 
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Price cap regulation 
Price cap regulation has especially received attention in the UK, where privatised 
utilities tended to be constrained on their output prices, in order to protect end-
users. One of the important rationales for developing an economic regulation 
different from the US system of profits (or ‘rate-of-return’) regulation, was the 
pragmatic fact that profits regulation would require too much detailed company 
specific information (which would be expensive and difficult to check, assess, and 
interpret). Hence, a different system was developed, where output prices were 
regulated. This system has become known as the RPI-X regulation, where RPI is 
the retail price index with which prices are allowed to increase annually, and X an 
efficiency factor (set by the regulator) by which prices have to decrease per 
annum. For an excellent overview of the various variants and technicalities, see 
Armstrong et al. (1994), or Vickers and Yarrow (1988). Since X is set for a certain 
time period (e.g., five years) we can rationally expect that unforeseen events take 
place in that time period, which would make it unfair for the regulated firms to 
meet the X criterion. Consequently, price cap regulation often includes an extra 
component, e.g., Y (usually indicated with the ‘cost passthrough’) which allows 
prices to rise due to unexpected events. A major drawback of such extension is, 
however, that such a pricing formula would signify a step backwards with respect 
to the incentives for temporal price differentiation, unless accompanied by 
regulation of the rate structure (Vickers and Yarrow (1988: 287)). Thomadakis 
(1982) analyses the possible incentives for undercapitalisation of production as a 
result of price cap regulation, and finds that incentives for underinvestment are 
especially present in the case where price caps are imposed (or relaxed) after 
uncertain costs have been revealed. 
 
Profits regulation 
Rate-of-return regulation (or ‘profits regulation’) has especially become popular in 
the US for regulating firms, whereas in other parts of the world, rate-of-return 
regulation has especially become popular in regulating networks. The idea here is 
that the regulator allows firms to make a certain profits rate, whilst firms remain 
free to set their output prices. Consequently, though regulated, these firms may 
still enter into a price competition game. An early warning for this type of 
regulation derives from the famous Averch-Johnson (AJ) thesis, which 
overinvestment in capital intensive assets, so that (by increasing the costs and 
investments in the denominator) firms can alter their absolute profits whilst still 
meeting the relative rate-of-return ceiling (Averch and Johnson (1962)). Hence, 
profits regulated firms would have an incentive to invest in rent-seeking activities. 
Though it remains difficult to empirically test for the AJ thesis (Viscusi et al. 
(1995: 390)), the capital structure of the (profits) regulated firm remains debated 
topic (see, e.g., Spiegel and Spulber (1994)). In the original, static setting of the AJ 
thesis, overinvestment in certain assets (at the expense of an underinvestment in 
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other activities) was the result of the rate-of-return regulation. In later studies, the 
AJ thesis has been reformulated in a dynamic setting, where elements of TCE have 
been incorporated (especially the role of uncertainty is stressed in a contractual 
relationship). Usually two parties are considered, where one party has to make an 
irreversible specific investment, whereas contextual determinants of this 
investment decision are captured by the contract metaphor. Two broad categories 
of analysis can be distinguished. First, there is the setting where the other party is 
the buyer of the investor’s output. Following the investment done by enterprise A, 
the buyer B shows opportunistic behaviour, and tries to renegotiate the price it has 
to pay for A’s output. This type of contract-related uncertainty (i.e., price and 
volume uncertainties) is dealt with in the contract renegotiation literature (see 
above in the current essay). The second category of analysis deals with policy 
uncertainty, since A may have made its investments under the silent premise of a 
current tax regime, environmental regulation, or other. Both categories of analysis 
can be captured by the intergenerational choice problem: firm A makes an 
investment at t1 (assuming it can bear the fruits of that investment in a time period 
between t1 and some tn) but at some moment tk (with k<n) some favourable 
conditions turn out to become unfavourable. How does A plan its investments 
under the uncertainty of future contextual conditions? Two possibilities arise: (a) 
the firm makes full investments before it has resolved uncertainties, or (b) it starts 
off by making a fraction of all investments, and decides to postpone the remainder 
until uncertainties have sufficiently been eliminated. The latter case presents a 
situation with incentives for undercapitalised production.  
2.5.3 Liberalisation, regulatory reforms, and the vertical separation 
of the value chain 
An important mechanism to improve the contestability of a market is to vertically 
disintegrate the sectoral value chain. This separation of the various value-adding 
elements is particularly an issue in liberalisation measures and regulatory reforms 
aimed at improving competition. From a TCE perspective we can explain 
rationales for both horizontal integration (Scherer et al. (1975)) and vertical 
integration (Joskow (1985)). The rationales that argue for integration usually apply 
to those (segments of) sectors that are characterised by specific investments 
(Williamson (1975)), or by natural monopoly (declining marginal costs at 
increasing scale, where it is cheaper for one producer to supply than for more than 
one producer, see Baumol et al. (1982: 8)). Some sectors such as the utility sectors 
combine both elements, and have been characterised by government ownership 
roughly between the 1930s until the 1980s. In the light of the massive privatisation 
wave around the globe that started in the 1980s, the question arose whether the 
benefits of privatisation could be realised by an ownership alone, or that 
contestability required the large, vertically and horizontally integrated former 
state-owned enterprise (SOE) to be separated into smaller competing units. This 
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measure is indicated with ‘breaking up the monopoly’, or ‘making the monopoly 
competitive’. An alternative approach (usually focussed on horizontally integrated 
firms, such as an infrastructure provider for electricity, rail, or water) leaves the 
(horizontal) monopoly intact, but aims at making more competitive by allowing 
private enterprises to operate the firm (hence, ownership remains public) and 
collect the usufruct, but here government writes a tender (or other form) and lets 
the private enterprises make competitive offers to operate the integrate firm. This 
latter approach is dealt with in the next subsection. 
   If the elements of a value chain are disintegrated horizontally or vertically, 
whereas there existed a natural tendency to be integrated, one can expect that the 
potential benefits of the realised competition will only be realised at the expense of 
the abandoned advantages of integration (see D'aveni and Ravenscraft (1994) for a 
discussion). Horizontal disintegration is essentially a scale economies problem, or 
even a natural monopoly problem. Vertical disintegration, however, may lead to 
the classical hold-up problem (see Joskow (1998) for a discussion on the 
electricity supply industry). 
2.5.4 Franchise bidding, concessions, and licensing 
Especially in utilities, the regulator may decide to let private sector firms ‘compete 
for the monopoly’ rather than letting the monopoly become competitive. This is 
the essence of franchise bidding, concessions, and licensing: the regulator invites 
(directly or through a tender) private firms to make an offer to operate a certain 
activity. Examples are found in many elements of value chains in utilities, 
especially there where the natural monopoly argument applies (i.e., in long-
distance transport and local distribution of utility products as electricity, water, 
natural gas, telecommunications through fixed lines, but also harbours and airports 
can be perceived a basic infrastructure to which the argument applies). The 
problem with these arrangements lies in the time inconsistency of the 
commitments: in the absence of security that the concession is continued in the 
next period, firms tend to invest only in the beginning of their appointment. 
Hence, here the (potential) hold-up problem arises again, though the underlying 
reasons differ somewhat from other settings. 
2.5.5 Policy reforms, and the expropriation risk 
Policy reforms may also cause firms to hold up investments as follows. Armstrong
et al. (1994: 139) argue that if, e.g., a regulator changes environmental policies or 
changes price caps, while firms are to make irreversible, specific investments that 
are not optimal in the post-reform context, then they would make a loss (due to the 
sunk costs). Hence, in times where policy reforms are foreseen, firms may defer 
investments (see Besanko and Spulber (1992) for a discussion). 
   A special case of the changes in policy is grouped under the so-called 
‘expropriation risk.’ In a principal-agent setting, this risk is illustrated as follows. 
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Once the agent has made its sunk investment, the principal may use these 
investments for other purposes than originally scheduled (cf. Laffont and Tirole 
(1993: 641)). In a narrower setting, the firm making the investment may lose the 
ownership rights due to nationalisation or due to badly defined property rights (see 
Henisz (2000) for a discussion on protection of foreign direct investments, or 
North (1991) for a general discussion of the role of institutions). 
 
2.6 An intermediate summary and analysis 
The theoretical barriers to corporate investment vary widely in terms of 
aggregation level of analysis, and in terms of stream of thought. Given the large 
number of possible theoretical determinants, it seems useful to recap this section 
before proceeding. The most important findings of sections 2.3 to 2.5 were the 
following. 
1) Determinants of underinvestment can derive both from within the firm (e.g., 
managerial opportunism, bureaucratic rules leading to inefficient resource 
allocation), and from the firm’s context. This notion opens the possibility for 
underinvestment to be a deliberate strategy, or the result of a process 
exogenous to the firm. 
2) Information asymmetry plays a major role. At the level of the investment 
opportunity, one can think of the valuation problem, where insiders may have 
an informational advantage over outsiders with respect to the possible 
profitability and value of an investment opportunity. This is particularly the 
case for intangibles (such as R&D expenditures, maintenance, and brand name 
building). At the level of the firm, it may be difficult for outsiders to observe 
and evaluate the investment opportunity set of the going concern. Since it is 
the performance of the entire firm and not of the individual investment project 
that is being evaluated in providing capital, disclosure of relevant financial 
information may help to mitigate the underinvestment problem too. 
3) Credible commitments can prevent the hold-up problem of investments. At the 
level of the transaction, the incomplete contracts approach, the contract 
renegotiation problem, and corporate governance issues cover this issue. In the 
absence of this security (especially in the context of relation-specific 
investments) there exists an incentive for integration, which would not only 
give rise to new investment problems (i.e., the resource allocation of the 
conglomerate), but it might also affect contestability, which in itself may 
affect the investment behaviour of other market participants. At the 
institutional level, it is important for firms to have certainty on the endurance 
and enforceability of regulations, and the securement of property rights. 
4) Uncertainty about demand or the profitability of an investment may cause the 
firm to fragmentise the necessary investment over time. Hence, instead of 
concentrating an investment at one point in time, it is being spread over 
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multiple discrete moments. Here, the risk preference profile of the investor 
plays an important role. 
5) Asset specificity (in its broadest interpretation) seems to have a patent on 
meeting most of the aforementioned criteria. 
 
2.7 Measurement and existence of underinvestment 
This section gives an overview of some recent empirical studies on 
underinvestment. Though some generalisations could be distilled from the 
theoretical causes to underinvestment, it remains unanswered to what extent these 
normative theories are useful for descriptive purposes. Empirical testing is an 
important and powerful tool to test the usefulness of the theoretical insights, and to 
obtain a clearer picture of how to prevent or correct underinvestment from 
happening. A number of questions can immediately be raised. 
   First, the normative theoretical studies reviewed in this chapter do not provide an 
unambiguous view of what underinvestment really is—other than a deviation from 
a theoretical benchmark. Section 2.7.2 gives an overview of some definitions. 
   Second, many normative theoretical studies use a benchmark (for example, 
‘optimal investment’) with which actual investments are compared. The inevitable 
question discussed in section 2.7.3 is ‘how to construct a relevant benchmark?’ 
   Third, many normative theoretical studies use variables that are not easily 
observed or measured, such as ‘managerial incentives’, ‘opportunistic behaviour 
of management’, ‘strategic underinvestment’, or ‘asset specificity’. If there exist 
empirical studies using these variables, they are most likely to be replaced by 
proxies. Though the use of proxies is fine for many empirical research, it is always 
important to remain conscious of the fact that not the real variable of interest is 
measured, but the proxy. Also, the proxy used may respond itself to other theories 
not included in the framework of the particular study. Consequently, we might 
infer on underinvestment whereas in reality we deal with another phenomenon. 
2.7.1 Empirical studies on underinvestment 
The amount of empirical studies on underinvestment is very low relative to the 
amount of theoretical studies. In the table below, some recent empirical studies 
have been outlined. The purpose of that list is not to cover all empirical studies in 
the field, but rather to give an impression how underinvestment is measured in 
empirical studies. The rationale behind this interest is that in theoretical studies (as 
shown in the earlier sections of this chapter), underinvestment may be a function 
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itu
tio
na
l o
w
ne
rs
hi
p 
re
du
ce
s 
th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p.
 
M
un
ro
 a
nd
 L
ea
th
er
 
(2
00
0)
 
Q
ua
lit
at
iv
e 
in
te
rv
ie
w
s 
(2
11
) 
in
 th
re
e 
ci
tie
s 
in
 
E
ng
la
nd
, a
nd
 a
cr
os
s 
th
e 
C
en
tr
al
 R
eg
io
n 
of
 
Sc
ho
tla
nd
. 
G
iv
en
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fr
om
 
re
pe
at
ed
 h
ou
se
 c
on
di
tio
n 
su
rv
ey
s,
 s
ig
ni
fi
ca
nt
 a
nd
 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
l d
is
re
pa
ir
 p
ro
bl
em
s 
in
 o
w
ne
r-
oc
cu
pi
ed
 p
ro
pe
rt
ie
s 
sh
ow
 u
nd
er
in
ve
st
m
en
t. 
A
 r
an
ge
 o
f 
m
ot
iv
es
 a
re
 id
en
tif
ie
d 
th
at
 
in
fl
ue
nc
e 
th
e 
de
ci
si
on
 f
or
 in
ve
st
in
g 
in
 
re
al
 e
st
at
e,
 b
ut
 o
nl
y 
so
m
e 
of
 w
hi
ch
 a
re
 
lik
el
y 
to
 b
e 
ca
pa
bl
e 
of
 a
m
el
io
ra
tio
n 
by
 
po
lic
y 
ac
tio
n.
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St
ud
y 
Sa
m
pl
e 
de
sc
ri
pt
io
n,
 st
ud
y 
pe
ri
od
, a
nd
 
m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
 
Ty
pe
 o
f u
nd
er
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
pr
ob
le
m
, a
nd
 b
en
ch
m
ar
k 
Su
m
m
ar
y 
of
 fi
nd
in
gs
 a
nd
 c
on
cl
us
io
ns
 
Pa
rr
in
o 
an
d 
W
ei
sb
ac
h 
(1
99
9)
 
M
on
te
 C
ar
lo
 s
im
ul
at
io
ns
 o
f 
23
 U
S 
fi
rm
s,
 
us
in
g 
C
om
pu
st
at
 1
98
1-
95
 d
at
a.
  
B
as
ed
 o
n 
pe
ck
in
g 
or
de
r 
th
eo
ry
, ‘
cu
t-
of
f’
 N
PV
s 
ar
e 
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
 f
or
 a
ttr
ac
tin
g 
st
oc
kh
ol
de
r 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
, f
or
 
ea
ch
 r
is
k 
le
ve
l (
vo
la
til
ity
) 
of
 
an
 in
ve
st
m
en
t p
ro
je
ct
. A
n 
es
tim
at
io
n 
is
 m
ad
e 
of
 th
e 
w
ea
lth
 tr
an
sf
er
 f
ro
m
 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
 to
 d
eb
th
ol
de
rs
. 
Sc
al
e-
ex
pa
nd
in
g 
pr
oj
ec
ts
 a
re
 m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 s
ho
w
 o
ve
ri
nv
es
tm
en
t, 
w
hi
ls
t 
di
ve
rs
if
yi
ng
 p
ro
je
ct
s 
m
ay
 b
e 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 
w
ith
 u
nd
er
in
ve
st
m
en
t. 
L
ow
 c
as
h 
fl
ow
 
vo
la
til
ity
 (
as
 f
or
 g
as
 a
nd
 e
le
ct
ri
ci
ty
 f
ir
m
s)
 
is
 n
ot
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
ith
 u
nd
er
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
pr
ob
le
m
s.
 
Sh
ar
pe
 a
nd
 T
uz
un
 
(1
99
7)
 
In
co
m
pl
et
e 
pa
ne
l d
at
a 
se
t f
or
 2
3 
A
us
tr
al
ia
n 
ba
nk
s 
(q
ua
rt
er
s 
19
89
:3
 –
 1
99
2:
4)
 u
si
ng
 o
ff
-
ba
la
nc
e 
sh
ee
t d
ir
ec
t c
re
di
t s
ub
st
itu
te
s 
(a
s 
as
se
ts
 s
ol
d 
w
ith
 r
ec
ou
rs
e,
 s
ta
nd
by
 le
tte
rs
 o
f 
cr
ed
it,
 g
ua
ra
nt
ee
s,
 e
tc
.)
. 
A
s 
w
ith
 p
ec
ki
ng
 o
rd
er
 th
eo
ry
, 
un
de
ri
nv
es
tm
en
t i
s 
‘s
ub
-
op
tim
al
 in
ve
st
m
en
t’
, w
hi
ch
 is
 
an
 a
ge
nc
y 
co
st
 in
du
ce
d 
by
 
ri
sk
y 
de
bt
. U
nd
er
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
ac
ro
ss
 f
ir
m
s 
is
 d
et
er
m
in
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
le
ve
l o
f 
ri
sk
 a
tta
ch
ed
 to
 
ou
ts
ta
nd
in
g 
de
bt
. 
St
ro
ng
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
r 
su
pp
or
tin
g 
un
de
ri
nv
es
tm
en
t h
yp
ot
he
si
s 
th
at
 h
ig
h 
ri
sk
 
ba
nk
s 
w
ith
 r
el
at
iv
el
y 
hi
gh
 p
ro
po
rt
io
ns
 o
f 
lo
ng
-m
at
ur
ity
 d
eb
t m
ak
e 
gr
ea
te
r 
us
e 
of
 
of
f-
ba
la
nc
e 
sh
ee
t d
ir
ec
t c
re
di
t s
ub
st
itu
te
s 
th
an
 lo
w
 r
is
k 
ba
nk
s.
 T
hi
s 
hy
po
th
es
is
 
fl
oa
ts
 o
n 
th
e 
w
ea
lth
 tr
an
sf
er
 a
ss
um
pt
io
n 
of
 th
e 
pe
ck
in
g 
or
de
r 
of
 c
ap
ita
l. 
L
am
on
t (
19
97
) 
E
xa
m
in
es
 th
e 
jo
in
t h
yp
ot
he
si
s 
th
at
 (
1)
 a
 
de
cr
ea
se
 in
 c
as
h/
co
lla
te
ra
l d
ec
re
as
es
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t (
ho
ld
in
g 
fi
xe
d 
th
e 
pr
of
ita
bi
lit
y 
of
 
un
de
ri
nv
es
tm
en
t)
, a
nd
 (
2)
 th
e 
fi
na
nc
e 
co
st
s 
of
 d
if
fe
re
nt
 p
ar
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
co
rp
or
at
io
n 
ar
e 
in
te
rd
ep
en
de
nt
. S
am
pl
e 
co
ns
is
ts
 o
f 
40
 o
il-
de
pe
nd
en
t o
il 
fi
rm
s,
 u
si
ng
 a
 c
on
tr
ol
 g
ro
up
 o
f 
26
 d
iv
er
si
fi
ed
 o
il-
ow
ni
ng
 f
ir
m
s,
 u
si
ng
 1
98
5-
86
 C
om
pu
st
at
 c
or
po
ra
te
 s
eg
m
en
t-
le
ve
l d
at
a.
 
U
nd
er
in
ve
st
m
en
t a
s 
an
 in
tr
a-
fi
rm
 r
es
ou
rc
e 
al
lo
ca
tio
n 
pr
ob
le
m
, m
ed
ia
n 
in
du
st
ry
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t a
s 
th
e 
be
nc
hm
ar
k 
(u
si
ng
 1
96
1-
85
 ti
m
e 
se
ri
es
 
fr
om
 th
e 
U
S 
A
nn
ua
l S
ur
ve
y 
of
 M
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
).
 
L
ar
ge
 d
ec
re
as
es
 in
 c
as
h 
fl
ow
 a
nd
 
co
lla
te
ra
l v
al
ue
 d
ec
re
as
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t. 
C
or
po
ra
te
 s
eg
m
en
ts
 a
re
 in
te
rd
ep
en
de
nt
. 
L
ar
ge
 d
iv
er
si
fi
ed
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 o
ve
ri
nv
es
t 
in
, a
nd
 s
ub
si
di
se
 u
nd
er
pe
rf
or
m
in
g 
se
gm
en
ts
. 
C
he
n 
et
 a
l. 
(1
99
7)
 
In
ve
st
ig
at
es
 th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 o
n 
th
e 
de
bt
 r
at
io
 o
f 
m
ul
tin
at
io
na
l 
an
d 
do
m
es
tic
 f
ir
m
s.
 U
se
s 
C
om
pu
st
at
 d
at
a 
(1
8,
49
5 
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
 in
 p
er
io
d 
19
84
-1
99
3)
. 
U
nd
er
in
ve
st
m
en
t i
s 
de
ri
ve
d 
fr
om
 th
e 
de
bt
 r
at
io
, f
lo
at
in
g 
on
 th
e 
pe
ck
in
g 
or
de
r 
th
eo
ry
 
of
 c
ap
ita
l. 
It
 s
ee
m
s 
th
at
 m
ul
tin
at
io
na
l e
nt
er
pr
is
es
 
(M
N
E
s)
 te
nd
 to
 h
av
e 
a 
lo
w
er
 d
eb
t r
at
io
s 
an
d 
hi
gh
er
 g
ro
w
th
 o
pp
or
tu
ni
tie
s 
th
an
 
do
m
es
tic
 f
ir
m
s,
 c
et
er
us
 p
ar
ib
us
. 
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St
ud
y 
Sa
m
pl
e 
de
sc
ri
pt
io
n,
 st
ud
y 
pe
ri
od
, a
nd
 
m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
 
Ty
pe
 o
f u
nd
er
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
pr
ob
le
m
, a
nd
 b
en
ch
m
ar
k 
Su
m
m
ar
y 
of
 fi
nd
in
gs
 a
nd
 c
on
cl
us
io
ns
 
K
its
on
 a
nd
 M
ic
hi
e 
(1
99
6)
 
St
ud
ie
s 
B
ri
ta
in
’s
 p
oo
r 
in
du
st
ri
al
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
si
nc
e 
19
60
, a
 p
er
io
d 
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
se
d 
by
 
de
in
du
st
ri
al
is
at
io
n 
an
d 
co
nt
in
ue
d 
re
la
tiv
e 
ec
on
om
ic
 d
ec
lin
e.
 M
ac
ro
ec
on
om
ic
 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
 g
ro
ss
 in
ve
st
m
en
t d
at
a 
ar
e 
an
al
ys
ed
 f
or
 1
96
0-
94
, a
nd
 c
om
pa
re
d 
am
on
gs
t s
ix
 c
ou
nt
ri
es
. 
G
ro
w
th
 o
f 
U
K
’s
 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
 g
ro
ss
 c
ap
ita
l 
st
oc
k 
(r
el
at
iv
e 
to
 o
ut
pu
t)
 is
 
co
m
pa
re
d 
w
ith
 th
at
 r
at
io
 in
 
ot
he
r 
(i
nd
us
tr
ia
l)
 c
ou
nt
ri
es
. 
C
ap
ita
l s
to
ck
 is
 c
at
eg
or
is
ed
 
in
to
 ‘
eq
ui
pm
en
t’
, 
‘(
in
fr
a)
st
ru
ct
ur
es
’,
 a
nd
 ‘
to
ta
l 
as
se
ts
’.
 
U
nd
er
in
ve
st
m
en
t i
n 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
 is
 
ar
gu
ed
 to
 b
e 
th
e 
ke
y 
re
as
on
 f
or
 th
e 
po
or
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
. U
nd
er
in
ve
st
m
en
t i
ts
el
f 
is
 
ar
gu
ed
 to
 b
e 
th
e 
re
su
lt 
of
 a
 la
ck
 o
f 
an
y 
st
ro
ng
 m
od
er
ni
si
ng
 f
or
ce
. 
U
nd
er
in
ve
st
m
en
t c
on
st
ra
in
s 
te
ch
no
lo
gi
ca
l p
ro
gr
es
s 
an
d 
th
e 
ex
pa
ns
io
n 
of
 d
em
an
d.
 
H
an
so
n 
(1
99
5)
 
D
ev
el
op
s 
a 
m
od
el
 o
f 
m
od
el
 o
f 
ow
ne
rs
hi
p 
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
th
at
 m
in
im
is
es
 h
ol
d-
up
 r
is
ks
 a
nd
 
sp
re
ad
s 
na
tu
ra
l r
is
k 
(v
ar
ia
nc
e 
in
 th
e 
st
at
e 
of
 
na
tu
re
).
 S
ub
co
nt
ra
ct
in
g 
da
ta
 in
cl
ud
e 
95
 f
ir
m
-
le
ve
l i
nt
er
vi
ew
s 
an
d 
in
du
st
ri
al
 c
en
su
s 
da
ta
 
fo
r 
th
e 
M
ex
ic
an
 a
pp
ar
el
 in
du
st
ry
. 
A
 r
is
k-
ad
ju
st
ed
 h
ol
d-
up
 
m
od
el
 h
yp
ot
he
si
se
s 
th
at
 th
e 
le
ss
 s
ta
nd
ar
di
se
d 
a 
go
od
, t
he
 
la
rg
er
 th
e 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r’
s 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 in
 d
es
ig
n 
an
d 
di
st
ri
bu
tio
n,
 w
hi
ch
 le
ad
s 
to
 a
 
lo
w
 le
ve
l o
f 
su
bc
on
tr
ac
tin
g.
 
T
hi
s 
hy
po
th
es
is
 is
 b
al
an
ce
d 
w
ith
 o
ne
 w
he
re
 h
ig
h 
un
ce
rt
ai
nt
y 
of
 d
em
an
d 
st
im
ul
at
es
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
 to
 
su
bc
on
tr
ac
t m
or
e.
 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
 d
o 
su
bc
on
tr
ac
t a
 h
ig
h 
sh
ar
e 
of
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
w
he
re
 d
em
an
d 
is
 
hi
gh
ly
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
an
d 
a 
lo
w
 s
ha
re
 w
he
re
 
th
ey
 m
ak
e 
la
rg
e 
re
la
tio
n-
sp
ec
if
ic
 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
. T
hi
s 
m
ak
es
 th
e 
op
tim
al
 
ow
ne
rs
hi
p 
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
a 
fu
nc
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
re
la
tiv
e 
im
po
rt
an
ce
 o
f 
pa
rt
ie
s’
 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 a
nd
 p
ar
tie
s’
 r
el
at
iv
e 
ri
sk
 
av
er
si
on
. 
H
en
de
rs
on
 (
19
93
) 
T
es
ts
 th
e 
co
m
pe
tit
iv
e 
im
pl
ic
at
io
ns
 o
f 
ra
di
ca
l 
an
d 
in
cr
em
en
ta
l i
nn
ov
at
io
n,
 u
si
ng
 
ne
oc
la
ss
ic
al
 a
nd
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n 
th
eo
ri
es
 o
f 
in
ve
st
m
en
t b
eh
av
io
ur
 in
 th
e 
fa
ce
 o
f 
in
no
va
tio
n,
 in
 th
e 
se
m
ic
on
du
ct
or
 
ph
ot
ol
ith
og
ra
ph
ic
 in
du
st
ry
, u
si
ng
 f
ir
m
-l
ev
el
 
da
ta
, w
ith
 a
 1
96
0-
86
 s
am
pl
e 
pe
ri
od
. 
Fi
rm
-l
ev
el
 d
at
a 
on
 p
er
so
n-
ye
ar
s 
in
ve
st
ed
 in
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
fi
rs
t 
th
re
e 
ye
ar
s 
of
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
(r
el
at
iv
e 
to
 th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
le
ve
ls
 o
f 
co
m
pe
tit
or
s)
.  
In
cu
m
be
nt
s 
ap
pe
ar
 to
 h
av
e 
ra
tio
na
lly
 
an
tic
ip
at
ed
 le
ss
-p
ro
du
ct
iv
e 
re
se
ar
ch
 
ef
fo
rt
s 
w
he
n 
in
ve
st
in
g 
in
 ‘
ra
di
ca
l’
 
in
no
va
tio
n,
 a
nd
 h
av
e 
in
ve
st
ed
 n
o 
m
or
e 
th
an
 e
nt
ra
nt
s 
in
 th
es
e 
pr
oj
ec
ts
. 
Fu
rt
he
rm
or
e,
 in
cu
m
be
nt
s 
in
ve
st
ed
 m
or
e 
th
an
 e
nt
ra
nt
s 
in
 ‘
in
cr
em
en
ta
l’
 
in
no
va
tio
ns
. 
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Sa
m
pl
e 
de
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ri
pt
io
n,
 st
ud
y 
pe
ri
od
, a
nd
 
m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
 
Ty
pe
 o
f u
nd
er
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
pr
ob
le
m
, a
nd
 b
en
ch
m
ar
k 
Su
m
m
ar
y 
of
 fi
nd
in
gs
 a
nd
 c
on
cl
us
io
ns
 
A
ce
m
og
lu
 (
19
93
) 
D
ev
el
op
s 
an
 e
nd
og
en
ou
s 
gr
ow
th
 m
od
el
 
w
he
re
 th
e 
m
ar
gi
na
l p
ro
du
ct
 o
f 
in
ve
st
m
en
t f
or
 
a 
ty
pi
ca
l f
ir
m
 d
ep
en
ds
 o
n 
th
e 
to
ta
l 
in
ve
st
m
en
t i
n 
th
e 
ec
on
om
y,
 w
he
re
 la
st
 
pe
ri
od
’s
 le
ve
l o
f 
ag
gr
eg
at
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t i
n 
un
ob
se
rv
ed
, b
ut
 a
gg
re
ga
te
 o
ut
pu
t i
s 
ob
se
rv
ab
le
 (
so
 th
at
 o
ut
pu
t m
ay
 G
ra
ng
er
 
ca
us
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t)
. S
am
pl
e 
co
ns
is
ts
 o
f 
qu
ar
te
rl
y 
m
ac
ro
ec
on
om
ic
 d
at
a 
fo
r 
th
e 
U
S 
(1
96
5:
1 
to
 1
98
9:
4)
 a
nd
 U
K
 (
19
65
:1
 to
 
19
90
:3
).
 
U
nd
er
in
ve
st
m
en
t s
uf
fe
rs
 
fr
om
 a
n 
in
fo
rm
at
io
na
l 
ex
te
rn
al
ity
. I
f 
th
is
 e
xt
er
na
lit
y 
is
 ig
no
re
d,
 th
en
 in
ve
st
m
en
t 
w
ou
ld
 f
ol
lo
w
 a
 w
hi
te
 n
oi
se
 
pr
oc
es
s 
ov
er
 ti
m
e.
 E
xi
st
en
ce
 
of
 e
xt
er
na
lit
ie
s 
an
d 
le
ar
ni
ng
, 
ho
w
ev
er
, a
dd
 to
 th
e 
pe
rs
is
te
nc
e 
of
 f
lu
ct
ua
tio
ns
 
(a
dd
in
g 
an
 M
A
 te
rm
 to
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t’
s 
tim
e 
se
ri
es
).
 
O
ut
pu
t h
as
 s
om
e 
pr
ed
ic
tiv
e 
po
w
er
 f
or
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t a
nd
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t (
th
ou
gh
 th
e 
ev
id
en
ce
 r
em
ai
ns
 s
om
ew
ha
t m
ix
ed
).
 T
he
 
U
K
 d
at
a 
su
gg
es
t t
ha
t t
he
 p
re
di
ct
iv
e 
po
w
er
 o
f 
ou
tp
ut
 f
al
ls
 a
s 
its
 v
ar
ia
nc
e 
in
cr
ea
se
s.
 
B
al
ak
ri
sh
na
n 
an
d 
Fo
x 
(1
99
3)
 
In
ve
st
ig
at
es
 th
e 
im
po
rt
an
ce
 o
f 
sp
ec
ia
lis
ed
 
as
se
ts
 a
nd
 o
th
er
 u
ni
qu
e 
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s 
of
 a
 
fi
rm
 in
 e
xp
la
in
in
g 
th
e 
va
ri
an
ce
 in
 c
ap
ita
l 
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
ac
ro
ss
 f
ir
m
s.
 S
am
pl
e 
co
ns
is
ts
 o
f 
29
5 
m
in
in
g 
an
d 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
 f
ir
m
s,
 
op
er
at
in
g 
in
 3
0 
in
du
st
ri
es
 f
or
 th
e 
19
78
-8
7 
pe
ri
od
. 
Fi
rm
-s
pe
ci
fi
c 
as
se
ts
 o
n 
th
e 
on
e 
ha
nd
 e
nh
an
ce
 th
at
 f
ir
m
’s
 
un
iq
ue
ne
ss
 a
nd
 c
om
pe
tit
iv
e 
ad
va
nt
ag
e,
 b
ut
 o
n 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
ha
nd
 th
es
e 
as
se
ts
 a
re
 m
os
tly
 
in
ta
ng
ib
le
, d
if
fi
cu
lt 
to
 
m
ea
su
re
 a
nd
 to
 e
va
lu
at
e.
 
R
&
D
 in
te
ns
ity
 a
nd
 
ad
ve
rt
is
in
g 
in
te
ns
ity
 a
re
 s
ee
n 
as
 p
ro
xi
es
 f
or
 f
ir
m
-s
pe
ci
fi
c 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
. 
U
ni
qu
e 
fi
rm
-s
pe
ci
fi
c 
as
se
ts
 a
nd
 s
ki
lls
 a
re
 
by
 f
ar
 th
e 
m
os
t i
m
po
rt
an
t d
et
er
m
in
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of unobservable or immeasurable variables (such as managerial effort to invest in 
low-cost highly durable assets). The practical value of these determinants seems 
rather limited. 
2.7.2 Some definitions of ‘underinvestment’ 
When assessing the empirical studies summarised in table 2.3 at a quick glance, a 
first preliminary conclusion that can be drawn deals with the definition of 
‘underinvestment’. Though all studies deal with ‘underinvestment’ in some way, 
the definition of ‘investment’ appears to have multiple interpretations. Some 
studies (Goergen and Renneboog (2001); Parrino and Weisbach (1999); Sharpe 
and Tuzun (1997); and Chen et al. (1997)) perceive underinvestment as a 
deviation from the theoretically possible optimum of (anonymous, undefined) 
investment projects, where the capital order of capital suggests underinvestment. 
   In some other studies (Munari et al. (2002); Henderson (1993); and Balakrishnan 
and Fox (1993)), a specific form of investments (and hence underinvestment) is 
considered, such as intangibles as R&D. 
  In another category of studies, underinvestment is not perceived relative to the 
theoretical optimum, but rather incremental to the investments realised by 
competitors in other sectors or countries (Lamont (1997) and Kitson and Michie 
(1996)). The Kitson and Michie study distinguishes some directions of 
investments in capital stock, as ‘equipment’, ‘(infra)structures’, and ‘total assets’; 
the Lamont study only deals with anonymous investments as such. 
   The study of Acemoglu (1993) seems a category on its own, since it deals with 
some time series characteristics of (anonymous) investment levels, based on the 
efficient market hypothesis.51 Only some studies use qualitative indicators for 
signalling and defining underinvestment. For example, Munro and Leather (2000) 
base themselves on house condition surveys in the UK, where ‘substantial 
disrepair problems’ in houses imply serious underinvestment by the owners. 
Munari et al. (2002) also use qualitative information for making more explicit 
statements on underinvestment. As Munari et al. state: 
 
                                                      
51 In popular terms, the efficient market hypothesis assumes that current prices reflect all 
(public) information necessary for making (investment) decisions. In that situation, the 
investments time series would be described by a random walk—that is, today’s 
observations do not depend on previous ones. As soon as investments would not follow a 
random walk, but some long or short run memory process instead, the market cannot be 
efficient, and investments can hence assumed to be suboptimal. This theoretical 
assumption may perhaps apply to liquid investments in stocks, derivates or currencies, but 
when considering the investment process and strategy of a firm, then the investments time 
series may well display a gradual expansion path, where investments in the current period 
do depend on the previous period’s investments. To state that this is underinvestment 
seems debatable. 
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‘Studies on the relationship between ownership and 
organizational actions are generally confined to a macro 
perspective on firm activities, looking at aggregate economic 
and financial quantities such as the amount and degree of 
investments as indicators to evaluate the coherence of 
managerial decisions with principals interests. Often, however, 
there is a lack of deeper analysis on the different areas of 
activities which those decisions affect.’ (p. 33) 
 
It seems that this comment holds for the majority of empirical studies on 
underinvestment. A good example is Chen et al. (1997), where all firms are equal 
(except for the distinction between ‘multinational’ and ‘domestic’ firms) and 
Compustat data or alike seem sufficient for drawing inferences on numerous 
dimensions, without ever paying attention to context-specific factors, or firm 
strategies. 
2.7.3 Popular benchmarks 
Within the empirical studies surveyed, the most popular benchmark is definitely 
the optimal capital structure of the firm (in terms of debt and equity) that puts 
constraints on capital availability and costs when investing in new projects. In fact, 
it is the set of assumptions on the costs of capital and on the investment options 
available that suggest that a firm is restricted in entering into new, more profitable 
investment opportunities. In fact, this indicator informs about the possibility or 
likelihood that a firm may invest in new, more interesting projects, rather than 
informing on contemporary poor performance of that firm, the quality of its goods 
or services provided, or other output indicators. 
   An alternative benchmark—closer to the intuition of benchmarking—is to 
compare investment levels of multiple firms. The benchmark can then be put at a 
sectoral level, a national level, international level, or just an arbitrary control group 
of ‘similar’ firms. To what extent the benchmark is representative for a specific 
firm is debatable. In the light of contemporary managerial finance, where 
outsourcing, leasing, and off-balance sheet funding are the standard, one may 
question to what extent reported company data provide sufficient information on 
what is really at stake with the investment behaviour of a particular firm. 
Therefore, this benchmark can only be used when combined with in-depth analysis 
for putting things in perspective. 
   The optimal capital structure may inform on future investments; investment 
behaviour of others may inform on current investments, but still there need not be 
any evidence of ‘underinvestment’, in a pragmatic sense of the word. The more 
pragmatic ‘benchmark’ that tries to ‘prove’ existence of underinvestment is the 
one that signals symptoms of underinvestment. For example, in the UK real estate 
study of Munro and Leather (2000), disrepair problems would indicate 
underinvestment in property. Though perhaps such signals hardly form a 
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‘benchmark’,52 this type of studies are the only ones that care for the performance 
of an asset or a firm. If the asset (or firm) underperforms relatively to a well-
specified benchmark, then the suspicion of underinvestment in new assets or in 
maintenance may arise. 
   This brief assessment of benchmarks may leave the reader with the 
uncomfortable feeling that—though the concept of underinvestment is by 
definition incremental—there does not exist clarity on the type of benchmark to be 
used. Unfortunately, this is true. Probably the largest problem in accepting a 
standard is not so much rooted in the benchmark per se, but much more in a clear 
definition of underinvestment. All of the three surveyed benchmarks use proxies.53 
Since neither benchmark measures underinvestment directly, they can only suspect 
underinvestment—not prove it. These suspicions, however, can be categorised into 
suspected future underinvestment, and suspected contemporary underinvestment. 
Expected future underinvestment may arise if the agency costs of debt get higher, 
and firms become constrained in investing in new projects. Expected 
contemporary underinvestment, on the other hand, may arise if the current 
investment levels (or those of the very recent past) are substantially below those of 
the firm’s competitors. Still, however, these suspicions may be sufficient 
conditions for underinvestment, but are certainly not sufficient and necessary. 
2.7.4 Implications for the current study 
The ‘one million Euros question’ becomes: ‘when do firms underinvest in the 
provision of a public good?’ Preferably, the answer to that question should provide 
a benchmark or evaluation criterion, which is both theoretically sound and 
measurable in practice. In the provision of public goods, the level (or amount) of 
public good provided is an important benchmark. Here, it is important to recall the 
difference between discrete and continuous public goods (as highlighted in the 
previous chapter). If the public good is discrete (for example, a bridge), then the 
benchmark is straightforward: if the good is there (the bridge functions), then there 
is no underinvestment. If it is not there (e.g., the bridge remains unfinished and 
cannot be used yet), then there is underinvestment.54 For continuous public goods, 
the benchmark criterion becomes much more difficult. Take the example of public 
information on property transactions as a continuous public good. When would the 
Registry Office provide sufficient amounts of this public good? The answer ‘once 
all demand is satisfied’ is not a very economic one, for it would ignore all costs 
and benefits associated with the provision of the public good. A more subtle 
answer, however, is difficult to specify in general terms. When analysing the 
                                                      
52 Probably, in this particular case the underlying real benchmark is ‘good condition of a 
house’, or alike. 
53 These proxies were respectively, capital structure of the firm, investment levels of 
others, and symptoms of neglect. 
54 Given that the bridge was desired. 
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benchmarks used in empirical studies, however, some interesting features may be 
applied in the field of public goods. 
   For example, both the Munari et al. (2002) and the Wolf et al. (2001) studies 
explicitly deal with public goods. The Munari et al. study takes a longitudinal 
perspective (comparing the level and scope of R&D investment of two time 
periods), which has the pragmatic advantage that one can easily compare 
previously recorded data with current data.55 Nevertheless, when analysed in 
isolation, these figures need not be that informative. For example, the European 
Commission complains about the member states’ spending on education: 
 
‘[…] Europe seems to be suffering from under-investment in 
human resources. Although the EU Member States, like the 
USA, spend just over 5% of their GDP on publicly funded 
education and training, there is still a clear deficit in private 
funding. While private sources have always been regarded as 
an addition to, rather than a substitute for, public funding in 
the European social model, an increase in private funding is 
necessary in view of the new challenges of globalisation. 
[…]’56 
 
Suppose the member states increase their spending on education—no matter 
whether this concerns public or private spending. Would an increase as such be 
enough? Of course much depends on the effectiveness of the spending—one might 
spend millions of Euros extra on education, but that need not improve the status of 
education as such. Thus, the scope of spending also matters. The comparison 
between public and private spending (found in the Wolf et al. (2001) study), is 
also reflected in the above-cited concerns of the EC. Again, these statements can 
be based on measurable data, comparing two sources of funding at a time.57 
   All other empirical studies on underinvestment focus on private goods.58 Most of 
these studies use measurable proxies for inferring on the real but immeasurable 
variables. The house condition study of Munro and Leather (2000) uses disrepair 
problems as proxies for the investment behaviour. In fact, these proxies reveal the 
symptoms of underinvestment; that is, once disrepair problems arise, the 
investigators had a starting point for suspecting underinvestment. This approach is 
very workable, although ‘symptoms’ as such cannot easily be generalised. Table 
                                                      
55 The Henderson (1993) study also takes this perspective of longitudinal comparisons. 
56 Source: http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/cha/c11066.htm 
57 This method is also applied by Pearce and Palmer (2001), analysing public and private 
spending on environmental protection. 
58 The last exception is the Shah (1992) study, focusing on the role of public infrastructure 
as a factor of production. That study, however, is rather technical in the sense of 
comparing shadow prices with user cost, in order to predict underinvestment. 
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2.4 gives some examples of some underinvestment symptoms in utility sectors—
those sectors of the economy where many public goods are present. 
 
2.8 A definition of underinvestment 
Underinvestment appears to have many interpretations, and there seem to be 
multiple possibilities for empirically testing for its existence. A good definition of 
‘underinvestment’ for the current study, however, seems to be lacking. Since the 
focus of the study is on exploring the possibilities for governments to fight 
underinvestment (by private sector companies), let underinvestment be defined 
from a governmental or societal perspective. Governments do not define 
‘underinvestment’ per se, but are more likely to define: 
x Policies where the investment levels and direction are prescribed. This 
matches with the notion of ‘changing the choice set available’ of section 1.3. 
For example, consider the concession for the usufruct of assets as in some 
forms of privatisation.59 Under a concession, the concessionaire often has the 
obligation to invest a fixed amount of money per annum in predefined 
directions (assets, maintenance, etc.). In this case, underinvestment is clearly 
the negative deviation from the prescribed target, while both ‘observed 
investment behaviour’ and ‘prescribed investment behaviour’ can be expressed 
in amounts of money, and are hence directly measurable. 
x Policies where performance targets are specified. This indirect goal-setting 
leaves more room for manoeuvre for the private sector entrepreneurs to 
determine the most profitable and effective resource allocation. It is somewhat 
comparable to the ‘economic instruments’ approach of section 1.3, in the sense 
that not all investment behaviour has been prescribed, though still the choice 
set is affected by this performance target policy too. An example of a 
performance target policy, is the case where a government specifies the 
                                                      
59 See section 2.5.4 for an explanation of concessions. 
Table 2.4: Some examples of underinvestment symptoms in utility sectors 
Sector Underinvestment symptoms 
Motorways Poor surface quality, congestions (due to shortage in road volumes or 
lengths) 
Electricity Power blackouts and brownouts, voltage drops 
Drinking water Poor taste or chemical contents, interruptions in delivery, drop in water 
pressure 
Telecommunications Poor quality of the (audio or data) signal, disruptions in connections, 
inaccessibility of a connection 
Railways Low change of obtaining a seat, delays, poor coach quality, difficulty 
with using one ticket for travelling amongst multiple areas 
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punctuality of a railway system, while it leaves undefined whether the 
punctuality figures are met due to investments in rails, whether engine drivers 
are offered specific incentives for being in time, or other. The theoretical 
advantage of this type of policy (relative to the aforementioned case where 
government specifies what to invest) is that the fruits of a free market can be 
borne, since resource allocation is left to private entrepreneurs. A clear 
disadvantage, however, is that investment behaviour becomes a second-order 
variable, which makes it more difficult to determine whether there exists 
‘underinvestment’ or whether there exists ‘bad luck’, ‘bad management’, or 
other.  
 
Both policy types have many variants, but what matters for the current study is 
that underinvestment can be expressed as a function of the applied policy. The 
advantage of expressing underinvestment as a function of a policy is that it allows 
policies to vary over different product-market combinations, as well as over space 
or time. For example, it is most likely that a government prioritises clean drinking 
water more than rock-bottom telephone rates. Consequently, it will apply a 
different policy in each sector. Over time, however, priorities and preferences may 
change—and so may policies. In addition, other determinants as ‘national wealth’ 
may affect the priorities a government gives to the development of a sector. Here 
the promotion of environmentally friendly technologies may serve as an example. 
Though in theory each government should take care of the environment, that care 
is usually given a lower priority than, for example, economic growth.60 
   A clear disadvantage of defining underinvestment in terms of government policy 
is that it may become ambiguous or obsolete—the same observed investment 
behaviour might simultaneously be classified as ‘underinvestment’ as well as 
‘societally desired investment’. 
 
2.9 Government instruments for discouraging underinvestment 
The purpose of this chapter was to analyse factors that prevent firms from making 
investments, even if it were financially attractive to make these investments (see 
research question 1). The previous sections have given an extensive overview of 
possible barriers to investment, and of the possible consequence: underinvestment. 
The current section deals with the implications for government intervention in the 
private sector investment decision. Though there exists at least a semantic 
difference between ‘discouraging underinvestment’ and ‘encouraging investment’, 
                                                      
60 A fine example here is probably the decision of the US president George W. Bush, 
early-2001, not to rectify the Kyoto agreement on greenhouse gas reductions, since 
rectification would be harmful for the US economy. In a press conference, Mr Bush 
argued: ‘I will not accept anything that will harm our economy and hurt our American 
workers’ (The Independent, 30 March 2001). 
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the two approaches share one big characteristic: to align investment with policy 
goals. However obvious this may seem at a glance, it seems useful to introduce the 
following definition: 
 
Definition 2.1: Policy instruments that encourage investment discourage underinvestment. 
 
For example, if the market underinvests in a certain type of technology, 
government can only intervene by either encouraging investment, or by restricting 
firms in their investments in other technologies. Since the latter group of measures 
affects the choice set, and can therefore not be considered a non-coercive 
instrument, I will proceed with the former. 
   Having a definition that helps to describe the action government can take, the 
next step is to determine a benchmark. After all, by definition 2.1 alone, firms can 
invest up to infinity, but such does not mean that there still exists underinvestment. 
Section 2.7 has discussed this issue in detail. 
   The essence of all non-coercive instruments is that they change the costs and 
benefits associated with the choice set available to entrepreneurs, without 
changing the choice set itself. Though the list of specific instruments is large,61 all 
instruments nail down to the idea that desirable behaviour should be encouraged 
through e.g. fiscal benefits (as depreciation allowances etc.) or subsidies (e.g., 
output-related or fixed amounts) and undesirable behaviour should be discouraged 
through levies, duties, etc. Table 2.5 illustrates a number of possible non-coercive 
instruments that may eliminate underinvestment through positive action. 
   In addition to the incentive compatibility problem, however, the Influenceability 
Dilemma also includes a participation constraint (see Laffont and Martimort 
(2002)). 
   If governments opt for economic instruments in encouraging investment (ergo, 
discouraging underinvestment), they must thus affect the costs and benefits 
associated with the choice set available to firms. Table 2.5 shows how economic 
instruments may affect the determinants of underinvestment, as analysed in this 
chapter. For most underinvestment determinants, government has limited 
possibilities for directly influencing a specific group of companies, or for directly 
influencing a specific type of investments. The added value then of analysing the 
hard-to-affect determinants is that they may operate as sufficient conditions—
having the nature of a prerequisite. For example, suppose the current government 
 
                                                      
61 See, for example, the large online database of the OECD at the Internet, listing a large 
number of economic instruments for the purpose of environmental protection. This 
database (called the ‘OECD/EEA Economic Instruments Database’) is publicly accessible 
at the following URL: 
http://www1.oecd.org/scripts/env/ecoInst/index.htm 
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offers a generous tax holiday for investments in the private provision of public 
goods. If, however, it is most likely that in the next period a government with 
opposite ideologies replaces the current government, then the fiscal measures may 
Table 2.5: Government instruments for discouraging underinvestment 
Source of underinvestment Possible non-coercive government 
instrument 
Wrong incentives for management to 
invest 
Personal income tax measures; budgetary 
policy increasing purchasing power; 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
measures 
Uncertainty on ROI with an option to wait Influence ROI, reduce uncertainty; 
monetary measures (e.g., affecting interest 
rate via Central Bank) 
Debt-to-equity ratio Fiscal measures 
Stock-market performance of the firm Specific measures might help an individual 
firm, but these distort competition 
Agency approaches to underinvestment Measures affecting the costs of debt and 
equity 
Strategic underinvestment and the 
signalling game 
Possible in case of a firm signalling vis-à-
vis government; moral appeals to the firms 
‘not to cheat’ 
Incomplete contracts and the hold-up 
problem 
Eliminate (long run) uncertainty with 
respect to ROI (may require regulation) 
Contract renegotiation and the hold-up 
problem 
In case of renegotiation between firm and 
government (e.g., concession) impose 
penalties on renegotiation for either party 
The role of competition Generic fiscal measures or subsidies on 
making an investment need not distort 
competition; specific measures would 
distort competition 
Declining product-market Subsidies or fiscal measures may lengthen 
the life of a product-market, and therewith 
provide incentives to continue investing 
Savings gap, hyperinflation, and capital 
flight 
Macroeconomic measures (generic); 
foreign direct investment (FDI) policies 
Profits and price cap regulation Macroeconomic measures (generic) 
Liberalisation, regulatory reforms, and the 
vertical separation of the value chain 
Macroeconomic or sectoral measures 
(generic) 
Franchise bidding, concessions, and 
licensing 
Difficult (see chapter 5); government 
procurement policies (competitive 
tendering) 
Policy reforms, and the expropriation risk Macroeconomic measures (generic); 
international treaties; free trade agreements 
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vanish in that subsequent period. Thus, though the absence of near-future policy 
reforms is not a necessary condition for invoking investments, it can readily be 
treated as a prerequisite. 
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3 THE SMART GOVERNANCE DILEMMA 
 
 
 
 
Given an analysis of all potential barriers to investment hindering the effectiveness 
of non-coercive instruments, the fundamental question rises how much 
encouragement a government should provide. I have labelled this the Smart 
Governance Dilemma, which deals with the efficiency of government policies—if, 
after all, it appears to be possible to encourage firms to invest with less support 
than intuitively thought, why should a government be too generous?62 This chapter 
analyses the possibility to ‘design’ or determine an optimal wealth transfer that (a) 
is sufficiently generous to encourage the private sector to invest, but also (b) 
minimizes governmental expenditures in order not to deviate too much from a 
Pareto efficiency. 
   The aim of this chapter is to propose a ‘smart’ framework that calculates the 
minimum amount of wealth transfer through non-coercive instruments, which is 
sufficiently high to encourage private sector investment, but not so high that the 
wealth transfer becomes very Pareto inefficient. Instead of immediately rushing 
into a complex debate on the societal valuation of the public good, I will start off 
with the question of how much monetary support is needed in order to make the 
private sector invest in a technology that yields a public good. This question is best 
answered in case of a standard technology, for which the costs and benefits are 
checked relatively easy. 
 
3.1 The participation constraint and an evaluation criterion 
Recalling the overall research model in Figure 1.7, it is the economic 
attractiveness of the investment that determines whether firms invest or not. 
Chapter 2 has shown that nevertheless some variables may intervene in this 
process, but these are ignored for the time being (they will return in the next 
chapter). How can we put this ‘economic attractiveness’ into operation? Both in 
the general economics literature (see, e.g., Frederick et al. (2002)) as in the 
corporate finance literature (see, e.g., Ross et al. (1999(1989))),63 the standard 
evaluation criterion would be the net present value (NPV). In terms of the NPV, 
                                                      
62 One could add here that penny-pinching is unproductive in the long run, since a lack of 
generosity may also be interpreted as an absent long-run commitment of government to the 
private sector. 
63 Note that the corporate finance literature uses the narrower criterion of ‘financial 
attractiveness’ instead of the ‘economic attractiveness’. 
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any project for which a nonnegative NPV is obtained should be accepted.64 
Although this criterion gives a fine intuition for a ‘single-shot’ investment, it does 
not capture any long-term sustainability conditions. For example, suppose a firm 
invests in an asset with an economic lifespan of ten years. Given now a zero NPV 
(which was considered sufficient), the firm earns exactly enough to recuperate the 
initial investment as well as all relevant costs during the lifespan of the asset. This 
implies that during its ten years’ lifespan, the project has not generated any 
additional penny other than the money needed to recuperate the aforementioned 
costs. Thus, though the zero NPV criterion suffices for a firm to be in the industry 
for the duration of one project, it does not help the firm in saving any money for a 
replacement investment. Suppose, for example, the firm intends to stay in the 
business. Then the zero NPV criterion implies that at each expiry of an asset, there 
is considerable uncertainty whether the firm may proceed. After all, since it had no 
opportunity to save money for any replacements, it has to find funding each time it 
has fully depreciated an asset. If, however, the firm were allowed not only to 
recuperate all costs of the asset currently installed, but also to save money for 
making a replacement investment once the current asset has been written off, then 
the long-run presence of the firm in that same market is much more predictable. 
   In mathematical terms, this intuition is represented by a maximisation problem 
subject to a long-run sustainability constraint: The firm is assumed to maximise 
the (net present) value on its investment, subject to the restriction that this NPV is 
not only nonnegative, but also covers the replacement costs at the end of the 
depreciation period. Let Vt be the NPV of an investment It calculated at time t, kt 
the capital stock at time t, and let G be the rate of physical depreciation of the 
capital stock. The firm’s maximisation problem then becomes: 
^ ` t,kI
V
tt
   max
0
f
,  s.t.: 11   ttt kkk G . 
In this optimisation problem, the firm maximises the NPV of its investment and 
capital stock, subject to the restriction that this capital stock at least remains equal 
over time—that is, all physical depreciation of assets already installed must be 
compensated by installing new ones. This simple and intuitive model is sometimes 
referred to as the ‘neoclassical investment model’ developed by Hall and 
Jorgenson (1967). The attractiveness of this model lies in the fact that we now 
have some (albeit a somewhat simplified) criterion for a government to determine 
the height of the subsidies or tax incentives necessary to not only let firms invest 
                                                      
64 Since the early 1990s, the theory of ‘real options’ has become increasingly popular as a 
valuation tool. Though the calculation of a real option price may have some advantages 
over the traditional NPV analysis (for example, it is easier to include the effects of 
abandonment or additional investment in continuous time), the essence and intuition 
remain the same as in the standard NPV analysis. See Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Trigeorgis 
(1996), or Brennan and Trigeorgis (2000) as some good entries into options pricing. 
79 
once, but which is also sufficiently high to let them reinvest after depreciation of 
the installed assets. 
   A second step is to complicate this model, such that it captures all kind of real-
life attributes that fine-tune the participation constraint. For example, there may 
exist cases where not every Euro invested turns into a Euro of capital stock. 
Imagine an organisation that wishes to invest in a small-scaled fundamentalist 
religious school (not equal to the dominant religion in that country). It will not 
meet the same resistance compared to when it wishes to invest in one thousand 
schools scattered across one province or state. In the latter case, there is no doubt 
the organisation has to spend more on lobbying or even protective measures to 
realise the project. Needless to say that in that case, the organisation receives ‘less 
bricks per Euro’. However hypothetical this example may be, investments in 
public goods (and religious schools may be included here) not only inhabit 
positive externalities, but they may also yield negative externalities. A motorway 
interferes with the quality of life (noise and dirt for inhabitants of surrounding 
areas), streetlights spoil the darkness overnight (negative impact on flora), and 
religious schools of an aberrant type may be considered a threat to the standard 
ones. In each of these cases, the seriousness of these side effects increases 
exponentially with the size of investments, and the investor may be asked to take 
preventive measures that mitigate these negative externalities. Uzawa (1969) 
therefore introduces a so-called ‘capital stock adjustment cost function’, which is 
visualised in figure 3.1. In this figure, investment It may increase, but the net effect 
It
 tI<
 
 
Figure 3.1: Capital stock adjustment cost function 
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is only  tI<  per cent of It. This capital stock adjustment cost function must be 
included in the restriction to the above maximisation problem.65 
   Another important notion is that the replacement cost of the existing capital 
stock probably varies over time. Investments in the sphere of renewable energy 
readily provide a good example here: About twenty years after their commercial 
introduction, both wind turbines and solar panels have seen price drops of about 
50 per cent of the introduction price. A smart government policy must take care of 
this phenomenon, because ignoring the technological progress that decreases the 
costs and benefits of a standard technology implies over subsidising. 
   One way of combining the two suggested refinements is given by authors as 
Auerbach (1983) or Hayashi (1982). They combine the Hall-Jorgensonian 
neoclassical investment model with a modified version of Tobin’s Q. Although the 
original Q (see Tobin (1961)) has seen many different interpretations, they all 
approach a ratio where the market value of installed capital stock is divided by 
price one has to pay for replacing the capital stock.66 One serious problem that has 
hampered empirical applications for a long time is that Q is based on marginal 
effects that may be expressed mathematically, but can never be observed 
empirically.67 Hayashi (1982), however, has shown that under some specific 
conditions (i.e., a constant-returns-to-scale technology for a firm that is a price-
taker), marginal Q equals average Q. This result is very powerful. Also, Hayashi 
(1982) helps to express ‘Q’ as follows: 
tt
t
Km
VQ  , 
where Vt is the NPV of the project (including all expected future profits, and 
subject to the long-run sustainability restriction), mt the price of new investment 
goods, and Kt the firm’s capital stock,68 all evaluated at time t. This is average Q, 
                                                      
65 Note that in this figure, divestment (i.e., It<0) yields little benefit to the firm. This effect 
stems from the sunk cost notion, which is extensively discussed in the real options 
literature (see, e.g., Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Trigeorgis (1996), or Brennan and 
Trigeorgis (2000)). 
66 Examples of these different interpretations vary from the accountancy ‘market-to-book 
value’ to advanced economic shadow price ratios. 
67 In fact, there are two important discussions related to Tobin’s Q. First, the difference 
between marginal Q (which is derived analytically), and average Q (which is observed); 
see Hayashi (1982) for a rigorous discussion. The second discussion deals with the 
unobserved capital stock adjustment cost function. If sunk costs are present, firms cannot 
decrease their capital stock (divest) costless. In addition, if investments face installation 
costs (loosely speaking, diminishing returns to scale), I units of gross investment do not 
necessarily turn into capital, but only a fraction does. See Abel et al. (1996) for a 
discussion. 
68 Alternatively, if one would like to calculate Q for an industry, then K is usually applied 
the to industry’s capital stock, while k represents the capital stock of the individual firm. 
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which can be observed. The link with the neoclassical investment model of Hall 
and Jorgenson (1967) is established in the value of the firm, Vt. All government 
incentives with respect to the investment process can be now readily incorporated 
in Q. For example, if government provides a tax holiday, Vt will increase, and so 
does Q. If the firm can obtain an investment subsidy, the costs of new investments 
mt decreases, so that Q increases. The impact of technological progress (reducing 
the replacement costs of the capital stock) increases Q. 
   Q not only has a very consistent underlying theoretical framework (see the 
appendix to this chapter for the references and mathematical derivations), but also 
does it provide an evaluation criterion that is both simple and intuitive. For 
example, if Q is bigger than unity, firms should invest—apparently installed 
capital stock yields more than it costs to install that capital stock. If Q is smaller 
than one, firms should not invest for the investment costs are bigger than the 
present value of the revenues.69 At Q equalling unity, firms should be indifferent. 
It is this criterion that will be used as a central evaluation criterion in fine-tuning 
the support needed to meet the participation constraint. 
   Given these simple guidelines, governments can readily apply this sort of ‘Q’ to 
calculate how much money should be transferred to the private sector in order to 
make them invest. Since the denominator of Q is an NPV, the impact of non-
coercive government instruments should also be expressed in terms of an NPV. 
3.1.1 A note on evaluation criteria and benchmarks 
In the above section, where I have explained my choice for a modified version of 
Tobin’s Q, the reader might get the incorrect impression that my choice for Q 
would be the only correct one. In order to be complete, I wish to emphasize the 
                                                      
69 Opposing to these simple guidelines offered by the literature, I would like to argue that 
firms invest as long as Q is nonnegative. Thus, I disagree with the mainstream literature on 
values for Q at the > 1,0  interval. If the denominator of Q is nothing more than an NPV, 
and if a nonnegative NPV suffices for investing, then firms must also invest if Q is 
nonnegative. These investments would, however, not necessarily be sustainable in the long 
run (and thus the NPV would not meet its long-run sustainability restriction), and may 
vanish after the economic lifespan of the first and single investment. The question rises 
whether this is bad per se (and thus whether the restriction should always be added). For 
example, one of my best friends has invested in a wind turbine project. Given his 
background as a tax lawyer, he knew how to fully exploit all fiscal and financial incentives 
available for this project, and his project has obtained a positive NPV. Just as I am 
convinced that he enjoys his brand new convertible (bought from the profits of this project) 
more than the ‘warm glow’ he might have received from positively contributing to the 
environment, I am also sure his motivation for this project was not to remain in the wind 
energy market forever. Actually, though the project generates sufficient cash to increase 
his standard of living, it does not generate sufficient money to meet the long-run 
sustainability restriction. Nevertheless, I am most convinced he could not care less. 
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limited applicability of Q, and put it in perspective by elucidating some 
background and alternatives. 
   In any government policy design that aims at stimulating the private sector to 
undertake some kind of action, one could plausibly argue there exists a so-called 
‘level of analysis problem’: government designs and evaluates a policy at the 
macroeconomic level (and includes externalities of the policy), whereas firms will 
predominantly be focussed on the microeconomic pecuniary gains that enhance 
the value of the firm. Not surprisingly, the literature offers distinct evaluation 
criteria and benchmarks for these two levels of analysis, each summarised below, 
as well as the gap. 
 
Evaluating non-coercive government policies  
Following the nice illustrations and argumentation given by Baumol (1990), 
entrepreneurs will engage in those activities that create most value for them. If 
some activities are unproductive to society (varying from environmental pollution 
to the destruction of people through the production and sales of weapons), one 
could plausibly argue there exists a difficulty with the payoff structure of the 
choices available to these firms. Governments can affect these payoff structures by 
means of supporting desired activities that currently have an uninteresting payoff, 
or fining the undesired activities such that firms will internalise the negative 
externalities of their actions undesired by society. The most popular non-coercive 
instruments are financial measures (subsidies and fines) and fiscal measures. 
   In the literature on non-coercive policy measures, the effect of subsidies and 
fines is the simplest one, of which most authors calculate a present value. In 
environmental economics, for example, the height of the individual fine (times the 
chance of fining) can be readily compared with (a) the value of negative 
externality (which gives rise to the currently unsolvable valuation problem), or (b) 
with the costs of avoiding the externality (such as a filter). Though there is little 
consensus on the valuation of the externality, there exists a consensus on the logic 
that if the fine helps to let firms internalise the costs of the externality, then the 
policy is effective, and firms can still dedicate resources to those activities that are 
value enhancing. 
   The literature focussing on the effects of fiscal measures is more complex. A 
popular evaluation criterion asserts that in the base-case (of no tax incentives) 
firms face a tax burden summarised in the net corporate tax rate. Since fiscal 
policies may lower the tax burden to firms, they may be evaluated by means of the 
adjusted net corporate tax rate (see Ec (2001), or Devereux and Griffith (1998) for 
applications of this methodology). The logic is then that firms will be attracted to 
those activities for which the net corporate tax rate is lowest. 
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Evaluating the private sector investment decision 
In corporate finance, the standard evaluation criterion is the NPV.70 In NPV 
calculations, most of the attention is paid to the discount rate, or ‘cost of capital’. 
Most academics agree the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is the most logical 
choice for determining that discount rate, particularly when uncertainty is 
introduced into the analysis (see Fama (1996)). As soon as the uncertainty 
becomes bigger, however, and firms wish to value the optionalities associated with 
the numerous choices they face at any moment in time (and not only at the end of 
a fixed period), the NPV rule is a pain in the neck. Here the ideas of the ‘real 
option theory’ have changed our thinking on valuation dramatically (see Dixit and 
Pindyck (1994), Trigeorgis (1996), or Brennan and Trigeorgis (2000) as overviews 
of and entries into this field). Albeit that the computational techniques of real 
options are more complicated than of the simple NPV (which also puts a burden 
on the quality of the data necessary to make these computations), the intuition 
remains the same: any investment must contribute nonnegatively to the value of 
the firm. 
 
Defining the gap 
At a first glance, the two levels of analysis need not clash—the governmental 
evaluation of non-coercive policies might be expressed in an NPV, just as the 
private sector would do. The biggest problems, however, are found in (a) the 
subject to be maximised as well as the underlying ideas regarding ‘maximisation’, 
and (b) the discount rate to be used as well as the underlying ideas regarding the 
analysis of ‘the future’. 
   The entire idea of wealth maximising (whether at the macro or the micro level) 
stands or falls with the valuation of the output of the activity in which government 
or firms invest. For firms this exercise is easy—cash is cash, and with a little effort 
one may even valuate the effects of those actions that do not raise cash 
immediately (the so-called ‘strategic actions’). For governments, however, the 
problem is much more difficult (see also chapter 5 of this study on this matter). 
Even if governments were only concerned with wealth maximisation for society,71 
then still we must acknowledge the impossibility to unambiguously valuate the 
public goods and other positive externalities provided by the public sector (or that 
arise as a result of the actions supported by governments). For governments to 
make a full cost-benefit analysis, however, these externalities must be included in 
the benefits of a public works project, but if we do not know how to valuate these 
                                                      
70 Although the theory prefers the NPV in most situations (see Amaro De Matos (2001)), 
in practice managers may still use dramatically naive decision rules as the ‘payback 
period’ (see Graham and Harvey (2001) for a large survey and discussion). 
71 Of course, governments are not only concerned with the creation of wealth, but also with 
its distribution. 
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benefits this exercise remains a very theoretical one.72 As a consequence, it is 
difficult to come up with an NPV-like criterion, and the use of an adjusted net 
corporate tax rate suddenly becomes apparent (for it escapes the valuation 
discussion on the externalities). A big problem with that approach, however, is that 
is does not easily translate into some benchmark—what tax rate is good? 
   Suppose it were possible to valuate the output of the project from a 
governmental perspective. Still then, the question arises of how to discount these 
benefits. Even in the case of publicly provided private goods, the question rises 
what discount rate should be used (see, e.g, Blomquist and Christiansen (1999) or 
Munro (1991)). In some works, the erroneous assumption is made that 
governments may discount at the risk-free interest rate—after all, that rate 
represents the costs of capital when public works are financed through issuing 
government bonds. That false assumption completely ignores not only the specific 
risks associated with the individual project (that should be included in the 
assessment of that project), but also the fact that governments then use the 
unlimited collateral of the taxpayers (who should have to compensate for all 
downside risk, but need not benefit from all upward potential). Different discount 
rates, however, raise the question whether assets can have a different value in the 
public or private sectors (cf. Brealey et al. (1997)). 
   Another issue associated with discounted utility (or discounted cash flows) 
concerns the time horizon and time preferences. At the micro-level, even though it 
is rational for investors to accept projects with a nonnegative NPV, they need not 
accept projects that yield a loss for some subsequent years, even though these 
project would have a positive overall NPV (Frederick et al. (2002)). At the micro-
level, this ‘anomaly’ stems from psychological theories, but what about the macro-
level? For an elected government starting a project that may be beneficial to 
society in the long run, but is loss-giving in the first few years, it may readily fear 
not to be re-elected.73 Also, over time, firms need not adjust their preferences (still 
they are likely to aim at profit maximisation), but what about governments? 
Suppose a left-wing government supports a certain policy (say, stimulate public 
transport) but is not re-elected. its right-wing successor is likely to have other 
preferences (say, build more motorways) and abolish the previous support 
programmes. This change of administration represents a regime shift in 
preferences. When translating that issue to the provision of public goods (of which 
many have a long-term effect and therewith deal with intergenerational 
sustainability issues and thus an intergenerational choice problem of how to divide 
costs and benefits amongst the various generations), discounting becomes a tricky 
                                                      
72 Although it can be very instructive to perform such an exercise, all too many will never 
be put into operation. 
73 Therefore, in the extreme, some authors suggest that unpopular policy measures are 
easier carried out by dictatorial than by democratic regimes (see Rodrik (1993), Rodrik 
(1996), Alessina and Drazen (1991), or Fernandez and Rodrik (1991)). 
85 
business (see Gollier (2002)). When assessing these time dynamics for the private 
provision of public goods, however, concepts as altruism or a ‘warm glow’ are 
introduced in order to explain any observed investment pattern (see Myles (1997), 
or Gradstein (1992)). 
 
Bridging the gap 
Although some authors believe it is possible to obtain a Pareto efficient solution to 
the private provision of public goods, I am more reluctant on this matter. If, after 
all, it is so difficult to valuate the public good, it is also virtually impossible to let 
government maximise its utility. Given my scepticism about governmental utility 
maximisation—but not about firms’ profit maximisation—I have a difficulty with 
optimisation techniques that aim at obtaining a Pareto efficient provision of public 
goods in general, and therewith also in the case of government support for the 
private provision of public goods. I believe firms may choose their optimal 
investment, given a payoff structure altered by government (which is exactly in 
line with Baumol (1990)). Nevertheless, I believe it will be difficult to statically 
calculate the optimal wealth transfer governments should make. 
   Instead, I think the whole problem might be better served by allowing a little 
dynamics into the game: Government makes sure it offers a payoff structure to the 
private sector that meets the participation constraint of the latter, but does not try 
to be too generous and violate its own expenditure minimisation problem. The 
methodology proposed above (combining Tobin’s Q with a neoclassical 
investment model) meets these criteria. There is, however, one big drawback of 
that framework. Despite its theoretical logical consistency, the number of cases for 
which Q can also be measured (and hence put into practice) forms only a subset of 
the entire economy.74 
 
3.2 Government’s expenditure minimisation problem and 
Pareto efficiency 
For a government trying to encourage private sector investment by means of non-
coercive instruments, it is very important to know how the private sector will 
respond to an amount of money offered as a support. That knowledge alone, 
however, is not enough. In order to achieve some sort of Pareto efficiency, 
government can use the knowledge on the predicted private sector behaviour as 
input to its own decision-making. The optimal wealth transfer therewith becomes a 
nested optimisation problem: first, government analyses how the private sector is 
likely to respond, and second, it optimises its own goals—in this light of the 
current study, such will be the maximisation of the provision of a public good. 
This logic is worked out in two sections (1) an explanation of the game theoretical 
                                                      
74 I described this problem above (in section 3.1). 
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dynamics, and (2) a discussion on the (implicit) governmental valuation of the 
public good. 
3.2.1 Nested optimisation and Nash equilibria 
Government support for the private provision of public goods will be treated as a 
nested optimisation problem: government will choose a strategy that is conditional 
upon the outcome of the strategy played by a rational75 private sector investor. 
Suppose a government is interested in the provision of a public good Y that can be 
‘produced’ by means of a technology that also produces some private good.76 In 
order to anticipate on the private sector’s investment behaviour, government first 
learns about the microeconomic attractiveness of the targeted investment decision 
necessary to provide the public good.77 In section 3.1, I introduced ‘Q’ as the 
evaluation criterion indicating the economic attractiveness. It is most reasonable to 
assert that at least the market for the private good is characterised by a downward 
sloping demand curve.78 As a consequence, increasing investment also increases 
the capital stock in the market, which will ultimately impose a downward pressure 
on the price that market offers for the private good. Thus, the economic 
attractiveness of the investment decision must be a function of the capital stock in 
that market:  KQ . This yields the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3.1: Due to a downward-sloping demand curve of a ‘normal’ private good, 
any increase in the installed capital stock of a technology yielding both a private and a 
public good puts a downward pressure on the market price for the private good—therewith 
lowering the economic attractiveness of the investment. 
                                                      
75 The usage of the term ‘rational’ may require some explanation. Anyone experienced in a 
specific card or board game, varying from bridge to chess knows that it is more fun playing 
such a game with players at a similar level. As soon as an absolute newcomer joins the 
game, one will observe that the newcomer’s moves may seem totally ‘irrational’, since he 
or she makes moves that would never have been made by the incumbent players. It may 
well be that the newcomer is a rational person, but since he or she is unfamiliar with this 
specific game, his or her movements deviate from the predicted pattern and are usually 
perceived as ‘irrational’ by the other players. 
76 Let a wind turbine serve as an example of this technology: the private good is electricity 
(which can be sold at a wholesale market) and the public good is clean air (or avoided 
emissions). 
77 This learning is easy: With a standard technology, government can ask—like any other 
market party can—the manufacturer or other supplier for the investment and operating 
costs. Assuming that this technology also yields some private good for which we deal with 
a market where firms are price-takers rather than price-makers (this is in fact a situation 
beyond Coase (1974)). Then, government can inform on the price the market offers for the 
private good, and mimic the microeconomic NPV calculations. 
78 In section 3.2.2, I will also discuss the limitations to continue providing more and more 
amounts of public good. 
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The entrepreneur will probably not explicitly calculate the Q introduced in section 
3.1—instead, it will calculate the more naive NPV for its individual project. 
Without entering into the detailed (mathematical) relationships here, let the 
entrepreneurial NPV (denoted as Vt) simply be the consequence of the economic 
attractiveness the market offers to new investments, that is:   KQVt . 
   Given now that an entrepreneur will not invest if the NPV on that investment is 
negative, we know that for all negative values of Vt (whether that NPV benefited 
from government support or not) the response of the entrepreneur will be ‘no 
investment.’ The payoff for the entrepreneur of that investment project is then 
zero, and government (unwilling or unable to invest herself) receives zero utility 
from the provision of the public good (since no public good is produced). 
   Suppose, however, the market offers already sufficiently to the provision of the 
private good, such that the base-case NPV for the entrepreneur (no government 
support) is nonnegative. Our above framework predicts that the entrepreneur 
should invest, and the payoff for the entrepreneur is its NPV, denoted as Vt. It may 
well be that this NPV is nonnegative, but not sufficiently high to generate massive 
investment by the private sector.79 This low economic attractiveness, which is 
bigger than zero but smaller than the one triggering large investments is denoted 
by   kQVt . In this case, government can either ‘free-ride’ on the private sector 
investments (providing no support for additional investment) or it can provide 
more support. In the ‘free-rider’ case, government enjoys the benefits of some 
(albeit low) amount of public good, denoted as Y . In case governments wish to 
boost investment by means of providing support to the private sector, the 
following payoffs are realised. First, the entrepreneurs must invest more, for which 
they receive an NPV based on a higher economic attractiveness (due to tax 
allowances or subsidies). This NPV is denoted as   kQVt . In this strategy, the 
government receives more of a public good, which is denoted as Y , but this goes 
at the expense of the allowances transferred to the private sector. Denoting the 
pecuniary value of the sum of all fiscal and financial measures by As, where s is 
the year when the allowance was introduced. The age of the assets that yield the 
public good then becomes t-s (see Hall and Jorgenson (1967)). Then the present 
value of all allowances given to the private sector is determined by all capital 
stock is then given by the sum of all allowances A, initiated in year s, and 
applicable to all assets of various ages t-s, which is denoted as ³  dsA sts , . Figure 
3.2 visualises these payoffs in a simple matrix. 
                                                      
79 This may be the domain for which > 1,0Q . 
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   In that matrix, the participation constraint for the entrepreneur is that the NPV on 
its investment is nowhere negative, which implies that in the case of investing both 
   0!kQVt  and    0!kQVt . In case the NPV would become negative, the firm 
does not invest, so that the NPV of negative strategy becomes zero. Apart from a 
participation constraint, there must exist an incentive constraint—that is, if 
government offers some support scheme to the private sector for investing, then 
this support scheme must inherently contain an incentive to do so. Thus, the NPV 
for the entrepreneur’s investment must be higher with government support than 
without support:      kQVkQV tt ! .80 
   When analysing the ‘payoffs’ for government, we see that in the South-East 
corner of the matrix, the private sector does not invest, and government (free-
riding under a ‘no support’ strategy) receives no public good. For government, it 
would be nice if it could free-ride on the private provision of the public good in 
the strategy plaid in the South-West cell of the matrix (no support, but still 
‘receiving’ amount Y of the public good). Suppose government offers some real 
penny-pinching support programme, which may have some symbolic value but 
                                                      
80 In case of the right-hand side column (where the private sector does not invest), the 
strategy ‘government support’ does not dominate ‘no government support’, which implies 
that the incentive constraint does not work here. Such does not matter, for if we would 
have calculated the NPV of hypothetical investment (which would be negative in both the 
upper and lower cells), then the upper NPV would probably still be higher than the lower 
one. Since, however, it is economically unattractive to invest under a negative NPV, the 
private sector will not respond, and the net effect of the support measures indeed turns out 
to fail the incentive constraint. 
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Figure 3.2: Payoff diagram 
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does not help the private sector to obtain a nonnegative NPV on investment (this is 
the North-East cell in the matrix). In this case, the private sector does not invest, 
and will hence not make use of the support scheme. Given the net payoff for 
government (zero public good), it must be indifferent between a lousy support 
programme and no support programme, if the two result in zero investment by the 
private sector. 
   Suppose now the private sector already obtains a nonnegative NPV on 
investment, and government free-rides by receiving some amount of public good, 
Y . Suppose government finds this amount of Y too low, and wishes to encourage 
more investment. In that case, it offers such a support programme that that is a 
serious incentive to invest. Gross, the government ‘receives’ more public good 
(being Y ), but this increase from the free-rider strategies yielding Y  or 0 public 
good comes at a cost. That costs equals the present value of all allowances, which 
equals ³  dsA sts , . For government to make this an attractive strategy, it must also 
meet some criteria: 
x A participation constraint:   0, ! ³  dsAY sts , otherwise the support 
programme would be loss giving. 
x An incentive constraint:   YdsAY sts ! ³ , , otherwise offering support 
would be more costly for society than the free-rider strategy. 
 
Without entering into all the details of Nash equilibria here,81 it is relatively easy 
to show that the above nested maximisation problem yields a so-called Nash 
equilibrium.82 In a Nash equilibrium, each player’s strategy choice is a best 
response to the strategies actually played by his rivals (see Mas-Colell et al. 
(1995: 246)), and it is easy to show that such is exactly the dynamics of the above 
‘game’. First, suppose the government gives no support, and the private sector 
does not invest (South-East cell). As a consequence of government not helping the 
private sector, the latter does not invest. Second, if government supports, but the 
private sector perceives that support as insufficient, it does still not invest. Since 
section 3.1 has provided a framework that should suffice as a decision tool, it is 
apparently a deliberate strategy played by government to offer a very unattractive 
support scheme, and it should know beforehand that the private sector will not 
invest. Third, if government knows beforehand the private sector will invest (or if 
it has even observed this already), then it need not offer additional support, as long 
                                                      
81 The literature on game theory, and Nash equilibria in particular is too wide to summarise 
here. See, for example, Mas-Colell et al. (1995: 246ff), Gibbons (1992: 8ff), Osborne and 
Rubinstein (1994: 14ff), or Gintis (2000: 12ff). 
82 See Bergstrom et al. (1986) for the existence of the Nash equilibrium (in particular, see 
their Theorem 2). 
90 
as it perceives Y to be a sufficient amount of the public good. Fourth, if 
government wishes to encourage investment, since currently there is either zero 
public good (right-hand side column) or little public good (South-West cell), it 
offers a support scheme for which the payoff for the private sector becomes 
      0t! kQVkQV tt . As a ‘reward’ for playing this strategy, government 
enjoys a higher public good production Y , albeit that this goes at the expense of 
the pecuniary value of all support measures, ³  dsA sts , . Altogether, for 
government it must hold that   0, t! ³  YdsAY sts . 
                                                      
83 See also the comments at the web pages of the PPP Working Group of the ‘The Office 
of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister’ at: 
http://www.ofmdfmni.gov.uk/ppp/mainreport/publicprivate.htm 
Exhibit 3.1: Project refinancing 
 
In the UK, government tried to stimulate PPPs under the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) 
programme. Particularly in the case of large-scale greenfield investment projects (where 
PPPs are typically observed), there exist many types of uncertainty. If private sector 
participants would join the PPP in the early stages of such projects (when the uncertainty is 
highest), risk should be compensated by return. As a consequence, the project might 
become unaffordable for the end-users. Therefore, governments may typically remove 
some part of the uncertainty by providing all kinds of guarantees, varying from loan 
guarantees to minimal income. In the UK, the early PFI projects (including the PPPs) could 
obtain a prespecified, contracted fixed periodic subsidy in order to let the entrepreneurs 
obtain a nonnegative return on their investments. 
   Once the projects came into operation, however, much of the initial uncertainty (as the 
time-to-build problem, the question whether the technology would meet demand, etc.) was 
eliminated. Less uncertainty for a ‘proven project’ implies less risk for the financiers. Not 
surprisingly, many entrepreneurs arranged a debt renegotiation with their bank consortia. 
Particularly when assessing a multi-million Euros project, primarily financed with debt, the 
gains of a lower interest rate of only half a per cent already yields enormous profits for the 
entrepreneurs. The UK government, having committed herself to a contractually guaranteed 
fixed support of these projects saw all the gains of the refinancing being privatised, 
whereas de facto the risks were socialised. The UK Office of Government Commerce 
(OGC) has learnt from the refinancing debacle, and launched profit sharing arrangements 
for newly issued projects. For the existing (early stage) projects, however, all it could do 
was to call upon the private sector for a voluntary profit sharing of the profits of debt 
renegotiation. These documents can be found at HM Treasury Office at:83 
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/documents/public_private_partnerships/ppp_index.cfm 
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   Exhibit 3.1 gives an example of a response by the private sector that was not 
anticipated by the UK government. Now one might argue that the UK government 
did not make an optimal response, so the support strategy proposed in this chapter 
would not yield a Nash equilibrium, but that is not true. In the case of the early PFI 
projects in the UK, government provided a support scheme (including the 
elimination of much risk by means of guaranteed payments) that was sufficiently 
attractive to encourage the private sector to invest. Government’s offer was 
optimal, in the sense that its offer was sufficiently attractive for the private sector 
to respond. The private sector made an optimal response—not only by investing 
when such were attractive, but also by realising the gains from refinancing. After 
some learning period, however, it appeared the private sector could yield a higher 
profit by means of the refinancing ‘trick’. From an economic point of view, this 
new situation was sub-optimal for government for it missed the boat on these 
particular profits of refinancing. From a common-sense point of view, however, 
government once were willing to provide a support for the realisation of the 
project, and it succeeded in obtaining it in co-operation with some private sector 
participants. In that sense, it received a project at the price it was willing to pay 
for. 
   If, however, government would have wanted to ensure the support scheme 
represented a stable Nash equilibrium, government should have been able to adjust 
the terms of support once more, and come to some sort of profit sharing 
agreement. If the private sector would have known that government were able to 
change the terms after the refinancing, however, the question rises whether these 
entrepreneurs would have been able to obtain financing at all. After all, in cases of 
large uncertainty, guarantees and fixed payments can do miracles. 
   In order to show that the Nash-equilibrium proposed above (not in exhibit 3.1) is 
efficient,84 consider whether government would be happy under each different 
outcome. Government implicitly reveals its willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the 
production of the public good, by means of launching a support programme. That 
WTP is not only a function of its own valuation of the public good, but will also 
embed a rational expectation of the response of the private sector. Since the costs 
                                                      
84 I will stick to the qualitative reasoning here, for reasons explained in the next section 
(i.e., the difficulty to determine the ‘true’ benefits for government). Others, however, have 
made the effort to enter into the formalisations of this problem. It appears that it is possible 
to use non-coercive instruments for which the Nash equilibria correspond to Pareto 
optimality. For example, in analysing iteratively adjusted incentive compatible planning 
mechanisms, Roberts (1979) distinguishes between policy measures concerned with the 
final outcome of the game (so-called global measures), and measures where each agent is 
concerned with her utility per step of the iterative planning procedure (so-called local 
mechanisms). Roberts shows how locally, Pareto efficiency can be guaranteed, but global 
mechanisms can impossibly guarantee a Pareto efficient outcome. That result is an 
extension of the impossibility given by Hurwicz (1979). Note that Drèze and De La Vallee 
Poussin (1971) also obtain Pareto efficient outcomes for the local mechanism. 
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and benefits of investing in the technology that produces the public good are 
public information, government can calculate beforehand how much support the 
private sector needs before it is triggered to invest. The entrepreneur(s) will only 
invest if it has a reasonable belief that investing is more profitable than not 
investing. If the support offered by government is insufficient to let the strategy 
‘invest’ dominate the strategy ‘not invest’, then government loses nothing. 
Apparently, however, it did not have a very high valuation of Y either. Otherwise, 
if government were desperate to increase the production of public good, it would 
attribute a high value to it, which implies that the increase of utility from zero 
public good or Y to Y should easily outpace the pecuniary disutility of all fiscal or 
financial allowances (equal to the cost ³  dsA sts , ). What matters, hence, is the 
governmental valuation of the public good.85,86 
3.2.2 Underinvestment and governmental valuation of the public 
good 
One of the most difficult issues in the research on public goods concerns their 
valuation. Over time, many different approaches have seen the light, but still 
valuation remains problematic.87 As Diamond and Hausman (1994) raise the 
question ‘is some number better than no number?’, one may wonder whether to 
opt for a theoretically consistent or a pragmatic approach. As Silberston (1995) 
discusses the limits to the various cost-benefits analyses based on various types of 
valuations, she favours a more pragmatic approach where a government first sets a 
target and then selects some instruments to meet that target. Having discussed the 
details of any cost-benefit analysis in her study on the sustainability of the UK 
transport policy, she acknowledges that ‘[…] because of the uncertainty about the 
extent of environmental costs, and how they varied on particular journeys, we saw 
insuperable difficulties in determining anything approaching optimum charges’ (p. 
1277). This comes close to the approach proposed by Groves and Ledyard (1980), 
who suggest that the chosen level of public goods should equal the quantity 
                                                      
85 Another thing that matters is the credibility of the government commitment. In dynamic 
games, an opportunistic government might first encourage the private sector to invest, and 
then abort the support programme. If this lack of commitment is apparent, then the private 
sector may not invest, even though at the surface it was economically attractive to do so. In 
fact, this is a barrier to investment, which has been discussed in the previous chapter 
(‘Policy reforms and the expropriation risk’). 
86 In addition to the previous footnote, it must be emphasized that not only the existence 
and efficiency of Nash equilibria matter, but also their (long-run) dynamic stability. See 
Schoumaker (1979), and Chen (2003) as nice entries into this topic. 
87 For some historic overviews, see Dougherty (2003), or Drèze (1995). See also Bromley 
(1995). 
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demanded by consumers, after which a taxation system spreads the costs over 
society.88 
   Following both Bergstrom et al. (1986) and Kirchsteiger and Puppe (1997), one 
can seriously doubt to what extent government is capable of determining the right 
level of investment necessary to yield a targeted level of public goods provision. 
Therewith, the painful question also arises ‘What is the benchmark for 
underinvestment?’ If government would not be capable of determining the 
optimum, and the market is not willing to voluntarily contribute up to the level 
where all costs are compensated, then the choice of a benchmark may become 
arbitrary. Assume a benchmark exists. Then the criterion for continuous public 
goods investments becomes: 
 
Definition 3.1: The private provision of a continuous public good suffers from 
underinvestment if investment yields a capital stock lower than the selected benchmark. 
Only if the level of realised capital stock exceeds the benchmark, then there is no 
underinvestment. 
 
This definition argues that—even though firms respond positively to Q’s bigger 
than one, and invest—the achieved level of capital stock may still be below the 
societally desired level. As already indicated in section 2.7, setting a generic 
benchmark is a difficult thing: though it is possible to detect ‘popular benchmarks’ 
in empirical works, they are by no means universally applicable. Therefore, I 
postpone the choice of a benchmark to the specific analyses in chapters 4 and 5. 
 
3.3 A proposal for a smart governance framework 
This chapter has analysed a possibility for designing an efficient or ‘smart’ 
government support framework. Government support for private sector investment 
can readily be treated as a nested optimisation problem, where determines some 
amount of support it wishes to transfer to the private sector, and where (in the 
second round) the private sector chooses whether investing is economically 
interesting (the participation constraint). Given a standard type of technology, 
government can assume the role of a private sector investor, and analyse the costs 
and benefits of the investment beforehand. Here, I assumed a technology that is 
not only ‘standard’, but also yields both a private and a public good. The market 
then values and rewards the output of the private product, whereas the public good 
is often not rewarded for—particularly if the investing firms are price-takers in an 
existing market for the private good. 
                                                      
88 Here, the reader is referred to Zeckhauser and Weinstein (1974) for a rigorous discussion 
on the structure of preferences for public goods with implicit account of their finance 
mechanism. 
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   So government learns the costs and benefits of an investment, and may calculate 
the ‘Q’ I proposed in section 3.1. Given Q (which reflected the economic 
attractiveness of the investment), government can predict or anticipate on the 
response of the private sector in terms of investment. If Q is smaller than unity 
(see section 3.1, or the mathematical appendix to this chapter), private sector 
investment is unsustainable in the long run. Government, however, can increase Q 
through non-coercive instruments (as subsidies or tax measures), so that it does 
become economically interesting to invest (read: the participation constraint has 
been met). 
   Apart from wishing to encourage private sector investment, government would 
not wish to be too generous. If it would exaggerate the wealth transfer (that has to 
be financed through taxation) to the investors, the policy instruments are unlikely 
to yield a (Pareto) efficient solution. Thus, government also faces an expenditure 
minimisation problem. My suggestion here, is that Q equalling unity should do 
well. 
 
Hypothesis 3.1: A smart governance solution for encouraging the private sector 
investment for producing public goods is to let the investor obtain a Q equal to unity. 
 
The question arises of how the dynamics work here, since offering a Q=1 to any 
investment does not sound like an efficient solution per se. In section 3.2, I have 
emphasized that in the absence of government valuation tool for the public good 
that is both generally accepted and logically consistent, a mathematical calculation 
of the ‘optimal’ amount of government support for the private provision of that 
public good tends to become irrelevant. I follow Silberston (1995) in her 
pragmatic approach, and believe more in governments setting a target (expressed 
in terms of a level or quantity), after which the corresponding policy instruments 
are selected. Unfortunately, section 3.2.2 showed that even this approach faces 
difficulties, since one may question to what extent a government is capable of 
selecting the right level of public goods provision (and hence the right level of 
investment needed), in the absence of detailed information of the individual 
preferences of its citizens. This notion hampers the development of a uniform, 
logically consistent, pragmatic benchmark for determining whether the market 
underinvests or not (see also sections 2.7 and 2.8 on this matter). 
   Nevertheless, we may explore more of the dynamics of the government 
valuation of the public goods provision. Definition 1.2 already emphasized the 
impact of government support on the economic attractiveness of investing. In this 
chapter I have shown how this may be evaluated by Q. Although it is difficult to 
come up with a universally valid formula for governmental valuation of public 
goods (see section 3.2), the relationship as such between governmental valuation 
(or utility) and the preparedness of providing support for private sector 
investments must be present. 
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Proposition 3.2: The utility government derives from the (increased) provision of a public 
good determines the preparedness to support the private sector in investing, which is 
reflected in the height of the pecuniary value of that support. 
 
Although government valuation of the public good may determine its generosity in 
supporting the private sector to invest, the utility government derives from 
increases in the provision of public goods must be downward-sloping. Just as the 
market for normal private goods is limited and faces lower marginal prices for 
increasing supply, the utility government derives from the ten thousandth wind 
turbine must be less than from the one hundredth turbine.89 
                                                      
89 Also, in environmental economics, this is reflected in the relatively high marginal 
abatement costs of adding an nth piece of equipment for environmental protection. This 
whole concept is reflected in the Kyoto protocol, where—apart from setting an 
international environmental standard— the idea of trading pollution rights and green labels 
nails down to the concept that investing €1m in Sweden for environmental protection is 
less beneficial for the globe than investing the same amount of money in environmental 
protection in, e.g., Poland or the Ukraine. Thus, from a macroeconomic perspective, both 
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Figure 3.4: Proposed ‘smart governance’ framework 
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Proposition 3.3: The level of public good provided influences the utility government may 
derive from any increases in thay level of public good provision, and therewith the 
governmental valuation of the public good. 
 
Altogether, figure 3.3 gives a combined feedback mechanism, which combines the 
relationships proposed above. In order to come to a first empirical test, we first 
have to agree on the operationalisation of the various building blocs of the figure. 
   First, the economic attractiveness of investing can be ‘measured’ by the version 
of Tobin’s Q, proposed in section 3.1 and worked out in the appendix to this 
chapter. Second, recalling the last footnote on decreasing returns to additional 
capital stock yielding more public good, investment should not be measured in 
levels, but in growth rates instead. Let I denote the level or physical quantity of 
investment, for which the price of this standard equipment is m, and which 
contributes to a physical amount of capital stock k. Then I/k gives the investment 
rate. Altogether, it is the amount of capital stock that determines how much public 
good Y can be produced. Without entering into the technical valuation here, 
governmental utility from the public good is given by U(Y). Dependent on how 
badly government wants the private sector to invest in the provision of that public 
good, it is prepared to provide some support through non-coercive instruments, of 
which the present value is given by ³  dsA sts , . Then, figure 3.4 proposes a 
‘workable’ version of the conceptual figure 3.3. 
                                                                                                                                      
economists and policy-makers acknowledge the limits to increasing efforts of abatement, 
and acknowledge that money could be better spent. See also the 1999 special issue of The 
Energy Journal, titled ‘The costs of the Kyoto protocol: A multi-model evaluation’. 
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Appendix 3.A Mathematical appendix 
 
The firm’s profit maximisation and Q 
Suppose an investment project, producing a private good, X, sold at px, and a 
public good, Y, which stems from a linear relationship with X: 
(3.1) ttt XY T , 
where Tt is some scalar. Firms investing in this technology are assumed to be 
price-takers and receive the wholesale market price, px, which is insufficient to 
make a profit. The production technology yields a net income Rt, net of production 
costs C(X,k): 
(3.2) ),()(, ttttttxt kXCkXpR  , 
for which the evolution of the firm’s capital stock is described as follows. Let the 
next-period value of the firm’s capital kt+1 be represented by: 
(3.3)  ttt Ikk \G   )1(1 , 
where G is the physical depreciation rate,90 and It the investment in capital goods at 
time t. Since not all investments It are necessarily turned into capital, Uzawa 
(1969) introduces the ‘installation function’  tI\ , which implies that only tIu\  
per cent of investment is turned into capital. Note that, when defining 
1{ ttt kkk , (3.3) can be rewritten as: 
(3.3’)  ttt Ikk \G   . 
Expression (3.3’) is sometimes referred to as the ‘accounting identity’ (see, for 
example, Poterba and Summers (1982: 143)). I disagree with that interpretation, 
and I believe that once making an empirical analysis, the true nature of the 
depreciation is revealed. The capital stock determines the amount of output, as 
well as the operating costs. If we allow the book value of the capital stock to 
depreciate per annum, then we either need an alternative interpretation of the 
production function, or we must accept that production declines in a fashion 
similar with the depreciation rate. Since the power of Tobin’s Q lies in its use of 
economic data rather than accounting data, I prefer to list the economic effects of 
all accounting methods allowed by the regulator under the header ‘allowances’, 
rather than mixing economic and accounting interpretations in the same analysis. 
                                                      
90 For any 0!G , the asset starts to produce less per year due to the damage of use. This 
process need not be continuous—it may well be that this physical depreciation occurs after 
expiry of the economic lifespan. At that moment, a firm withdraws the asset, and the 
aggregate overall capital stock in the industry decreases with one asset. In order to ensure 
sustainability or continuity here, each withdrawal (either gradual or discrete) must be 
compensated by a new investment. 
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Then, expression (3.3’) uses delta as a rate of physical depreciation (just as, e.g., 
Abel (1982: 354) labels it). Therewith, (3.3’) provides the necessary conditions for 
maintaining a long-run capital stock, constant over time (cf. Gould (1968)). 
   Another critical remark with respect to (3.3’) concerns the dimensions of k, I, 
and  tI\ . If the capital stock determines output, it must be expressed in physical 
units—otherwise, a decrease in the value of the capital stock would cause a 
decrease in output levels, which is nonsense. As a consequence, investment I must 
also be expressed in physical quantities; the only question rises whether this is a 
rate or an absolute figure. Many authors remain vague about this choice. For 
example, Hayashi (1982) simply refers to ‘investment’, which can be multiplied 
with a price of investment goods. Implicitly, Hayashi thus expresses I in levels. 
When having a closer look at (3.3’), it must follow that  tI\  is an absolute 
investment figure, for both tk and tkG  represent absolute figures. 
   Net income is based on current capital goods. Lastly, let the price mt of a unit 
investment It, shape the entrepreneur’s dynamic optimisation problem. Let first the 
initial present value of the entrepreneur becomes: 
(3.4) dteV rt
t
t

f
 
³ 
0
0 S , 
where tS are the after-tax net profits, for which holds:91 
(3.5)     tttinvtct ImART ,11  S , 
where Tc is the corporate tax rate,92 and Ainv,t the rate of investment tax credit for 
investments made in year t. A little rewriting yields: 
(3.4’)    > @ dteImzARTV rt
t
ttttinvtc

f
 
³  
0
,0 11 , 
where zt is the present-value of the depreciation deduction on investment after the 
tax credit (see Hall and Jorgenson (1967)), for which holds: 
(3.6)    
 ³
f

 
0
,, dseATz
str
stdeprstct , 
where Adepr,(t+s) is the depreciation allowance per unit of investment for tax 
deductions. It is the proportion of the original cost of an asset of age (t+s) that may 
be deducted from income. The firm’s objective function now becomes: 
                                                      
91 Note that Hayashi includes a term Ds at the right-hand side of this equation, which 
represents the value (made present) of current and future tax deductions attributable to past 
investments (at t=t-s). Though highly important for analysing going-concerns, that fiscal 
allowance may be too advanced for the data used in this study. 
92 Though Tc is denoted time-invariant here, such is only done for expositional purposes. In 
the empirical analysis, it is allowed to vary over both time and geographical space. 
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(3.7) 
^ `
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(i) 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Since (3.7) is an improper integral I define the following transversality 
conditions.93 Initial endowments are set equal to zero. Thus the first transversality 
condition becomes: 
 
(3.8) k0=0. 
 
The condition for terminal capital stock is determined below. 
Now the present-value Hamiltonian becomes: 
(3.9) 
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Since the present-value Hamiltonian still contains a nasty exponential which 
hampers further calculations, it is convenient to transform it into a current-value 
Hamiltonian as follows. 
(3.9’) 
   
     > @tttrttttttinvtc
rt
ttttc
kIkeImzART
eIkHIkH
 
 
\GO,11
,',
 
 
Define now rttt eq O{ , so that (9’) can be rewritten as: 
(3.9’’)        > @ttttttttinvtcttc kIkqImzARTIkH  \G,11,  
 
In this expression, the firm can freely determine the control variable It. The so-
called state variable (the one determined by past decisions) is the capital stock kt; 
the shadow value of the state variable (i.e., the co-state variable) is qt. 
   Before obtaining the first-order conditions (FOCs), I first follow Chiang (1992: 
Chapter 8), for checking the equations that describe the motion in the state and co-
state variables. In optimising the present-value Hamiltonian, the state value would 
have appeared as tt Hk Oww /  (the partial derivative of (3.9) with respect to the 
multiplier, yielding restriction (3.3’)). 
                                                      
93 See Chiang (1992: Chapter 3) for transversality conditions in variable-endpoint 
problems. 
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   Since  > @ tctttt qHkIkH ww  ww // \GO  (by means of (3.9’’) and by 
the definition of qt) equation (3.3’) describing the motion of the state variable has 
to be rewritten as: 
(3.10) 
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This implies that if net investment is zero ( 0 tk ), then (3.10) reduces to: 
(3.10’)   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w \\ ,1 . 
In words, the gross amount of investment is established by the theoretical response 
of investment to Tobin’s Q (that is,   qqI ww ). That response is called forth by 
increases in Q. 
   In addition, in optimising the present-value Hamiltonian, the motion of the co-
state variable would have been described by ttkH O ww / .94 When plugging in 
the definition for qt, and by differentiating qt in the left-hand side, a little rewriting 
yields: 
  rt
t
crt
t
rt
t
t
t eq
Herqeq
k
H 
w
w 
w
w        O , 
which can be rewritten as: 
(3.11) t
t
c
t rqq
Hq 
w
w  . 
Thus, q is constant  0 tq  when the user cost of capital  trq  equals the marginal 
revenue product of capital. 
   Lastly, the terminal endpoint transversality condition has to be checked and 
defined. If the life of the firm would have been capped at t=T, and if the firm 
                                                      
94 For an explanation of the minus sign, see Chiang (1992: Chapters 7 and 8). In particular, 
see p.179, note 8. The clue is in the integration by parts of the term ³
f

 
0 
dtktt O , which 
yields: > @ ³³ fffff   00000 dtkkkdtkdtk tttttt OOOOO  . Applying the 
transversality conditions to the initial state (k0=0) and terminal state (specified later on) 
further simplifies this expression. By setting the partial derivative of the Hamiltonian equal 
to zero, one can find the expression ttkH O ww / . 
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cannot have negative capital stock, the terminal capital stock kT should be zero.95 
Since the multipliers Ot are concerned with the value of capital in period t, it 
follows from (3.9’) that if at t=T the value of capital stock equals zero, then this is 
equal to stating that at T it must hold that  > @ 0  TTTT kIk \GO . Since it was 
defined above that rttt eq O{ , it follows that
rt
tt eq
 O . Now, the endpoint 
condition can be rewritten as  > @ 0  TTTrTT kIkeq \G . Therefore, in the 
limit  foT , the terminal endpoint transversality condition becomes: 
(3.12)  > @ 0   lim
t
 
fo ttt
rt
t kIkeq \G . 
 
The first-order conditions (FOCs) now become: 
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In words, the marginal user cost of capital qt equals the after-tax marginal 
purchase price of capital goods divided by the marginal adjustment costs of 
changing the capital stock. 
(3.14) 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Using ttkH O ww /  as obtained above, combined with the fact that 
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and that t
t
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, (3.14) can be simplified to: 
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95 Otherwise, the firm would hold valuable capital forever, which one the one hand yields 
unnecessary opportunity costs, but more important—given the Hamiltonian— the firm 
would still be able to increase her value by decreasing her capital stock. 
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Hence, the after-tax marginal revenue product of capital stock equals the 
opportunity costs of capital. 
The third f.o.c. is the partial derivative of (3.9’’) with respect to the multiplier qt: 
(3.15)   0  
w
w
ttt
t
c kIk
q
H \G  
This optimality condition is a mere mimicking of (3.3’).  
   Though all optimality conditions have been defined now, there are two problems 
before turning to an empirical test. First, the exact functional form of the capital 
adjustment cost function \(I) is unknown. Optimality condition (3.7) requires that 
q is not only based upon the observable component mt, but also on the 
unobservable part \(I). Empirical studies investigating the relationship between q 
and investment have often tried to fit \(I), but found that fitted adjustment costs 
were so high that they could not be given a reasonable economic interpretation. 
The second problem for empirical analysis is that the above conditions rely on the 
unobservable marginal q, whereas only average q is observable. 
 
Effect of economic instruments 
Consider a phase diagram, as illustrated in figure 3.5. Consider a firm that faces an 
investment opportunity, as described in this appendix. The profit function  kS of 
this investment shows decreasing returns to scale, so that   022 ww kS , whereas 
the capital adjustment cost function is convex, so that    0!ww II\ and 
   022 !ww II\ . The logic of the phase diagram is now as follows. For those 
values of Q that fall below the line where 0 k , incumbents decrease their capital 
stock. The small horizontal arrows in the figure directed to the left represent this 
movement ( 0k ). 
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Thus, if 0 k , then   tt kI G\  , which says that net investment equals physical 
depreciation. Since increases in k lead to higher depreciation, the slope of the line 
where 0 k must be upwards.96 
   The line for which 0 q is found as follows. Recall that equation (3.11) in this 
appendix expressed q as: t
t
c
t rqq
Hq 
w
w  , implying that q is constant  0 tq  
when the user cost of capital  trq  equals the marginal revenue product of 
capital.97 Since the marginal revenue product of capital decreases in k, all points 
meeting the condition that 
t
c
t qr
Hq
w
w  also decrease in k, so the line where 0 q is 
downward-sloping in k. Furthermore, since tc qH ww decreases in k, it must hold 
that q  increases in k. Thus, all points above the line where 0 q must yield 
positive increases in Q. The long-run equilibrium point E is obtained at the 
                                                      
96 See Abel (1982) for a full proof of this statement. 
97 Note that if the profit function were linear in k, then   022  ww kS . As a consequence, 
tqH ww becomes independent of k, so that the line where 0 q would have become a 
horizontal one in figure 3.5. See Abel (1982: 365). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Phase diagram 
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intersection of the lines for which 0 q and 0 k . For the proof that all other 
points will be attracted by E along the saddle path, I suffice referring to Shone 
(2001: Chapter 8), Romer (1996: Chapter 8), or Chiang (1992: Chapter 5). 
   The effects of economic instruments as tax incentives or subsidies can now 
readily be given in another phase diagram. Here, I borrow from Abel (1982) and 
Romer (1996: Chapter 8). Suppose government gives a permanent capital 
investment subsidy Sinv, which is a fraction of the purchase price of the capital 
good. This subsidy reduces the net purchase price mt of investments. Clearly, the 
expression shaping the line 0 k  remains unchanged. To see why the investment 
subsidy shifts up the line for which 0 q , recall that the motion of q was 
described as: 
t
t
c
t rqq
Hq 
w
w  . 
The subsidy increases the profitability of the investment, which yields a higher Hc. 
Since therewith tc qH ww also increases, q  must decrease in a similar fashion. 
Therewith, the line for which 0 q  shifts upwards.98 This motion is visualised in 
figure 3.6. 
   In the graph, the initial equilibrium (saddle point) E0 corresponded with the 
optimal capital stock k0. The investment subsidy (or other economic instrument) 
increased the marginal profitability of holding a unit of capital, and shifted the 
equilibrium up to E1. For that situation, the corresponding capital stock is k1. 
   Only a few economic instruments are designed as permanent. What is the effect 
then of a temporary measure? In general, temporary measures are believed to have 
a more stimulating effect than permanent ones. Abel (1982) shows how temporary 
investment credits indeed yield a bigger effect than permanent ones, except for the 
case where   022  ww kS . Thus, if the production function of the firm shows 
decreasing returns to scale, then temporary measures may be more effective than 
permanent ones. Without entering into the details here with respect to the why and 
how behind the superiority of temporary measures (see Abel (1982) for a full 
exposition), the intuition behind the statement is as follows. The shorter-lived the 
incentive, the shorter time period available to the industry to respond, and hence 
the smaller the increase in capital stock. Shorter-lived policies, however, cause 
larger jumps in q, and therewith larger jumps in investments. Since it is investing 
that is rewarded by the policy analysed by Abel, rather than holding capital, there 
is an incentive to divest after the policy is removed.  
                                                      
98 As an alternative explanation, the subsidy causes an immediate increase in q. Any orbit 
in the (K,q) space jumps upward, until it reaches a higher saddle path. It will then gradually 
move along that saddle path to the new equilibrium. 
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Figure 3.6: Effect of a permanent investment subsidy 
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4 THE POLICY PORTFOLIO DILEMMA: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
FROM WIND TURBINES INVESTMENTS 
 
 
 
However important the analysis underlying the Influenceability Dilemma, or the 
calculation of the optimal government support for private sector investment may 
be, these analyses remain empty without a clear policy prescription. This critique 
follows Drèze (1995), who noticed that few economists make this translation from 
mathematical analysis to the real world. This chapter provides empirical evidence 
on (a) the mixture of policy instruments that make the private sector invest indeed, 
and (b) the efficiency of the support offered by these instruments. I have labelled 
this dilemma the Policy Portfolio Dilemma. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Government support for the private provision of public goods is a much-debated 
issue in the literature. If voluntary contributions to the public good provision were 
the base case, then each individual might contribute as much as it values the public 
good which (ignoring the free rider problem) should yield an efficient outcome. 
Both the free rider problem and the impossibility of government to impose 
taxation based upon individual preferences results in inefficient taxation, and 
therewith in an inefficient private provision of a public good. Kirchsteiger and 
Puppe (1997), for example, show how taxation may indeed raise the total supply 
of a public good, but the taxation is unlikely to match the individual utility of the 
good, a result which can also be found in Lahiri and Raimondos-Moeller (1998). 
The ‘crowding-out thesis’ even shows how government support on top of 
voluntary contributions leads to a ‘dollar-to-dollar decrease’ in the voluntary 
contributions (see e.g. Roberts (1987), Andreoni (1993), or Nyborg and Rege 
(2003)). In spite of all inefficiencies associated with each possible type of taxation, 
fiscal and financial support still remain important instruments for encouraging the 
private provision of public goods. 
   Independent of the economic arguments against taxation and government 
support, this chapter addresses the question whether government support works in 
the encouragement of private provision of public goods.99 In a multi-case study, I 
analyse the effect of green policies of the EU(15) countries on wind turbine 
                                                      
99 Another fundamental debate concerns ‘the other public good’, being the question 
whether—in this specific case of encouraging the production of renewable energy—the 
subsidies add to the conservation of the non-renewable energy sources. See Baumol and 
Wolff (1981) for a discussion. 
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investments in the 1985-2000 period. I evaluate the effects of these policies by 
means of a uniform hypothetical investment project in a 1 MW wind power plant 
for which I first derive a ramified version of Tobin’s Q. I address the following 
specific questions. First, why would government support be necessary? Does the 
base-case yield sufficient financial attractiveness for private sector investments, or 
do private sector investors need additional support? Second, what support schemes 
are offered, and how do they affect the Q of the investment project? Third, does 
the private sector provide the public good if Q becomes nonnegative? In other 
words, should Q exceed unity for investors, or are nonegative values sufficient? 
Given both the present value of the support schemes, and given the response in 
investments, how have governments implicitly valued the public good? In other 
words, how much value-for-money have the taxpayers received? 
 
4.2 A model 
Wind turbines produce a pure private good X, which is electricity, and a 
continuous, pure public good Y, which is the avoided emission that enhances a 
cleaner environment.100 The amount of environmental benefits is a direct function 
of the production of the private good: tititi XY ,,,  T , where Xi,t is the total amount 
of wind power generated in country i at time t, and where Ti,t indicates the amount 
of avoided emissions. I concentrate here on the CO2 emissions. Anticipating the 
fact that no firm-level data on investments were available, this chapter needs a 
modification of the Tobin’s Q worked out in chapter 3. 
   First, in the ‘standard’ version of Tobin’s Q, all conditions exogenous to the firm 
(both market conditions and government incentives) are allowed to vary over time. 
Consequently, firms not only assess whether it is interesting to increase their 
capital stock, but if market conditions deteriorate, they may decide to decrease 
their capital stock as well. When assessing the green policies of the EU(15) 
countries in the period observed, most of the measures taken lasted for a 
guaranteed time period. Therefore, the profitability of installed capital is almost 
fixed. Consequently, it seems illogical for incumbents to decrease capital stock if 
the profitability for newly installed capital drops, whilst the profitability of 
existing capital stock remains constant. 
   A second ramification of the model worked out in chapter 3 concerns the 
assumptions underlying the profit function. The maths in appendix 3.A assumed 
diminishing returns to scale, but for wind turbines that assumption need not hold. 
                                                      
100 Strictly speaking, wind turbines do not produce a public good, but conventional power 
generating technologies produce a public bad. Since the market prices, however, do not 
reflect the inclusion of the value the negative externalities of the latter technology, I let 
renewable energy generating technologies include the production of a public good. 
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Wind turbines, in isolation or grouped as a wind power plant seem to be 
characterised by constant returns to scale.101 
   Third, wind turbines do not suffer from the physical depreciation in the sense 
proposed in Appendix 3.A. Since an important part of the equipment is 
mechanical, wind turbines do deteriorate when used. Nevertheless, this hardly 
affects their output quantities during their economic lifespan. Instead, it is more 
plausible that after their economic lifespan, the costs of maintenance and repair 
increase dramatically, which is no longer justified by their book value. 
4.2.1 Ramified Q 
Wind turbines produce a private good electricity, X, sold at px, and a public good 
‘avoided emissions’, Y, which stems from a linear relationship with X: 
(4.1) jtjtjt XY T , 
where Tjt represents the avoided emissions in country j during year t. Firms 
investing in wind turbines only receive the electricity wholesale market price, px, 
which is insufficient to make a profit. Let wt be the wind regime determining total 
output of X. The wind regime may vary over time and particularly geographical 
space. The production technology yields a net income Rt, net of production costs 
C(X,k): 
(4.2) ),()(, ttttttttxt kXCwkXwpR  , 
for which the evolution of the firm’s capital stock is described as in Appendix 
3.A—albeit that the initial value k0 = 0 . Net income is based on current capital 
goods. Lastly, let the price mt of a unit investment It, shape the entrant’s dynamic 
optimisation problem. For all transversality conditions, the capital stock 
adjustment cost function, etc., see Appendix 3.A. Contrasting with the calculations 
in Appendix 3.A, where all elements affecting Q could change over time, I now 
restrict the impact of government policies to investments made at a certain time. 
The aim of this complication is to ensure that changes in economic instruments do 
not apply retrospectively. I rewrite the initial present value of a firm in a fashion 
similar to Hayashi (1982) and Hall and Jorgenson (1967): 
(4.3) dteV tr
t
t
wacc
f
 
³ 
0
0 S , 
where tS are the after-tax net profits (discounted at the CAPM-based weighted 
average cost of capital, WACC), where: 
                                                      
101 See, for example, a recent World Bank paper ‘Statistical analysis of wind farm costs 
and policy regimes’, available at the following URL: 
 www.worldbank.org/astae/windfarmcosts.pdf 
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(4.4)       dsAImSImDeprDrTRT ststtinvtttttdctct ³
f
 
0
,, 11S  
where Tc is the corporate tax rate,102 ttdc DrT ,  the tax shield on interest rd (paid for 
outstanding debt Dt), and tttc ImDeprT  the tax shield on the economic 
depreciation Depr—applicable to the initial investment. Investments may be 
subsidised or given another rebate at rate Sinv. All allowances applicable to past 
investments of age s are captured in the last integral. Table 4.1 gives the functional 
form of all allowances analysed in this chapter. As,t-s means the sum of all 
allowances for investments of age s, concerning the policies initiated at time t-s. 
The idea behind this notion of age is that changes in policies do not have a 
retrospective effect. Therefore, all policies that have been guaranteed for a time 
period equal or close to the economic lifespan of a wind turbine have been listed 
under this header. All policies with a non-guaranteed character (that are thus time-
variant) have been included in the ‘regular’ income stream. For example, only 
Germany has offered production subsidies that were fixed for a ten years’ time 
period. All other countries offering production subsidies reserved the right to 
change them on an annual basis. 
   Without rewriting (4.4) entirely here for all individual allowances, I suffice with 
defining the firm’s objective function as: 
(4.5) 
^ `
      dtedsAImSImDeprDrTRTV rt
t
ststtinvtttttdctct
kI tt

f
 
f
³ ³ »
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,
11   max
0
 
s.t. 
(i)  tt Ik \  . 
 
The current-value Hamiltonian for this problem can now be specified as: 
(4.6)        > @tttststtinvtttttdctcc kIqdsAImSImDeprDrTRTH  ³
f
 \
0
,, 11  
The motion of the state variable is described by: 
(4.7) 
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whereas the motion of the co-state variable in the present-value Hamiltonian 
yields (see Appendix 3.A): 
                                                      
102 Though Tc is denoted time-invariant here, such is only done for expositional purposes. 
In the empirical analysis, it is allowed to vary over both time and geographical space. 
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(4.8) t
t
c
t rqq
Hq 
w
w  . 
Note that—given that wind turbines have constant returns to scale—the term 
tc qH ww is decreasing in k.
103 Consequently, in a (Q, k) space as given in figure 
3.3, the line for which 0 q would be a downward sloping one, of the following 
shape: 
(4.9) 
r
q
H
qrq
q
H t
c
tt
t
c w
w
  
w
w
       
Abel (1982: 359) gives an interpretation for this expression. The 0 q locus 
gives, for any value of the capital stock k, the present value (in perpetuity) of the 
tax-adjusted rental to capital, calculated under the assumption that the capital stock 
remains constant. 
   The line for which net investment is zero ( 0 k ) is obtained by rewriting (4.7) 
which yields: 
(4.10)         
t
ttt
t
tt
ttinvtct q
qIA
q
qImSDeprTI
w
w
w
w ,1\  
which says that the gross investment expenditures equal the purchase price of 
capital stock mt, adjusted for all allowances and subsidies. Also, (4.10) shows how 
investment is triggered by changes in Q. Figure 4.1 gives the associated phase 
diagram. 
   Analysing the case for which As,t-s=At, the first f.o.c. for the firm’s optimisation 
problem now becomes: 
(4.11)     01  »
¼
º
«
¬
ª
w
w

w
w
 
w
w rt
t
t
t
t
t
tinvttc
t
c e
I
I
q
I
A
mSmDeprT
I
H \ , 
which yields: 
(4.12) 
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103 This assumption holds if the demand curve for the industry’s output is downward 
sloping. Then, optimisation of the present-value Hamiltonian with respect to kt would be 
downward sloping in k. This is equal to a downward-sloping partial derivative of the 
current-value Hamiltonian with respect to q. See Appendix 3.A. 
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Table 4.1: Present value of economic instruments 
Economic instrument Present value 
Favourable, guaranteed 
feed-in tariffs 
(fixed prices)a 
     ³  
T
str
ttstsxstsxc dseXwppT f
0
,,,,
~1  
Production subsidy 
(per unit of output) 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T
stststsoutputc
f 
³
0
,,1  
Production subsidy 
(per unit of capacity 
installed) 
   dsekST str
T
stsstscapacityc
f 
³
0
,,,1  
Subsidy on capital 
investment 
tttinv ImS ,  
Subsidy on interest 
rates on loans 
(‘soft loans’) 
    
   dseDrrT
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T
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T
strstr
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old
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new
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


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³
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Tax relief on 
investments from fiscal 
profits (percentage 
deduction of capital 
investment costs) 
stsstsstinvc ImAT  ,,,  
Reduced corporate tax 
rate    ³ 
T
tr
tttttDt
reduced
c
regular
c dteImDrRTT wacc
0
, G  
Accelerated 
depreciation 
 
 
 
 ³
³





 
G
G
1
0
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~1
0
,,,
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stssts
Accel
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Note: a In essence, one should treat the guaranteed feed-in prices as a floor, since firms might in 
theory obtain even higher prices in the market. In this sense, firms actually possess a put option. 
Since, however, no wholesale prices higher than the guaranteed feed-in prices were observed, I will 
not complicate matters more by means of options pricing.
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Note how the long-run equilibrium value for q=1 is clearly justified here: the 
nominator of (4.12) equals the net benefit of installing an extra unit of capital 
stock: it includes all tax benefits, subsidies, and allowances, and is corrected for 
the purchase price of that unit of capital stock. The denominator on the other hand 
gives the costs of an extra unit of capital stock. Once the nominator and 
denominator are equal, firms should be indifferent with respect to investing. 
The second f.o.c. becomes: 
(4.13) 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which yields:104 
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Note that the marginal Q derived in this model is based on firms that are price-
takers, whereas the both the production function and installation function are 
homogeneous. These are exactly the conditions Hayashi (1982) uses for 
establishing the result that marginal Q equals average Q. The interesting feature of 
                                                      
104 Here, I use the fact that under constant returns-to-scale, kR ww is a constant, set at R. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Phase diagram 
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that result is that average Q is observable, whereas marginal Q is not. Expressing 
average q yields: 
(4.14) 
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4.2.2 Discussion of economic instruments 
The effects of the economic instruments listed in table 4.1 are either related to the 
book value of the investment, or to economic spin-off of an asset. The intuition 
behind the instruments related to the book value of the investment is that—given a 
base-case of linear depreciation—firms are allowed to realise a part of the tax 
shield on depreciation upfront. Since the present value of upfront realisations is 
higher than under the base-case, so is the present value of the investment. 
 
Favourable feed-in tariffs 
The economic value of ‘favourable’ tariffs is incremental to the market prices at 
each time period. Since the feed-in tariffs are not only higher than the market 
prices, but also fixed (they are guaranteed), their after-tax effect is discounted at 
the risk-free interest rate. 
 
Production subsidy 
Production subsidies are given pre-tax, so that their net effect is still affected by 
corporate income taxation. Since the production subsidies were guaranteed and 
fixed for a given time period, their impact is discounted at the risk-free interest 
rate. 
 
Capacity subsidy 
The capacity subsidy applies to the installed amount of power generating capacity, 
which is the capital stock. The fixed, guaranteed nature justifies risk-free 
discounting. 
 
Capital investment subsidy 
Capital investment subsidies are typically given at the end of year 0, when the 
investment is completed. Due to their realisation in year 0, they are not discounted. 
Two forms can be observed: a percentage subsidy ( tttinv ImS , ), or a fixed amount 
( > @ ttinvt ISm ,~ ). 
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Soft loans 
Though interest expenses are not included in a regular cost-benefit analysis, they 
do affect the value of the investment in two ways. First, the interest rate 
determines the tax shield on debt; lower interest payments lower this tax shield, 
which decreases the value of the project. Second, the lower interest rate paid 
lowers the weighted average costs of capital, the rwacc. A lower WACC implies 
that future income is discounted at a lower rate, which increases the value of the 
project. 
 
Tax relief on investments 
Usually the tax relief on investments consists of a percentage of the investment 
amount. Suppose 40% of mtIt can be deducted of the fiscal profits at a 35% tax 
rate. The net advantage then becomes 40%*35%= 14%, which would have been 
equal to a 21.5% subsidy (=14%/(1-35%)). Note that this tax credit usually occurs 
in the year when the investment is made, so that it need not be discounted. 
 
Reduced corporate tax rate 
The positive effect of a reduced corporate tax rate lies of course in the increase of 
the net, after-tax income. Simultaneously, however, the tax shields on debt and on 
depreciation are reduced. 
 
Accelerated depreciation 
In the base-case, I assumed linear depreciation, for which the depreciation factor 
caselBaseDepr  is T1 (the economic lifespan of the investment). Under an 
accelerated depreciation scheme, the tax shield on depreciation increases, since 
most depreciations are realised upfront (where they are less affected by the 
discount rate). In this accelerated scheme, with depreciation rate AccelDepr , the 
present value of the tax shield on depreciation is calculated over a shorter time 
period, AccelDepr1 . For example, suppose the investment may be written off 
immediately, that is 1 AccelDepr , then and the entire tax shield on depreciation is 
realised in one year. 
 
4.3 Some base-case developments 
Since the 1980s, privatisation has taken place in many electricity sectors around 
the world. With the withdrawal of government as an active provider of electricity, 
it is either the privatised companies or newcomers on the market that determine 
the fuel mix. The considerations for choosing a power generating technology will 
predominantly be based on microeconomics, where only the gains of power 
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generation count—not necessarily the long-run macro-level environmental impact 
of the technology. 
   Wind turbines have a positive impact on the environment. Instead of using fossil 
fuels for power generation, wind is transformed into electricity. Unfortunately, 
relative to the traditional fossil fuel power plants, availability of wind power is 
uncertain, and the marginal costs of production are still much higher. Since, 
however, the naked output (free of spin off effects) which is traded (i.e., 
electricity) has to compete with traditionally generated power, then in a liberalised 
market there is little incentive to invest in environmentally-friendly power 
generation. 
4.3.1 Base-case assumptions 
In the base-case I analyse a hypothetical investment project in a 1MW wind power 
plant. Most of the assumptions outlined below are concerned with the layout of 
that project. Deviations between these assumptions and ‘real life’ projects roughly 
have a uniform impact across the various countries, and therewith most potential 
deviations will cancel out in the comparison. 
 
Investment costs and annual costs 
The costs of wind turbines have decreased rapidly over time. The exact figures 
vary per manufacturer, but in general terms investment costs have dropped by 
about 5.5% per annum over the 1985-1995 period, and have decreased with about 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Estimated investment costs in onshore wind turbines 
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3% afterwards.105 In concrete terms, the investment costs of a 1 MW wind power 
plant have dropped from about €1.8m in 1985 to about €900k in the year 2000. 
Figure 4.2 shows an estimate of this development. Apart from the investment 
costs, the annual operation and maintenance costs have dropped as well. 
Simultaneously, however, the average costs of land use have risen over time. 
Therefore, I assume constant annual operating and maintenance costs (including 
land rental) of €40k. 
 
Financing costs and the use of debt 
Many wind power projects are fully debt financed.106 Full debt financing not only 
lowers the discount rate, but also maximises the tax shield from debt. In order to 
let full debt financing de realistic, I assume a collateral is provided which is 
uncorrelated with the market value of the installed capital stock, and which is 
provided at zero cost. Though I assume an annual 6% interest rate, the project may 
still suffer from some contingencies. Therefore, I will use a somewhat higher 
discount rate of 7.36 per cent for the analyses.107 
 
Economic lifespan and depreciation 
The choice for the economic lifespan of a wind turbine varies between 10 and 15 
years: commercial banks assume an economic life span of 10 years, whereas 
advocates of wind power use a longer lifespan. I have used a 15 years’ lifespan. In 
the base case, I applied a linear depreciation for that lifespan in order to calculate 
the tax shield on depreciation. 
 
                                                      
105 This estimate is consistent with the ones reported by Faber et al. (2001), Ec (1997), and 
Btm (1999)—these sources, however, use a broader bandwidth within which mine fits. See 
also Uce et al. (2001), for a review of long-run cost projections for onshore and offshore 
wind farms. At present, the average investment costs are about €900 per kW installed—a 
number that is expected to drop to about €600 to €800 by the year 2050. 
106 If investors wish to maximise the profits from the wind power project, full debt is a 
logical consequence. Nevertheless, other motives may drive investors to use free cash for 
investments in renewables. See Bear Stearns (2001) German Wind Farm Developers, 
European Equity Research. That report describes how D/E ratios of 0.6 to 0.7 provide 
unique opportunities for investors to deduct the negative income flows from the wind 
power project from the taxable income of the going concern. By doing so, wind power 
projects are attractive possibilities for postponing tax payments. It is beyond the scope of 
the current paper to include these motives in determining a leverage ratio. 
107 This discount rate is the result of a risk-adjustment. In CAPM, I used a D/E ratio of 100. 
This left some minimal amount of equity (less than 1% of D+E), for which the beta 
increased to almost 70. Though the relative use of equity becomes infinitesimally small in 
the limit, it does add some points to the WACC. In the limit, the WACC appeared to equal 
7.36. 
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Prices and currency 
For the sake of uniformity, I have expressed all prices, costs, and benefits in 
Euros.108 Most countries have applied output-related incentives as fixed feed-in 
tariffs or production subsidies. For the years where no price-related regulation was 
available (for most countries, this was the 1985-1990 period), I have assumed that 
wind power producers could sell their electricity at wholesale prices (representing 
avoided costs of production). Since it proved difficult to obtain wholesale prices 
for all countries, particularly in the pre-1990 period (most electricity sectors were 
nationalised) the ex-tax industry price has been used as a proxy. Of course, 
industry prices may have been subsidised, and do not represent truly avoided costs 
of production, but in the absence of better data the IEA uses the same 
methodology.109  
   For some countries, other specific assumptions have been made. For example, 
wherever price deflation occurred in Italy, Sweden, Greece, Portugal, and Austria, 
the electricity retail price index has been used, due to an absent wholesale price 
deflator for the electricity sector. For Spain, the National Renewable Energy plans 
(starting back in 1986) regulated favourable buy-back tariffs. The 1998 Royal 
Decree explicitly gave wind power producers the option to choose between (a) the 
wholesale price plus a premium, or (b) a fixed price of about €62.6/MWh. For the 
sake of simplicity, and to avoid the aforementioned problem of obtaining the true 
wholesale prices, the fixed price has been applied. Since no exact regulated price 
data could be obtained for the 1986-96 period,110 I have applied the fixed 
€62.6/MWh price to that entire period. Since in Spain the government has 
traditionally determined the electricity prices for the different consumer 
categories, no electricity wholesale price index was available to deflate the fixed 
tariff. 
   In Greece, the feed-in tariff for independent power producers (IPPs) has been 
regulated since 1985. Since no historical feed-in tariff data were obtained, the 
1994 legislation (where IPPs receive 90% of the grid price) has also been applied 
to the pre-1994 period (deflated at the wholesale price index). 
   In Portugal, the conditions for IPPs to deliver to the national grid have been 
regulated since 1988. In 1998, wind power was guaranteed a PTE 10.48/kWh 
price. Since no historical data were obtained, and since no wholesale price index 
was available, I have deflated this price using the electricity retail price index. 
                                                      
108 Since the Euro did not exist before 01 January 2002, I have used the following 
methodology. The German Mark has been used as a reference for calculating the exchange 
rate with the Euro, ECU, and pre-ECU standard. For 1990 onwards, I have used exchange 
rates from oanda.com. For the 1985-1989 period, I assumed the DMark to equal about 
€0.49. For all other currencies, I have used historical exchange rates (IMF data) vis-à-vis 
the DMark, and then multiplied with the normalisation factor to construct ‘Euros’. 
109 See for example the explanatory note at p. 301 of Iea/Oecd (2002). 
110 A request at the Spanish regulatory body has not been answered. 
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   For Luxembourg, neither industry nor wholesale price data were available, as 
holds for the price indices. Given the relatively high retail prices, and furthermore 
the enormous interconnection with the Belgium economy (e.g., during the entire 
period observed the currencies of both countries were interchangeable) I have 
applied the data for the Belgium market to the Luxembourg case for the period 
before specific feed-in tariff regulations occurred (that is, before 1994). 
   For constructing a base-case feed-in tariff, I used the average 1985 ex-tax 
industry price for the EU(15), deflated by the real energy price index for industrial 
end-users in OECD Europe. This results in base-case prices varying from 
€51.9/MWh in the year 1985 (start), via €53.8/MWh in 1990 (highest), to 
€44.9/MWh in the year 2000 (lowest and last). I applied these prices uniformly to 
all countries in the sample. The rationale for uniform base-case feed-in tariffs is 
that it was impossible to obtain wholesale prices for the sample period. Most 
countries did not have a true wholesale market in that era, and their prices were in 
fact artefacts determined by law or Parliament. For example, in Spain government 
set all prices, varying between industries, etc. Industry-specific energy prices have 
been frequently applied, and have often been (ab)used as some form of subsidies. 
Therefore, using country-neutral base-case prices may eliminate some part of this 
implicit subsidisation. As a consequence, however, the present value of the 
differences between the real-price vectors and base-case price vectors may yield 
negative subsidies there. 
 
Wind regime 
A crucial factor that affects the profitability of a wind turbine investment project in 
the various countries is the wind regime. I have used the wind regimes given by 
Btm (2000), and cross-checked these figures with the data provided by the 
European Wind Energy Association.111 
 
Fiscal regime 
I have used the statutory corporate tax rates provided by the Institute of Fiscal 
Studies (IFS).112 Since the IFS data do not cover Denmark and Luxembourg, I 
have assumed these corporate tax rates to equal 32% and 37% respectively for the 
entire sample period.113 
4.3.2 Base-case Q 
Using the above assumptions, the base-case Q’s calculated for investment in wind 
turbines have steadily remained below unity over time. Figure 4.3 shows the 
calculated Q’s of an investment in a hypothetical 1MW wind power plant in 
the1985-2000 period. The base case shows that not a single positive Q (let alone 
                                                      
111 URL: www.ewea.org 
112 URL: www.ifs.org.uk, see link to ‘Corporate tax’. 
113 These estimates have been based on Ec (2001). 
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one exceeding unity) was calculated. A sensitivity analysis on these results with 
respect to the assumptions yields the following results. 
   The capital-intensive nature of wind turbine projects by definition makes the 
outcomes very vulnerable to changes in the level of the initial investment. A 
change of 10% in the investment costs triggers similar responses in the base-case 
Qs. Jumping ahead to the net analysis (including fiscal and financial incentives) 
this sensitivity is smoothened for most of the individual countries, either due to 
investment subsidies, or due to the tax shield on depreciation, investment reliefs, 
etc. 
   Changes in the discount rate show a similar pattern. For example, if the debt-to-
equity ratio changes from full debt financing to a D/E ratio of one, the WACC 
slightly increases to 7.9%. More important, however, is the fact that the tax shield 
from debt decreases. For the base-case, this has a moderate effect. For countries as 
Denmark and Spain (corporate tax rate comparable to the base-case) the impact is 
smoothened. In the case of Spain, this is because of the investment subsidy—given 
a lower capital need, the impact of a change in the finance structure is more 
limited too. In the case of Denmark, the income is much higher than in the base-
case (due to production subsidies and high feed-in tariff), which limits the impact 
of changes in the tax shield, etc. In the case of Germany, however, the tax benefits 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Base-case Q's (1MW investment project) 
121
drop dramatically, which can be attributed to the high corporate tax rate of 52%. 
These effects are multiplied for a full equity financed project. 
  If the asset beta is increased from 0.69 to 1.00, the discount rate increases to 
8.9%. The base-case Qs then drop slightly, an effect that is replicated in the case 
of Germany. In Denmark and Spain the increased discount rate hardly has any 
effect on Q. 
   An increase of the operating costs with 10% (i.e., €4k per annum) is of minor 
importance to the project. 
   Overall, it appears that the Q calculations are rather stable. The variables most 
sensitive to changes are related to the capital structure and to the investment 
amount. Particularly the tax shield from debt has a multiplying effect here. 
 
4.4 Policies affecting Q 
4.4.1 Description of green policies 
Table 4.2 reviews the national policies for encouraging wind turbine investments 
during the 1985-2000 period. For some countries as Austria, Spain, and Belgium, 
table 4.2 includes some regional policies as well. These governments have 
transferred some policies to non-central governments, so that inclusion of these 
regional policies makes the overview more accurate. Nevertheless, I have 
predominantly restricted the empirical assessment to the policies at the national 
level. Legislation that has come into force after 31 December 2000 has not been 
included in this review, since the available data on installed wind turbine capacity 
have at least a two years’ time lag before being published, which would hamper an 
assessment of the effects of these policies. Since the focus is on a 1 MW wind 
power plant, I have excluded stimuli for households (such as auto-consumption 
projects for rural areas), as well as niche-market applications of wind power.114 
   Production subsidies and subsidies on capital investments appear to be the two 
most popular instruments in the various national policies. Favourable feed-in 
tariffs have also been a common practice. 
                                                      
114 For example, the combination of wind and solar power, or the use of wind power for the 
extraction of water from geothermal deposits. 
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tu
rb
in
es
 (
in
 
fo
rc
e 
fr
om
 0
1.
02
.1
99
7)
. 
T
he
 L
a 
R
io
ja
 r
eg
io
n 
of
fe
rs
 s
om
e 
su
bs
id
ie
s 
fo
r 
de
m
on
st
ra
tio
n 
pr
oj
ec
ts
 i
n 
R
E
S 
(i
nc
l. 
w
in
d)
 a
s 
w
el
l 
as
 t
he
 e
xt
en
si
on
 o
f 
en
er
gy
 i
nf
ra
st
ru
ct
ur
es
 (
in
 f
or
ce
 f
ro
m
 2
4.
11
.2
00
0 
til
l 
15
.1
2.
20
00
).
 T
he
 B
al
ea
ri
c 
Is
la
nd
s 
ha
ve
 o
ff
er
ed
 a
 m
ax
im
um
 
su
bs
id
y 
of
 E
SP
 3
00
/W
 in
st
al
le
d 
(b
y 
th
en
 E
C
U
 1
.7
9)
 f
or
 w
in
d 
tu
rb
in
es
 (
in
 f
or
ce
 2
7.
04
.1
99
7 
on
ly
 f
or
 p
ro
je
ct
s 
un
de
rt
ak
en
 
in
 1
99
7)
. T
he
 C
as
til
la
-L
eo
n 
re
gi
on
 p
ro
vi
de
s 
su
bs
id
ie
s 
fo
r 
w
in
d 
en
er
gy
 (
in
 f
or
ce
 f
ro
m
 0
1.
01
.1
99
6)
. T
he
 M
ur
ci
a 
re
gi
on
 
pr
ov
id
es
 s
ub
si
di
es
 f
or
 R
E
S 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
, u
p 
to
 5
0%
 o
f 
th
e 
pr
oj
ec
t i
m
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
bu
dg
et
 (
in
 f
or
ce
 f
ro
m
 0
6.
05
.1
99
7)
. 
Pr
od
uc
tio
n 
su
bs
id
y:
 
T
he
 
na
tio
na
l 
‘R
en
ew
ab
le
 
E
ne
rg
y 
Pl
an
s’
 
(o
f 
19
86
-8
9,
 
19
89
-9
0,
 
an
d 
19
91
-2
00
0)
 
re
gu
la
te
 
fa
vo
ur
ab
le
 b
uy
-b
ac
k 
ra
te
s 
fo
r 
re
ne
w
ab
le
 e
ne
rg
y 
fr
om
 f
ac
ili
tie
s 
sm
al
le
r 
th
an
 1
00
M
W
. 
A
cc
or
di
ng
 t
o 
th
e 
R
oy
al
 D
ec
re
e 
28
18
/1
99
8,
 w
in
d 
po
w
er
 p
ro
du
ce
rs
 c
an
 c
ho
os
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
re
ce
iv
in
g 
ei
th
er
 (
a)
 T
he
 ‘
fi
na
l 
av
er
ag
e 
ho
ur
ly
 p
ri
ce
’ 
on
 t
he
 
w
ho
le
sa
le
 m
ar
ke
t, 
pl
us
 a
 €
0.
02
88
/k
W
h 
pr
em
iu
m
, o
r 
(b
) 
A
 f
ix
ed
 p
ri
ce
 o
f 
€0
.0
62
6/
kW
h.
 
D
ec
re
e 
17
0/
94
 o
f 
th
e 
A
ra
go
n 
re
gi
on
 g
ra
nt
s 
su
bs
id
ie
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
ex
pl
oi
ta
tio
n 
of
 r
en
ew
ab
le
 e
ne
rg
y 
so
ur
ce
s,
 i
nc
l. 
w
in
d 
(i
n 
fo
rc
e 
fr
om
 3
0.
07
.1
99
4)
. 
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N
et
he
rl
an
ds
 
A
cc
el
er
at
ed
 d
ep
re
ci
at
io
n:
 S
in
ce
 1
99
6,
 w
in
d 
tu
rb
in
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 a
re
 a
llo
w
ed
 t
o 
ap
pl
y 
a 
‘f
re
e 
de
pr
ec
ia
tio
n’
 u
nd
er
 t
he
 
V
A
M
IL
 f
ac
ili
ty
 (
V
A
M
IL
 a
lr
ea
dy
 e
xi
st
ed
 s
in
ce
 1
99
1)
. T
hi
s 
fa
ci
lit
y 
al
lo
w
s,
 f
or
 e
xa
m
pl
e,
 a
 c
om
pl
et
e 
de
pr
ec
ia
tio
n 
in
 t
he
 
fi
rs
t y
ea
r 
of
 o
pe
ra
tio
n.
 
T
ax
 r
el
ie
f o
n 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
: F
ro
m
 0
1.
01
.1
99
7 
til
l 
01
.1
0.
20
02
 th
e 
E
IA
 (
E
ne
rg
y 
In
ve
st
m
en
t D
ed
uc
tio
n)
 a
llo
w
s 
to
 d
ed
uc
e 
40
 to
 5
2%
 (
de
pe
nd
en
t o
n 
th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t a
m
ou
nt
) 
fr
om
 th
e 
fi
sc
al
 p
ro
fi
ts
 (
w
ith
 a
 c
ap
 o
f 
N
L
G
 5
0 
m
ln
., 
ab
ou
t €
22
.7
 m
ln
.)
. 
C
ap
ita
l i
nv
es
tm
en
t s
ub
sid
y:
 I
n 
M
ay
 1
98
6,
 th
e 
5-
ye
ar
s 
la
st
in
g 
IP
W
 (
In
te
gr
al
 P
ro
gr
am
m
e 
W
in
d 
en
er
gy
) 
w
as
 l
au
nc
he
d.
 
In
 1
98
6 
an
d 
19
87
, 
th
e 
IP
W
 s
ub
si
di
se
d 
ab
ou
t 
€3
00
/k
W
 i
ns
ta
lle
d.
 F
ro
m
 1
98
8 
to
 1
99
0,
 a
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 t
he
 t
ot
al
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
co
st
s 
w
as
 s
ub
si
di
se
d,
 w
ith
 i
ts
 c
ap
 d
ec
re
as
in
g 
fr
om
 5
0%
 (
19
88
) 
to
 3
7%
 (
19
90
).
 I
n 
19
86
, 
th
e 
M
in
is
tr
y 
of
 
V
R
O
M
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
an
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 s
ub
si
dy
 (
M
PW
—
E
nv
ir
on
m
en
ta
l 
Pr
em
iu
m
 W
in
d 
en
er
gy
) 
of
 €
11
5/
kW
, 
an
 a
m
ou
nt
 t
ha
t 
gr
ad
ua
lly
 d
ec
re
as
ed
 t
o 
€4
5/
kW
 i
n 
19
90
. 
Fr
om
 1
99
1 
to
 1
99
5,
 t
he
 T
W
IN
 p
ro
gr
am
m
e 
pr
ov
id
ed
 c
ap
ita
l 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
su
bs
id
ie
s,
 c
ap
pe
d 
at
 3
5%
 o
f 
to
ta
l 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
co
st
s.
 D
ur
in
g 
19
93
 a
nd
 1
99
4,
 t
he
 t
ot
al
 a
m
ou
nt
 o
f 
su
bs
id
ie
s 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
de
cr
ea
se
d 
si
gn
if
ic
an
tly
. F
or
 1
99
5,
 th
e 
m
ax
im
um
 w
as
 s
et
 a
t 3
0%
 o
f 
to
ta
l i
nv
es
tm
en
t c
os
ts
. F
ro
m
 1
99
6 
on
w
ar
ds
, t
he
 C
O
2 
R
ed
uc
tio
n 
Pl
an
 p
ro
vi
de
s 
ca
pi
ta
l i
nv
es
tm
en
t s
ub
si
di
es
 o
f 
ab
ou
t 5
%
 o
f 
to
ta
l i
nv
es
tm
en
t c
os
ts
. 
Pr
od
uc
tio
n 
su
bs
id
y:
 I
n 
ad
di
tio
n 
to
 a
ll 
su
bs
id
ie
s,
 R
E
S 
pr
od
uc
er
s 
re
ce
iv
e 
a 
st
an
da
rd
 b
uy
-b
ac
k 
ta
ri
ff
 f
ro
m
 t
he
 r
eg
io
na
l 
en
er
gy
 d
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
co
m
pa
ni
es
. I
n 
A
ug
us
t 1
99
4,
 a
n 
ar
bi
tr
ag
in
g 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 d
et
er
m
in
ed
 t
ha
t w
in
d 
po
w
er
 s
ho
ul
d 
re
ce
iv
e 
a 
st
an
da
rd
 
ta
ri
ff
 
of
 
N
L
G
0.
07
9/
kW
h—
an
 
am
ou
nt
 
th
at
 
pr
ov
ed
 
di
sa
pp
oi
nt
in
g 
to
 
m
os
t 
w
in
d 
tu
rb
in
e 
ow
ne
rs
. 
T
hi
s 
di
ss
at
is
fa
ct
io
n 
ha
s 
le
d 
to
 a
 r
ev
is
io
n 
fo
r 
19
95
 a
nd
 1
99
6.
 F
or
 t
ur
bi
ne
s 
in
st
al
le
d 
in
 1
99
5 
an
d 
19
96
, 
th
e 
st
an
da
rd
 t
ar
if
f 
be
ca
m
e 
N
L
G
0.
13
3/
kW
h 
pl
us
 a
n 
N
L
G
0.
05
4/
kW
h 
su
bs
id
y.
 F
ro
m
 1
99
7 
on
w
ar
ds
, 
th
e 
m
ar
gi
na
l 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
su
bs
id
y 
w
as
 
re
pl
ac
ed
 b
y 
a 
tr
an
sf
er
re
d 
le
vy
 (
th
e 
R
E
B
),
 d
is
cu
ss
ed
 b
el
ow
. 
T
he
 s
ta
nd
ar
d 
bu
y-
ba
ck
 t
ar
if
f 
re
m
ai
ne
d 
eq
ua
l. 
Fo
r 
19
99
, 
it 
w
as
 N
L
G
0.
08
1/
kW
h.
 
Fr
om
 1
99
6 
on
w
ar
ds
, 
sm
al
l 
an
d 
m
ed
iu
m
-s
iz
ed
 e
le
ct
ri
ci
ty
 c
on
su
m
er
s 
(i
.e
., 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
 a
nd
 s
m
al
l 
co
m
pa
ni
es
) 
pa
y 
a 
m
ar
gi
na
l 
le
vy
 o
n 
th
ei
r 
po
w
er
 c
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
(R
E
B
—
R
eg
ul
at
or
y 
E
ne
rg
y 
T
ax
),
 w
hi
ch
 i
s 
la
rg
el
y 
tr
an
sf
er
re
d 
to
 t
he
 R
E
S 
pr
od
uc
er
. T
ha
t t
ra
ns
fe
r 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
ov
er
 ti
m
e 
fr
om
 N
L
G
0.
02
95
/k
W
h 
(1
99
6)
 to
 N
L
G
0.
03
54
/k
W
h 
(2
00
0)
. 
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It
al
y 
Su
bs
id
y 
on
 c
ap
ita
l 
in
ve
st
m
en
t:
 T
ho
ug
h 
L
aw
 1
0/
91
 p
ro
vi
de
s 
su
bs
id
ie
s 
of
 3
0%
-8
0%
 o
f 
th
e 
ca
pi
ta
l 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
in
 a
 
re
ne
w
ab
le
s 
pl
an
t, 
Ie
a/
O
ec
d 
(1
99
8:
 1
42
) 
st
at
es
 th
at
 n
o 
su
bs
id
ie
s 
w
er
e 
di
sb
ur
se
d 
du
e 
to
 g
ov
er
nm
en
ta
l b
ud
ge
t c
on
st
ra
in
ts
. 
In
st
ea
d,
 i
nc
en
tiv
es
 w
er
e 
de
ri
ve
d 
fr
om
 L
aw
 9
/9
1 
(v
ia
 D
ir
ec
tiv
e 
C
IP
6/
19
92
) 
pr
ov
id
ed
 f
av
ou
ra
bl
e 
bu
yb
ac
k 
ra
te
s 
fo
r 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t R
E
S 
pr
od
uc
er
s.
 
Pr
od
uc
tio
n 
su
bs
id
y:
 D
ir
ec
tiv
e 
C
IP
6/
19
92
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
fa
vo
ur
ab
le
 b
uy
ba
ck
 r
at
es
 f
or
 in
de
pe
nd
en
t R
E
S 
pr
od
uc
er
s 
(i
n 
fo
rc
e 
fr
om
 1
99
2 
to
 1
99
7)
 o
f 
ab
ou
t 
IT
L
 2
70
/k
W
h.
 T
he
se
 b
uy
-b
ac
k 
ra
te
s 
ap
pl
ie
d 
fo
r 
th
e 
fi
rs
t 
ei
gh
t 
ye
ar
s 
of
 o
pe
ra
tio
n,
 a
ft
er
 
w
hi
ch
 a
 l
ow
er
 p
ri
ce
 h
as
 p
ai
d 
of
 a
bo
ut
 I
T
L
 9
0/
kW
h.
 F
ro
m
 1
99
7 
on
w
ar
ds
, b
ot
h 
ra
te
s 
ha
ve
 b
ec
om
e 
un
re
gu
la
te
d,
 a
nd
 a
re
 
co
ns
id
er
ab
ly
 lo
w
er
 (
ab
ou
t I
T
L
 2
00
/k
W
h 
fo
r 
fi
rs
t 8
 y
ea
rs
, b
ut
 a
bo
ut
 I
T
L
 1
00
/k
W
h 
fo
r 
re
m
ai
nd
er
).
 
U
K
a 
Pr
od
uc
tio
n 
su
bs
id
y:
 
Si
nc
e 
19
90
, 
th
e 
N
on
-F
os
si
l 
Fu
el
 
O
bl
ig
at
io
n 
(N
FF
O
) 
ha
s 
pr
ov
id
ed
 
ou
tp
ut
 
su
bs
id
ie
s 
fo
r 
re
ne
w
ab
le
s.
 F
iv
e 
pr
og
ra
m
m
es
 in
 a
 r
ow
 (
N
FF
O
-1
, t
o 
5)
 h
av
e 
se
en
 th
e 
lig
ht
, a
ll 
w
ith
 d
ec
lin
in
g 
ou
tp
ut
 s
ub
si
di
es
. F
or
 w
in
d 
(w
ith
 1
 M
W
 n
et
 c
ap
ac
ity
) 
N
FF
O
-1
 (
19
90
-1
99
8)
 p
ai
d 
G
B
P 
0.
10
/k
W
h,
 N
FF
O
-2
 (
19
92
-1
99
8)
 p
ai
d 
G
B
P 
0.
11
/k
W
h 
de
liv
er
ed
. T
he
 n
ex
t N
FF
O
 p
ro
gr
am
m
es
 r
un
 f
or
 1
5 
ye
ar
s,
 w
ith
 a
 lo
ng
er
 li
fe
sp
an
. O
n 
av
er
ag
e,
 N
FF
O
-3
 (
19
95
-2
01
2)
 p
ai
d 
G
B
P 
0.
05
29
/k
W
h,
 w
he
re
as
 N
FF
O
-4
 (
19
97
-2
01
7)
 p
ai
d 
G
B
P 
0.
04
57
/k
W
h.
 N
FO
-5
 (
19
98
-2
01
9)
 p
ay
s 
G
B
P 
0.
04
18
/k
W
h.
 
Sw
ed
en
 
Su
bs
id
y 
on
 c
ap
ita
l 
in
ve
st
m
en
t:
 T
he
 1
99
1 
E
ne
rg
y 
Po
lic
y 
B
ill
 (
19
91
-1
99
6)
 f
ac
ili
ta
te
d 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
su
pp
or
t 
to
 w
in
d 
po
w
er
. 
O
ri
gi
na
lly
, 
a 
25
%
 s
ub
si
dy
 w
as
 g
ra
nt
ed
, 
bu
t 
la
te
r 
th
is
 b
ec
am
e 
35
%
 f
or
 p
la
nt
s 
>6
0k
W
. 
Fr
om
 m
id
-1
99
6 
to
 m
id
-
19
97
, 
no
 s
ub
si
di
es
 w
er
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e.
 T
he
 J
un
e 
19
97
 p
ar
lia
m
en
ta
ry
 d
ec
is
io
n 
on
 e
ne
rg
y 
po
lic
y 
gr
an
ts
 1
5%
 o
f 
th
e 
ca
pi
ta
l 
co
st
s 
fo
r 
ne
w
 w
in
d 
tu
rb
in
es
 >
20
0k
W
 (
th
is
 s
ub
si
dy
 is
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
to
 b
e 
re
du
ce
d 
to
 1
0%
 s
oo
n)
. 
Pr
od
uc
tio
n 
su
bs
id
y:
 S
in
ce
 0
1.
07
.1
99
4,
 w
in
d 
po
w
er
 p
ro
du
ce
rs
 r
ec
ei
ve
 a
 s
o-
ca
lle
d 
‘E
nv
ir
on
m
en
ta
l 
B
on
us
’,
 e
qu
al
lin
g 
th
e 
ex
ci
se
 ta
x 
on
 e
le
ct
ri
ci
ty
 f
or
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
s.
 T
hi
s 
bo
nu
s 
di
ff
er
s 
pe
r 
re
gi
on
 (
hi
gh
es
t i
n 
so
ut
he
rn
 a
nd
 c
en
tr
al
 S
w
ed
en
),
 a
nd
 
eq
ua
lle
d 
SE
K
 1
13
/M
W
h 
(1
99
6)
, S
E
K
 1
38
/M
W
h 
(1
99
7)
, S
E
K
15
2/
M
W
h 
(1
99
8)
, a
nd
 S
E
K
 1
81
/M
W
h 
(2
00
0)
. I
n 
ad
di
tio
n 
to
 t
he
 r
eg
ul
ar
 p
ri
ce
 p
ai
d 
fo
r 
el
ec
tr
ic
ity
 (
an
d 
th
e 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l 
bo
nu
s)
, 
fr
om
 1
99
7 
un
til
 t
he
 e
nd
 o
f 
20
01
, 
a 
sp
ec
ia
l 
su
bs
id
y 
of
 S
E
K
 0
.0
9/
kW
h 
w
as
 g
iv
en
 f
or
 s
m
al
l-
sc
al
e 
w
in
d 
po
w
er
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
un
its
 (
<1
.5
M
W
).
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G
re
ec
e 
Su
bs
id
y 
on
 c
ap
ita
l i
nv
es
tm
en
t:
 L
aw
 1
89
2/
19
90
 p
ro
vi
de
s 
(a
.o
.)
 c
ap
ita
l 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
su
bs
id
ie
s 
up
 t
o 
45
%
 (
19
90
-1
99
3)
. 
T
he
 ‘
O
pe
ra
tio
na
l 
Pr
og
ra
m
m
e 
fo
r 
E
ne
rg
y’
 O
PE
 (
19
94
-1
99
8)
 a
cc
om
pa
ny
in
g 
L
aw
 2
24
4/
19
94
 s
ub
si
di
se
s 
w
in
d 
en
er
gy
 
pr
oj
ec
ts
 w
ith
 4
0%
 (
up
 t
o 
G
D
R
 3
50
,0
00
/k
W
 s
ub
si
di
se
d 
pr
oj
ec
t 
co
st
s)
. 
L
aw
 2
60
1/
19
98
 (
in
 f
or
ce
 1
99
9-
on
w
ar
ds
) 
gi
ve
s 
fi
rm
s 
in
ve
st
in
g 
in
 R
E
S 
pl
an
ts
 t
he
 c
ho
ic
e 
of
 e
ith
er
 r
ec
ei
vi
ng
: 
(a
) 
A
 4
0%
 c
ap
ita
l 
su
bs
id
y,
 p
lu
s 
an
 i
nt
er
es
t 
ra
te
 s
ub
si
dy
 
(4
0%
 o
f 
th
e 
in
te
re
st
 p
ai
d 
on
 lo
an
s 
fo
r 
R
E
S 
eq
ui
pm
en
t i
nv
es
tm
en
ts
),
 p
lu
s 
a 
40
%
 le
as
in
g 
su
bs
id
y,
 o
r 
(b
) 
A
 ta
x 
de
du
ct
io
n 
eq
ua
lli
ng
 1
00
%
 o
f 
th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
co
st
s,
 p
lu
s 
th
e 
af
or
em
en
tio
ne
d 
in
te
re
st
 r
at
e 
su
bs
id
y.
 T
he
 t
ax
 d
ed
uc
tio
n 
cr
ea
te
s 
a 
ta
x-
ex
em
pt
 r
es
er
ve
 th
at
 a
cc
um
ul
at
es
 u
nt
il 
to
ta
l i
nv
es
tm
en
t c
os
ts
 h
av
e 
be
en
 r
ec
up
er
at
ed
 (
w
ith
in
 u
p 
to
 1
0 
ye
ar
s)
. 
Pr
od
uc
tio
n 
su
bs
id
y:
 U
nd
er
 l
aw
 1
55
9/
19
85
, 
au
to
-p
ro
du
ce
rs
 a
nd
 I
PP
s 
w
er
e 
al
lo
w
ed
 t
o 
se
ll 
a 
lim
ite
d 
am
ou
nt
 o
f 
re
ne
w
ab
le
 e
ne
rg
y 
to
 t
he
 s
ta
te
-o
w
ne
d 
el
ec
tr
ic
ity
 c
om
pa
ny
 P
PC
. 
In
 1
98
8,
 t
he
 t
ar
if
f 
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
fo
r 
pu
rc
ha
si
ng
 r
en
ew
ab
le
 
el
ec
tr
ic
ity
 b
y 
PP
C
 w
as
 r
eg
ul
at
ed
. U
nd
er
 l
aw
 2
24
4/
19
94
, a
ut
o-
pr
od
uc
er
s 
an
d 
IP
Ps
 w
er
e 
al
lo
w
ed
 t
o 
in
st
al
l 
up
 t
o 
50
M
W
. 
Fu
rt
he
rm
or
e,
 i
t 
re
gu
la
te
s 
pr
ic
es
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
PP
C
 a
nd
 i
nd
ep
en
de
nt
 p
ow
er
 p
ro
du
ce
rs
, 
co
ns
is
tin
g 
of
 a
n 
en
er
gy
 a
nd
 a
 
ca
pa
ci
ty
 c
om
po
ne
nt
. 
T
he
 e
ne
rg
y 
co
m
po
ne
nt
 f
or
 I
PP
s 
se
lli
ng
 t
o 
an
 i
nt
er
co
nn
ec
te
d 
gr
id
 i
s 
90
%
 o
f 
th
e 
sa
le
s 
pr
ic
e.
 I
n 
19
97
, f
or
 w
in
d 
pl
an
ts
 d
el
iv
er
in
g 
at
 m
ed
iu
m
 v
ol
ta
ge
 (
6.
6-
22
kV
),
 th
is
 s
al
es
 p
ri
ce
 e
qu
al
le
d 
G
R
D
 1
8.
79
/k
W
h 
(E
C
U
 0
.0
57
);
 
w
he
n 
de
liv
er
in
g 
at
 t
he
 h
ig
h-
vo
lta
ge
 g
ri
d 
(1
50
kV
),
 t
hr
ee
 s
ub
-z
on
es
 h
av
e 
th
ei
r 
ow
n 
pr
ic
es
. 
T
he
 c
ap
ac
ity
 c
om
po
ne
nt
 
eq
ua
ls
 5
0%
 o
f 
th
e 
am
ou
nt
 P
PC
 c
ha
rg
es
 a
t 
th
e 
en
d-
us
er
s,
 w
hi
ch
 i
s 
m
ul
tip
lie
d 
by
 0
.5
0 
fo
r 
w
in
d 
en
er
gy
. 
In
 1
99
7,
 t
he
 
ca
pa
ci
ty
 c
re
di
t f
or
 w
in
d 
pr
od
uc
er
s 
de
liv
er
in
g 
at
 th
e 
m
ed
iu
m
 v
ol
ta
ge
 g
ri
d 
w
as
 G
R
D
 2
41
/k
W
 (
.5
*.
5*
G
D
R
96
4)
 p
er
 m
on
th
 
(E
C
U
 0
.7
26
),
 c
al
cu
la
te
d 
ov
er
 t
he
 m
ax
im
um
 m
ea
su
re
d 
po
w
er
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
ov
er
 t
he
 b
ill
in
g 
pe
ri
od
. T
he
 h
ig
h 
vo
lta
ge
 g
ri
d 
re
m
un
er
at
es
 h
ig
he
r 
ca
pa
ci
ty
 p
ay
m
en
ts
 c
al
cu
la
te
d 
on
 t
he
 b
as
is
 o
f 
th
e 
m
ax
im
um
 m
ea
su
re
d 
po
w
er
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
tw
o 
su
cc
es
si
ve
 m
ea
su
re
m
en
ts
 in
 th
e 
pe
ak
 h
ou
r 
zo
ne
. B
ot
h 
re
m
un
er
at
io
ns
 th
us
 s
ho
w
 s
ea
so
na
lit
y 
as
pe
ct
s.
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Ir
el
an
d 
A
cc
el
er
at
ed
 d
ep
re
ci
at
io
n:
 I
t i
s 
as
su
m
ed
 (
th
ou
gh
 th
is
 is
 d
eb
at
ed
) 
th
at
 in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 in
 w
in
d 
tu
rb
in
es
 m
ay
 o
pt
 f
or
 th
e 
15
%
 
ta
x 
de
pr
ec
ia
tio
n 
p.
a.
 a
llo
w
an
ce
 f
or
 p
la
nt
s 
an
d 
m
ac
hi
ne
ri
es
 (
vi
s-
à-
vi
s t
he
 4
%
 p
.a
. f
or
 in
du
st
ri
al
 b
ui
ld
in
gs
).
 
T
ax
 r
el
ie
f 
on
 in
ve
st
m
en
ts
: S
in
ce
 1
98
0,
 a
 1
0%
 t
ax
 r
at
e 
ap
pl
ie
s 
to
 a
 s
pe
ci
fi
ed
 r
an
ge
 o
f 
ec
on
om
ic
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
, 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
el
ec
tr
ic
ity
 g
en
er
at
io
n 
(t
he
 c
ur
re
nt
 ‘
no
rm
al
’ 
ta
x 
ra
te
 is
 2
8%
).
 S
in
ce
 1
8.
03
.1
99
9 
(o
pe
ra
tin
g 
fo
r 
2 
ye
ar
s)
, t
he
 1
99
8 
Fi
na
nc
e 
B
ill
 a
llo
w
s 
a 
ta
x 
re
lie
f 
fo
r 
eq
ui
ty
 in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 in
 R
E
S 
pr
oj
ec
ts
 u
nd
er
 c
er
ta
in
 r
es
tr
ic
tiv
e 
co
nd
iti
on
s.
 
Su
bs
id
y 
on
 c
ap
ita
l i
nv
es
tm
en
t:
 T
he
 A
E
R
-3
 p
ro
gr
am
m
e 
of
fe
re
d 
ca
pi
ta
l g
ra
nt
s 
€8
0,
00
0 
pe
r 
M
W
 in
st
al
le
d.
 
Pr
od
uc
tio
n 
su
bs
id
y:
 S
in
ce
 1
99
4,
 f
iv
e 
‘A
lte
rn
at
iv
e 
E
ne
rg
y 
R
eq
ui
re
m
en
t’
 (
A
E
R
) 
pr
og
ra
m
m
es
 h
av
e 
be
en
 l
au
nc
he
d,
 o
f 
w
hi
ch
 A
E
R
-1
 A
E
R
-3
, a
nd
 A
E
R
-5
 a
pp
ly
 t
o 
w
in
d 
po
w
er
. T
he
 A
E
R
s 
ar
ra
ng
e 
15
-y
ea
rs
’ 
pu
rc
ha
se
 c
on
tr
ac
ts
 w
ith
 t
he
 I
ri
sh
 
ut
ili
ty
 E
SB
; 
th
e 
pr
ic
es
 i
nc
re
as
e 
an
nu
al
ly
 w
ith
 R
PI
 i
nf
la
tio
n.
 T
he
 A
E
R
s 
re
gu
la
te
 t
he
 p
ri
ce
 c
ap
, 
bu
t 
th
e 
re
al
 p
ri
ce
s 
ar
e 
se
ttl
ed
 t
hr
ou
gh
 a
 b
id
di
ng
 p
ro
ce
ss
. 
U
nd
er
 A
E
R
-1
 (
19
94
-1
99
6)
, 
R
E
S 
pr
od
uc
er
s 
w
er
e 
pa
id
 a
 f
ix
ed
 t
ar
if
f 
fo
r 
a 
15
-y
ea
rs
’ 
pe
ri
od
 o
f 
IE
P 
0.
06
1-
0.
06
4/
kW
h 
du
ri
ng
 w
ee
kd
ay
s 
(a
bo
ut
 E
C
U
 0
.0
8)
, 
an
d 
IE
P 
0.
02
4-
0.
02
5/
kW
h 
du
ri
ng
 t
he
 w
ee
ke
nd
s.
 
A
E
R
-3
 (
19
97
-1
99
9)
 r
eg
ul
at
es
 a
 p
ri
ce
 c
ap
 f
or
 w
in
d 
en
er
gy
, w
he
re
as
 th
e 
su
cc
es
sf
ul
 b
id
s 
en
de
d 
at
 I
E
P 
0.
02
21
/k
W
h 
(E
C
U
 
0.
02
8)
, w
hi
le
 t
he
 m
ax
im
um
 w
in
d 
po
w
er
 p
la
nt
 h
ad
 b
ee
n 
fi
xe
d 
at
 1
5 
M
W
. A
E
R
-5
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
an
no
un
ce
d 
in
 A
ug
us
t 
20
01
, 
an
d 
is
 n
ot
 d
is
cu
ss
ed
 h
er
e.
 
Po
rt
ug
al
 
Su
bs
id
y 
on
 c
ap
ita
l i
nv
es
tm
en
t:
 I
n 
Po
rt
ug
al
, i
nv
es
tm
en
t s
ub
si
di
es
 h
av
e 
be
en
 c
on
si
de
re
d 
th
e 
ke
y 
in
st
ru
m
en
t t
o 
pr
om
ot
e 
th
e 
us
e 
of
 R
E
S.
 T
w
o 
pr
og
ra
m
m
es
 h
av
e 
pr
ov
id
ed
 c
ap
ita
l 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
su
bs
id
ie
s:
 t
he
 E
ne
rg
ia
 P
ro
gr
am
m
e 
an
d 
th
e 
M
A
PE
/P
O
E
 P
ro
gr
am
m
e.
 T
he
 E
ne
rg
ia
 P
ro
gr
am
m
e 
(1
99
4-
19
99
) 
gr
an
ts
 u
p 
to
 5
0%
 c
ap
ita
l 
su
bs
id
ie
s 
of
 t
ot
al
 i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
co
st
s 
fo
r 
di
ss
em
in
at
io
n 
(c
om
m
er
ci
al
is
at
io
n)
 p
ro
je
ct
s,
 w
ith
 a
 c
ap
 o
f 
PT
E
 5
0m
ln
 (
ab
ou
t E
C
U
 2
49
k)
 f
or
 w
in
d 
pr
oj
ec
ts
. 
Pr
od
uc
tio
n 
su
bs
id
y:
 T
he
 1
98
8 
D
ec
re
e 
L
aw
 1
89
 r
eg
ul
at
es
 c
on
di
tio
ns
 u
nd
er
 w
hi
ch
 I
PP
s 
m
ay
 d
el
iv
er
 t
o 
th
e 
na
tio
na
l 
gr
id
; i
t f
ur
th
er
m
or
e 
in
cl
ud
es
 p
ro
vi
si
on
s 
fo
r 
fa
vo
ur
ab
le
 p
ri
ce
s.
 I
n 
19
98
, t
he
 p
ri
ce
 f
or
 w
in
d 
en
er
gy
 w
as
 P
T
E
 1
0.
48
/k
W
h.
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A
us
tr
ia
 
O
th
er
 fi
sc
al
 m
ea
su
re
s:
 S
in
ce
 0
1.
08
.1
99
5,
 a
n 
O
rd
in
an
ce
 o
f 
th
e 
Fe
de
ra
l M
in
st
er
 o
f 
Fo
re
ig
n 
A
ff
ai
rs
 g
ua
ra
nt
ee
s 
m
in
im
um
 
pr
ic
es
 f
or
 R
E
S 
po
w
er
, v
ar
yi
ng
 f
ro
m
 A
T
S 
0.
42
1/
kW
h 
to
 A
T
S 
0.
9/
kW
h 
(r
at
es
 f
or
 p
la
nt
s 
<
2M
W
, d
ep
en
di
ng
 o
n 
th
e 
tim
e 
of
 d
el
iv
er
y)
. T
he
 1
99
8 
‘E
le
ct
ri
ci
ty
 B
us
in
es
s 
an
d 
O
rg
an
is
at
io
n 
L
aw
’ 
(E
L
W
O
G
, i
n 
fo
rc
e 
fr
om
 1
99
9 
on
w
ar
ds
) 
st
at
es
 t
ha
t 
th
e 
fe
de
ra
l p
ro
vi
nc
es
 h
av
e 
to
 f
ix
 th
e 
fe
ed
-i
n 
ta
ri
ff
s 
fo
r 
R
E
S 
po
w
er
. F
ur
th
er
m
or
e,
 r
en
ew
ab
le
 e
le
ct
ri
ci
ty
 m
ay
 n
ow
 b
e 
so
ld
 
di
re
ct
ly
 t
o 
an
y 
cu
st
om
er
. 
T
he
se
 f
ee
d-
in
 t
ar
if
fs
 n
ot
 o
nl
y 
di
ff
er
 p
er
 p
ro
vi
nc
e,
 b
ut
 a
ls
o 
pe
r 
se
as
on
 (
su
m
m
er
 o
r 
w
in
te
r)
, 
w
ith
in
 w
ee
ks
 (
w
or
ki
ng
 d
ay
s 
or
 w
ee
ke
nd
s)
, a
nd
 t
hr
ou
gh
ou
t 
th
e 
da
y 
(d
ay
tim
e 
or
 n
ig
ht
s)
. O
n 
av
er
ag
e,
 t
he
 f
ee
d-
in
 t
ar
if
fs
 
va
ry
 b
et
w
ee
n 
€0
.0
40
/k
W
h 
an
d 
€0
.0
49
/k
W
h.
 
Su
bs
id
y 
on
 c
ap
ita
l 
in
ve
st
m
en
t:
 I
n 
th
e 
19
92
-9
6 
pe
ri
od
, 
th
e 
L
aw
 o
f 
E
nv
ir
on
m
en
ta
l 
Pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
pr
ov
id
ed
 u
p 
to
 3
0%
 
ca
pi
ta
l 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
su
bs
id
ie
s.
 S
in
ce
 J
ul
y 
19
97
, 
th
e 
‘P
ro
m
ot
io
n 
In
st
ru
m
en
t 
fo
r 
E
le
ct
ri
ci
ty
 f
ro
m
 R
en
ew
ab
le
s’
 (
PI
E
R
) 
pr
ov
id
es
 (
a.
o.
) 
ca
pi
ta
l 
su
bs
id
ie
s.
 T
he
 c
ap
ita
l 
su
bs
id
ie
s 
ar
e 
ca
pp
ed
 t
o 
pr
ov
id
e 
no
t 
m
or
e 
th
an
 a
 7
%
 r
at
e 
of
 r
et
ur
n 
fo
r 
15
 
ye
ar
s.
 
Pr
od
uc
tio
n 
su
bs
id
y:
 I
n 
ad
di
tio
n 
to
 th
e 
fe
ed
-i
n 
ta
ri
ff
, t
he
 M
in
is
tr
y 
of
 E
co
no
m
ic
 A
ff
ai
rs
 s
ig
ne
d 
a 
‘v
ol
un
ta
ry
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t’
 
(F
eb
ru
ar
y 
19
94
) 
w
ith
 t
he
 u
til
ity
 f
ir
m
s 
of
 a
dd
in
g 
a 
bo
nu
s 
to
 I
PP
s 
fo
r 
a 
3 
ye
ar
s’
 p
er
io
d 
af
te
r 
th
e 
co
ns
tr
uc
tio
n 
of
 a
 R
E
S 
pl
an
t 
(f
or
 p
la
nt
s 
co
ns
tr
uc
te
d 
be
fo
re
 3
1.
12
.1
99
6—
th
ou
gh
 s
om
e 
ut
ili
ti
es
 c
on
tin
ue
d 
th
is
 b
on
us
 p
ac
ka
ge
 u
nt
il 
ea
rl
y 
19
98
).
 
Fo
r 
w
in
d 
po
w
er
, t
hi
s 
bo
nu
s 
w
as
 1
00
%
. T
hi
s 
ag
re
em
en
t 
ap
pl
ie
d 
to
 t
he
 1
99
4-
19
96
 p
er
io
d.
 F
ro
m
 J
ul
y 
19
97
 o
nw
ar
ds
, t
he
 
PI
E
R
 p
ro
vi
de
s 
al
l i
nc
en
tiv
es
 f
or
 R
E
S.
 
Fr
an
ce
b  
A
cc
el
er
at
ed
 d
ep
re
ci
at
io
n:
 S
in
ce
 1
99
3,
 p
ri
va
te
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 i
nv
es
tin
g 
in
 R
E
S 
pr
oj
ec
ts
 m
ay
 d
ep
re
ci
at
e 
th
ei
r 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 
w
ith
 1
00
%
 in
 o
ne
 y
ea
r.
 
T
ax
 r
el
ie
f o
n 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
: S
in
ce
 1
99
3,
 p
ri
va
te
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 in
ve
st
in
g 
in
 R
E
S 
pr
oj
ec
ts
 m
ay
 a
pp
ly
 f
or
 a
 r
ed
uc
ed
 c
or
po
ra
te
 
in
co
m
e 
ta
x 
ra
te
 (
50
%
 r
ed
uc
tio
n)
. 
O
th
er
 f
is
ca
l 
m
ea
su
re
s:
 T
ho
ug
h 
th
e 
19
46
 l
aw
 c
on
ce
rn
in
g 
th
e 
na
tio
na
lis
at
io
n 
of
 e
le
ct
ri
ci
ty
, 
an
d 
a 
19
55
 d
ec
re
e 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
th
e 
ba
si
s 
fo
r 
ob
lig
at
in
g 
E
dF
 t
o 
pu
rc
ha
se
 e
ne
rg
y 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
co
-g
en
er
at
or
s,
 t
hi
s 
m
ea
su
re
 p
re
do
m
in
an
tly
 
fo
cu
ss
ed
 o
n 
su
rp
lu
s 
ca
pa
ci
tie
s,
 a
nd
 d
id
 n
ot
 p
ro
vi
de
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 i
nc
en
tiv
es
 f
or
 e
nc
ou
ra
gi
ng
 R
E
S 
pr
od
uc
tio
n.
 T
he
re
fo
re
, a
 
ne
w
 d
ec
re
e 
w
as
 p
ut
 in
 p
la
ce
 a
s 
pe
r 
N
ov
em
be
r 
19
94
, w
he
re
 E
dF
 w
as
 o
bl
ig
ed
 to
 p
ur
ch
as
e 
R
E
S 
el
ec
tr
ic
ity
 a
s 
w
el
l. 
Pr
od
uc
tio
n 
su
bs
id
y:
 U
nd
er
 t
he
 ‘
E
O
L
E
 2
00
5’
 w
in
d 
en
er
gy
 p
ro
gr
am
m
e 
(1
99
6-
20
05
),
 s
pe
ci
al
 f
ee
d-
in
 t
ar
if
fs
 a
re
 
re
gu
la
te
d 
be
tw
ee
n 
E
dF
 a
nd
 I
PP
s 
fo
r 
15
-y
ea
rs
’ 
pe
ri
od
s.
 T
hi
s 
pr
og
ra
m
m
e 
co
ns
is
ts
 o
f 
3 
st
ag
es
. U
nd
er
 s
ta
ge
 1
 (
19
96
),
 th
e 
fe
ed
-i
n 
ta
ri
ff
 w
as
 F
FR
 0
.3
8/
kW
h 
(€
0.
05
8)
. 
St
ag
e 
2 
(1
99
7)
 a
pp
lie
d 
an
 F
FR
 0
.3
4/
kW
h 
ra
te
. 
St
ag
e 
3 
(2
00
1)
 f
or
es
ee
s 
a 
€0
.0
83
8/
kW
h 
ra
te
 f
or
 t
he
 f
ir
st
 5
 y
ea
rs
, a
ft
er
 w
hi
ch
 a
 l
ow
er
ed
 r
at
e 
is
 o
ff
er
ed
 f
or
 t
he
 n
ex
t 
10
 y
ea
rs
 (
be
in
g 
€0
.0
30
5/
kW
h 
fo
r 
ov
er
 3
60
0 
hr
s.
 o
f 
pr
od
uc
tio
n,
 a
nd
 €
0.
08
38
/k
W
h 
fo
r 
le
ss
 th
an
 2
00
0 
hr
s.
).
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Fi
nl
an
d 
Su
bs
id
y 
on
 c
ap
ita
l i
nv
es
tm
en
t:
 T
he
 1
99
3 
‘w
in
d 
en
er
gy
 p
ro
gr
am
m
e’
 p
ut
 a
 3
0%
 c
ei
lin
g 
to
 c
ap
ita
l i
nv
es
tm
en
t s
ub
si
di
es
. 
T
he
 1
99
6 
C
ou
nc
il 
of
 S
ta
te
’s
 ‘
ne
w
 d
ec
is
io
n 
on
 g
en
er
al
 c
on
di
tio
ns
 f
or
 g
ra
nt
in
g 
en
er
gy
 s
up
po
rt
s’
 c
ap
s 
th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
su
bs
id
y 
to
 w
in
d 
tu
rb
in
e 
pr
oj
ec
ts
 to
 4
0%
 (
de
ci
si
on
 5
4/
96
).
 
Pr
od
uc
tio
n 
su
bs
id
y:
 I
n 
es
se
nc
e,
 R
E
S 
el
ec
tr
ic
ity
 r
ec
ei
ve
s 
th
e 
fr
ee
-m
ar
ke
t 
pr
ic
e.
 I
n 
ad
di
tio
n,
 h
ow
ev
er
, s
om
e 
pr
em
iu
m
s 
ha
ve
 b
ee
n 
ad
de
d.
 D
ur
in
g 
19
97
, w
in
d 
po
w
er
 r
ec
ei
ve
d 
a 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
su
bs
id
y 
eq
ua
l t
o 
th
e 
ta
x 
le
vi
ed
 to
 in
du
st
ri
al
 e
le
ct
ri
ci
ty
 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n 
of
 F
IM
 0
.0
25
/k
W
h 
(a
bo
ut
 €
4.
2/
M
W
h)
. 
A
s 
pe
r 
Se
pt
em
be
r 
19
98
, 
th
e 
su
bs
id
y 
eq
ua
lle
d 
th
e 
ta
x 
le
vi
ed
 t
o 
ho
us
eh
ol
d 
el
ec
tr
ic
ity
 c
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
of
 F
IM
 0
.0
41
/k
W
h 
(a
bo
ut
 €
6.
9/
M
W
h)
. 
B
el
gi
um
 
T
ax
 r
el
ie
f 
on
 in
ve
st
m
en
ts
: 
T
he
 n
at
io
na
l 
19
92
 c
om
pa
ny
 t
ax
 c
od
e 
(1
99
2-
on
w
ar
ds
) 
al
lo
w
s 
a 
pr
ef
er
en
tia
l 
de
du
ct
io
n 
fo
r 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 i
n 
R
E
S 
to
 b
e 
de
du
ct
ed
 f
ro
m
 t
he
 p
ro
fi
ts
. 
T
hi
s 
fi
sc
al
 i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
de
du
ct
io
n 
co
ns
is
ts
 o
f 
a 
‘b
as
e-
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
’ 
th
at
 v
ar
ie
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4.4.2 Present value of green policies 
Figure 4.4 shows the present value of all economic instruments listed in table 4.2, 
by means of the calculations given in table 4.1. The exact figures are given in table 
4.3 in the appendix to this chapter. 
   Any discussion of the financial attractiveness of the different economic 
instruments should emphasize the fundamental difference between the ‘bidding 
programme’ countries, and the others. Under a non-bidding programme, firms 
apply for a subsidy or other incentive, and may increase their capital stock up to 
the long-run economic equilibrium. The governments of both the UK and Ireland, 
however, decided to launch bidding programmes for encouraging investments in 
renewable energy. Under such programme, the number of eligible projects (and 
therewith the capital stock) is specified beforehand, as is the budget available. 
Firms can join a tender and demand for subsidies. The firms demanding the lowest 
subsidies are eligible, whereas all the other projects (demanding too much support) 
are not. In theory, this is a very nice mechanism. That shield yield efficient 
outcomes. Particularly when assessing ex post how high the granted support has 
been in the UK, then it turns out that the NFFO bidding programme was anything 
but efficient (particularly the 1990-94 period is striking). 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Present value of economic instruments (1MW investment project) 
132 
A more technical issue with respect to the bidding programmes is concerned with 
the impulse-response function, as will be tested in the regression analysis below. 
When the number of projects eligible for government support is uncapped, then 
the market determines the efficient investment response. Under a bidding 
programme, however, it is the number of eligible projects that has been fixed 
beforehand, whatever the financial attractiveness of the measures. Thus, for any Q 
above unity (even if it were 3), the response is the same. Therefore, the UK and 
Ireland are considered outliers in the sample, and will not be included in the 
econometric analysis. 
4.4.3 Q including incentives 
When including the present value of the various economic instruments, the Qs 
increase enormously relative to the base-case. Figure 4.5 gives the ‘net Qs’; the 
data can be found in table 4.4 in the appendix to this chapter. 
   In this graph, I have included a surface that intersects with the Q=1 value (see 
the phase diagram in figure 4.1 for the rationale). Even though this need not 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Q including economic instruments (1MW investment project) 
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represent the long-run equilibrium value for which 0 q (this will be discussed in 
the next section), it does provide a minimum value for that condition. 
   When analysing the Q values including incentives, it appears that none of the 
countries in the sample provided positive Qs at the start of the sample period. 
Also, all countries had nonnegative Qs at the end of the sample period. Though 
strictly speaking Q should at least be one for a long-run sustainable industry, 
nonnegative Qs might attract ‘single shot’ investments. These do not generate 
sufficient income to ensure an infinitely lived industry, but they might attract some 
investments. 
   Of all countries, the Qs for the UK can safely be labelled excessive. As the 
present value of the economic instruments already suggested, wind turbine 
investments were very profitable during the 1990-94 period in the UK. Though 
some countries provided little incentives, I still obtained relatively high Qs. For 
example, the Dutch government has hardly provided serious incentives before 
1995, but the Qs during the pre-1995 period have not been dramatically low 
(oscillating around the Q=0 value). Such anomalies are attributed to the favourable 
wind regimes of such countries, or the relatively low corporate tax rates. 
   On the downside, the Qs obtained for Ireland are dramatically low, and in fact 
(given the investments in turbines revealed in the next section) I also obtained very 
low Qs for Denmark. Here, a general comment holds for all countries with low 
accumulated levels of wind turbines. Usually, when a product-market is in its 
start-up phase, additional subsidies are available for market development. For 
renewable energy, both national governments and the EU have specific subsidy 
programmes. Including these may explain the residual growth observed with 
currently negative Qs. 
 
4.5 Investment response to green policies 
4.5.1 Wind turbine investments over time 
I have used annual IEA/OECD data on the installed wind turbine capacity per 
country.115 These data have some limitations. First, since only some countries have 
reported wind turbine capacity per ownership class (public, NGO, private) whilst 
these distinctions have not been made from the start, I have decided to treat all 
countries similarly and use aggregates. As a consequence, even if the calculated 
Qs would be negative, one may observe growth in investments. This ‘autonomous’ 
growth is attributed to either (a) public sector investments, since public enterprises 
are assumed to use another evaluation criterion than micro-level Q, or (b) the fact 
that for premature markets, additional market development subsidies are often 
available. 
                                                      
115 The IEA is the International Energy Agency of the OECD. 
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Table 4.2 does not include these kinds of subsidies, which might lead to an 
underestimate of Qs for markets with low levels of accumulated turbine capacity. 
A second remark concerns replacements. Since only aggregate figures were 
available, the data reflect net investments, and should actually be corrected for 
replacement investments. Therefore, the gross investment figures might be higher. 
A consequence of this data limitation is that we may now observe a negative 
growth in turbine capacity in Luxembourg between 1998 and 1999, whilst in 
reality there might have been a positive gross investment in that period. Figure 4.6 
gives an impression of the cumulative investment figures for the four largest 
investing countries (ranked by their year 2000 capital stock). The data for all 
countries in the sample can be found in table 4.5 in the appendix to this chapter. 
   Germany, Denmark, and Spain are by large the biggest investors in wind 
turbines. Particularly when assessing the cumulative year 2000 figures, the gap 
between these three countries and the rest of the sample becomes even more 
apparent. When calculating the marginal growth rates of the capital stock in all 
countries, then it appears that the largest investors in cumulative terms have had 
their peak in the late 1980s or early-1990s. Ever since, these growth rates have 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Cumulative installed capacity (Kt) for the four largest wind turbine investing 
countries 
135
been lower than 100 per cent.116 Interpreting declining growth rates (for example 
in the three largest investing countries) as saturation, it seems that if there is 
growth to be expected it should come from the smaller wind turbine countries.117 
As such, declining growth need not be bad: if an industry approaches its long-run 
equilibrium, the only investments that should be made are the replacement 
investments, necessary to cover the depreciation of the existing capital stock. In 
order to analyse this equilibrium hypothesis, we need to analyse the phase 
diagrams. 
   Before turning to the phase diagrams, however, I calculate the average Qs, for 
which I have used two approaches. First, I have assumed that each country was 
served by a single investor—that is, all investments made in year t represented a 
single investment project. Under this assumption, the subsidies and tax allowances 
are capped for a number of countries, limiting the value of Q. Figure 4.7 outlines 
the results. The most striking Q-values were obtained for the UK (about 5 in 
1991), Italy (over 3 in 1995), and Ireland (over 3 in 1996). The only two other 
countries for which I obtained Qs bigger than one were Belgium (1997) and 
Germany (1989 and 1993). 
   In the second approach, I have removed the restriction that all investments 
represented atomistic projects, and allowed the maximum incentives possible. 
Under this scenario, the Qs had to be bigger, and figure 4.8 shows how much 
bigger they were. In the remainder, I proceed with the second approach (the higher 
values for average Q). See table 4.6 in the appendix to this chapter for the data. 
                                                      
116 With an exception for Spain in the 1996-1997 period. 
117 See the recent wind energy report of the German Federal Environmental Ministry at 
http://www.bmu.de/download/dateien/windenergie_studie02.pdf. In this report (in 
German) the authors argue that particularly in the coastal regions of Germany, there is little 
space left for new turbines (p. 14). 
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Figure 4.7: Q including economic instruments (observed capital stock, assuming single 
investor) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Q including economic instruments (observed capital stock, assuming 
multiple investors) 
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4.5.2 From Q to capital stock: Phase diagrams 
Figure 4.1 gave the theoretical relationship between capital stock and Tobin’s Q 
for wind turbine investment. The data, however, made it very difficult to establish 
such a nice smooth pattern as in figure 4.1. In figure 4.9, I have depicted the same 
four countries as in figure 4.6 (Germany, Denmark, Spain, and the Netherlands). 
   At first, the diagram may look fuzzy for it only describes the different pairs of k 
and Q, without providing any line for which 0 q . The reason for omitting these 
lines is a simple one. Plotting these lines requires complex simulations. Since any 
line for which 0 q embodies a set of unobservable partial derivatives (see 
equations (4.9) and (4.7)), they can at best be approximated by, for example, 
Monte Carlo simulation.118 
                                                      
118 Not only should one have a very good estimate of the response of I to Q (for which the 
panel data response in the next subsection may only represent a first step), but also recall 
that qHc ww was downward sloping because kH c ww had a downward slope, which 
was the result of a downward sloping demand curve. Thus, in addition to the response of I 
to Q one has to fit the demand curve. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Combined diagram of four countries in (k,Q) space 
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   An additional reason for not including any line for which 0 q is of minor 
importance and concerns the visual interpretation. In each year, the incentives as 
well as the economic context (wholesale prices) change per country, resulting in a 
different Q per country per year. As a consequence, with constantly shifting Qs, 
the long-run equilibrium and optimal capital stock also change each year. If the 
combination (k,Q) is an orbit, and the equilibrium the attractor, then the moving 
attractor causes the system to be in permanent motion. Since it is very unrealistic 
to assume that the system can move towards its current equilibrium 
instantaneously, it becomes quite plausible to assert that none of the observed pairs 
of (k,Q) represent steady states. Now one might try to draw a line for which 
0 q for each year in order to check how the equilibrium has moved over time, 
but this gives a very messy picture since these lines never overlap. 
4.5.3 From Q to capital stock: Individual regressions 
Numerous regression models exist for estimating a relationship between Tobin’s Q 
and corporate investment—varying from relatively simple OLS models to 
dynamic panel data models using GMM estimates. The common denominator in 
all econometric models is the problem of the unobservable installation function. 
Net investments can be observed, but gross investments cannot. It is beyond the 
scope of this study to come up with a ‘new’ regression model. The only purpose 
any regression model would have here is to confirm that higher Q’s yield more 
investments, and that such relationship has a consistent pattern. A simple model 
that meets these criteria is given by Blundell et al. (1992), which is very similar to 
the one provided by Hayashi (1982). The intuition is as follows. First, investment 
is triggered by (4.10) and (4.11), of which the latter yielded: 
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A little rearranging gives: 
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The second step is to recall the Euler equation describing the evolution in q, which 
was given by (4.13): 
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A little rearranging of that equation yields: 
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Multiplying (4.15) by It and (4.16) by kt, and taking the difference of the resulting 
equations gives:119 
(4.17)   tctctinvtttt RTDeprTSImqk )1(1 ,   . 
Here, I follow Poterba and Summers (1982) for the intuition behind (4.17). The 
left-hand side of the equation gives the market value of I units of additional 
investments is tt qk .120 On the right-hand side, we find the market costs of the 
additional unit of investment. The direct investment costs mtIt are lowered by the 
investment subsidies and investment tax credits. With each additional unit of 
investment also an amount of revenues R are foregone, due to the constant returns 
to scale and the downward sloping demand curve. Firms will thus invest up to the 
point where the benefits of an additional unit of investment equal the costs. 
   Following Lucas Jr. (1967), I use the fact that the first derivative of the gross 
investment function (which is assumed to be homogeneous of degree one) with 
respect to I can be treated as a function of the ratio I/k. Then (4.15) can be 
rewritten as: 
(4.18) 
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which we can solve for I to obtain the optimal investment rule: 
(4.19)  tt kqI ,~J , 
where tq~ (hereafter referred to as ‘modified Q’) is the left-hand side of (4.18), 
being: 
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Since the interest is not so much in the effect of mtIt investment but in It units only, 
I will use tq

as the normalised modified Q: 
(4.20) »
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119 Since the revenues R were decreasing in k, kR ww must be negative. After multiplying 
(4.16) with k, I have added that negative sign to R. 
120 To check this, recall that the multiplied forms of (4.15) and (4.16) with It and kt 
respectively yield  tt Iq\ . Since that part equals tt qk , it follows that gross investment 
 tI\ turns into the change of capital stock tk —a result identical to the restriction on the 
Hamiltonian. 
140 
In words, (4.20) incorporates an adjustment that is directed at the investment 
decision only: the only variables that remain in the denominator are the investment 
subsidy, the tax credit on investment, and the accelerated depreciation of new 
investment. Once more I follow Hayashi (1982), and reduce (4.19) to: 
(4.21)  tqk
I ~E , 
for which the OLS equation becomes: 
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In the appendix to this chapter, table 4.7 gives the I/k ratios, whereas table 4.8 
gives modified Q. The scatter plots in figures 4.10 and 4.11 illustrate the effect of 
the above transformation. 
Table 4.9 in the appendix gives the results of a simple OLS estimation for a zero 
year time lag.121 The interest is in the slope estimators E, and not so much in 
finding a perfect model fit. Therefore, only the betas and associated t-statistics and 
standard errors have been reported. 
   Though for most countries only a few observations were available, the 
regression does provide ‘significant’ results for nine countries. A few comments 
should be made. 
   First, both bidding countries (UK and Ireland) show a very significant and 
positive response of investments to the modified Q. However significant 
statistically, this result is doubtful. For both countries the number of eligible 
projects was determined beforehand, and Q was the result of the bidding process 
rather than of a straightforward relationship between financial attractiveness and 
investment as in the non-bidding countries. 
   Second, most countries have very few variation in the dependent, which raises a 
serious question mark with respect to individual series regressions. I will tackle 
this problem by means of panel data analysis. For some countries, the results need 
a particular explanation. 
 
                                                      
121 Blundell et al. (1992) use a GLS estimator, and first check whether Q is independent of 
the error term. If not, then firms are not the price-takers Hayashi (1982) assumed them to 
be, and it becomes incorrect to use average Q as being equal to marginal Q. In case of the 
wind turbines, both wholesale prices and government incentives are exogenous, and so is 
Q. 
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Figure 4.10: Scatter plot for all (k,Q) pairs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.11: Scatterplot for all (I/k, q ) pairs 
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Germany 
The country with the biggest investment (Germany) has an insignificant slope 
estimator at a zero year time lag. When increasing the time lag, all slope 
estimators become insignificant except for Germany and Belgium. The latter result 
must be spurious (given even less variation in the dependent); the time lag for 
Germany is attributed to the dreadful red-tape for installing wind power plants. 122 
Once that time lag is introduced, however, the sign of the slope estimator changes 
to minus 0.88 at a two years time lag! However counterintuitive this result may 
seem at a first glance, a line plot helps to find the rationale. 
   As figure 4.12 shows, though modified Q went up in Germany and has remained 
high ever since 1989, the growth rate of installed capacity has already decreased 
from 1987 onwards. If we go back to the absolute figures (see table 4.5 in the 
appendix), however, then we see that the investment figures in absolute levels are 
still very impressive and the highest of the entire sample. True that the growth 
rates are declining, but in absolute levels they still increase. As argued in section 
4.5.1, the most logical reason for declining growth rates of capital stock is 
probably not rooted in the financial attractiveness but rather in the saturation of 
geographical space.  
 
                                                      
122 In Germany investors lament over both red tape and local urban planning legislation, 
since these reduce the speed of implementation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.12: Combined diagram of I/k and modified Q for Germany 
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Denmark 
Though the data for Denmark should have sufficient variation, the economic 
instruments included for calculating Q cannot explain the growth in turbine 
capacity. It must be emphasized here that in Denmark households own about 60 
per cent of all wind turbines installed. The economic instruments listed in table 4.2 
do not include measures for households, and may hence underestimate the 
financial attractiveness of turbine investments. Furthermore, households may well 
have different utility preferences than companies, and may attribute a high value to 
the ‘warm glow’ of positively contributing to the environment.123 
4.5.4 From Q to capital stock: A panel data regression 
The biggest drawback of the individual time series regressions is that there are 
many countries with little variation in the dependent. This data limitation can be 
overcome by means of a panel data regression model. Assuming that all investors 
respond in a similar fashion to Q, I have estimated a common effects panel data 
model. Though such strategy eliminates the data problem for the ‘small growth 
countries’, it cannot solve the parameter restriction problem associated with the 
bidding programme countries. Therefore, I have excluded the UK and Ireland.124 
   The simple straight-line common effects panel data model, assuming 
homogeneity in both the intercept and slope estimators is given by: 
(4.23) itit
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which is defined as above (in (4.22)). The regression analysis yields a beta of 0.74, 
with a standard error of 0.082 and a t-statistic of 8.897. This beta is thus very 
significant. The Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.89 suggests that there is very little 
serial correlation in the error term. 
   An important implication of this regression analysis is that it does not seem to 
matter too much what exact policy instruments are used, as long as the project 
becomes financially sustainable. Hence, it seems that firms have equal preferences 
for investment subsidies or tax rebates, as long as they yield the same results. 
Probably, this result only holds for a macro-context within which macroeconomic 
and political stability are present, and where government commitment to whatever 
instrument is guaranteed for a minimum time period. If this were not the case, then 
the international business literature suggests that entrepreneurs prefer those 
                                                      
123 Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) emphasize that even for-profit entrepreneurs may start a 
not-for-profit organisation, due to the ‘soft incentives’ associated with that not-for-profit 
status (as donations). Now it could be possible that some Danish entrepreneurs follow this 
strategy, but given the size of the wind turbine market, it does not seem plausible. 
124 Particularly the inclusion of the UK would lead to a series of outliers—some five 
observations centred around the €800k values for which hardly any growth is realised (all 
close to the x-axis). 
144 
incentives that have immediate spin off, such as an investment subsidy. Other 
instruments, as production subsidies or tax holidays over a longer time span 
become less attractive when macroeconomic or political instability increase.125 
   If the shape of the wealth transfer does not matter, what policy instruments yield 
a win-win situation? This depends on the preferences of government. In the long 
run and overall, it would not matter whether government spends on subsidies or 
faces an opportunity cost due to fiscal incentives. Nevertheless, entrepreneurs are 
probably more committed to fulfilling long run projects if they receive favourable 
buyback rates or production subsidies, than an initial investment subsidy. 
4.5.5 A note on the ‘barriers to investment’ 
In section 2.1, I have argued that the barriers to investment (surveyed in chapter 2) 
may hinder entrepreneurs in their optimal investment decision. Consequently, the 
observed capital stock may deviate from what we might expect from a technical 
analysis in (Q,k) space. In the empirical analysis of this chapter, I found for 
example that in Germany the red tape was hindering entrepreneurs in their turbine 
instalments. Consequently, it was the only country for which the regression 
analysis became very significant at a two years’ time lag between modified Q and 
the investment growth rate. Still I decided not to include (dummy) variables in the 
regressions for the barriers to investment, for the following two reasons. First, the 
data I obtained were measured at such a low frequency, that adding extra variables 
would either dramatically drop the statistical significance or yield spurious results. 
A second reason is that the data were only reported at the aggregate, national level 
whereas many barriers to investment take place at the micro-level. 
   Given now this inability to include (dummy) variables in the regression analysis, 
the inferences on possible underinvestment, and particularly the policy 
implications become weaker. 
 
4.6 Implicit governmental valuation of the public good 
Up to here, the focus has been on the investment, and not so much on the public 
good. In section 4.2.1, I have argued that the avoided emissions of wind power 
may vary over both time and space. It is striking to see how the average CO2 
emissions from power generation differ per country. Figure 4.13 gives an 
overview for the EU(15) countries during the 1985-99 period; table 4.10 in the 
appendix gives the underlying data. 
   The differences in the emissions from power generation can be roughly 
explained as follows. The lowest emissions are found in the countries that 
predominantly rely on hydropower (Sweden, Austria, Finland), nuclear power 
                                                      
125 See for example Henisz (2000), Jou (2000), Tybout (2000), Single (1999), Clark 
(1993), Davis and Swenson (1993), or Mcclintock (1988). 
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(Belgium), or a combination of these two (France). For Luxembourg, it must be 
noted that it primarily depends on electricity import; this also explains the fact that 
it is the only country for which the emissions per MWh generated can fluctuate so 
much over time. 
   When calculating the implicit government valuation or utility of wind power, I 
divided the present value of all economic instruments for a 1MW investment by 
the product of the average emissions times the wind regime: 
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In case of a negative present value of the allowances, I valued this ratio as zero. 
Figure 4.14 gives the results; table 4.11 in the appendix gives the underlying data. 
Most estimates of the marginal abatement costs of CO2 vary between zero and 
some 250 Euros per tonne,126 and my calculations seem to fit fine within these 
estimates. More important, however, is that this analysis gives a completely 
different interpretation of the ‘generosity’ of the various governments. In the 
above analysis of the Tobin’s Q values, countries as the UK seemed to exaggerate 
their economic incentives. When relating the tax money spent to the avoided 
emissions in that country over the lifespan of a wind turbine, then it appears that 
the UK has been generous, but not so much as France (ignoring the environmental 
costs of nuclear power production in the latter country), or Luxembourg. 
 
4.7  Underinvestment issues 
Clean air is a continuous public good. Therewith the question regarding 
underinvestment is one that depends on the benchmark chosen. The empirical 
analysis in this chapter suggests that the answer is twofold: (1) the reasons 
underlying underinvestment can occur in a technical, microeconomic sense, or (2) 
they are rooted in the macroeconomic governmental valuation, indicating societal 
preferences. In addition, I have observed some ‘barriers to investment’, interfering 
in the discussion. 
 
 
                                                      
126 See, for example, Blok et al. (2001). 
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Figure 4.13: Average emission in national power generation [tonne CO2/MWh] 
 
Figure 4.14: Implicit govermental valuation of a 1MW project [€/tonne CO2] 
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4.7.1 Barriers to investment 
In section 4.5, I already mentioned the impossibility to test for precise effects of 
possible ‘barriers to investment’ (as sketched in chapter 2), due to limitations in 
the data. In terms of figure 3.4, this impossibility implies I cannot test for the 
statistical importance of these phenomena, so that—if the capital stock remains 
below the levels desired by government—the policy recommendations for this 
chapter become weaker. Suppose the main issue in wind turbine investment is a 
funding constraint, because banks dislike the asset specificity of the investment. In 
that case, providing loans (not even under ‘soft’ terms) may be a powerful 
catalyser for investment. When assessing the case of German wind turbine 
investments, it now seems that high levels of Tobin’s Q, that in addition are stable 
over time, form as key explanation in the success of the German wind turbine 
support programme. Meanwhile, however, Germany was the only country where a 
commercial bank offered soft loans that covered 50 per cent of the capital 
investment. Since I do not know whether all projects applied for this soft loan, or 
whether the parental company needed such funding at all, it becomes more 
difficult to give clear-cut policy advise. 
4.7.2 Technical underinvestment based on Tobin’s Q 
In the microeconomic part of the optimisation problem, the phase diagrams 
showed how investment and capital stock are related to Tobin’s Q. The panel data 
regression showed how investments were indeed sensitive to Q, and—except for 
Denmark, where households own 60 per cent of the wind turbines—how Qs 
approaching unity or even higher yielded very large investments in Germany and 
Spain. For all other countries it was difficult to assess the individual time series 
due to the limited variation in the dependent variable. Underinvestment in this 
technical sense would occur if Q were above unity but the capital stock would not 
reach its equilibrium level. Hence, the benchmark here is the observed capital 
stock, related to Tobin’s Q. In this technical interpretation, the two countries with 
the largest capital stock are Germany and Spain. For Germany, the observed 
capital stock steadily exceeds the Q=1 line from 1989 onwards. 
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Independent of the exact position of the locus for which 0 q , it seems plausible 
that the German wind turbine investments will move to their long-run equilibrium. 
The fact that the growth rates are declining in spite of high values for Q confirms 
this intuition. 
   For Spain, I had not included regional economic instruments, for they were quite 
different—both over time and over space. Therewith, my calculations for Q have a 
downward bias, and the ‘true’ Q should be higher. Since my calculated Qs for 
Spain are close to unity, I suspect them to be on the Q=1 line. This intuitive 
conclusion would justify the high levels of capital stock that have rapidly 
increased since 1995 onwards. 
   I cannot draw any inference on the case of Denmark, since the high levels of 
capital stock cannot be explained by the Qs calculated for the economic measures 
listed in table 4.2. Since households own about 60 per cent of the wind turbines in 
Denmark, different instruments should be analysed here. 
   For all other countries analysed, the majority of the time period there was 
underinvestment in a technical sense—albeit one spurred by governments. Given 
that in most countries for most of the time period no Qs exceeding unity were 
observed, investments remained absent. Here, the private sector cannot be blamed 
for not investing, but it does show that the funding problem in the private 
provision of public goods is a serious one. 
4.7.3 Underinvestment in the context of governmental valuation 
Apart from the technical interpretation of underinvestment, it appears that the 
governmental valuation of the public good ‘clean air’ varies widely over both time 
and space. 
Economic
instruments
Barriers to
investment
Q I/kEconomic 
context
U(Y)
k
Benchmark for 
underinvestment 
(technical sense)
 
 
Figure 4.15: Technical interpretation of underinvestment 
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Starting off from the premise that no private sector participant will invest in a loss-
giving project, the question rises whether government (as a representative of 
society) is willing to support the private sector in a market where firms are price-
takers, and where the wholesale price yields a base-case scenario of negative Qs. 
In section 4.6 I have related the present value of the economic instruments to the 
Economic
instruments
Barriers to
investment
Q I/kEconomic 
context
U(Y)
k
Benchmark for 
underinvestment
(desirability of public good)
 
 
Figure 4.16: Desirability-of-public-good interpretation of underinvestment 
 
 
Figure 4.17: Scatter for (U(Y), I/k) pairs 
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amount of the public good they would yield. The results were striking in the sense 
that some countries originally appeared to have given extraordinarily high 
incentives (e.g., the UK from 1990 to 1994, Germany from 1989 to 1995, or Italy 
in 1995 and 1996), but when related to the amount of public good provided, they 
were less dramatic. In fact, for countries where the national power generation 
hardly yields CO2 emissions (e.g., Sweden or France), the spin-off for the 
taxpayers is so much lower than in countries as Greece or Ireland. This provides a 
completely different perspective to the optimisation problem, and therewith to the 
analysis of potential underinvestment. If society does not value the public good 
sufficiently high enough, can we blame the private sector for not investing? 
   Although it would be tempting to analyse a relationship between governmental 
valuation U(Y) and the investment rate I/k or the capital stock k, I do not have a 
solid criterion that sets the benchmark. In addition, the scatter plot in figure 4.17 
shows it will be difficult to interfere on such relationship. 
4.8 Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have analysed the effect of various economic instruments on 
private sector investments in wind turbines. The main conclusions can be 
summarised as follows. First, wind turbine investments appear to be very sensitive 
to higher marginal revenue products of capital. Second, investments do not seem 
to respond differently to tax incentives or subsidies; what matters is the financial 
attractiveness of these measures. The most frequently observed instruments were 
the capital investment subsidy, the production subsidy, and the tax relief on 
investments. Other measures, including accelerated depreciation, or even soft 
loans were utilised, but were less frequent. Third, in countries where the national 
average emissions per unit of electricity output are high, governments provide 
more generous incentives for renewable energy production. Fourth, the countries 
with the largest wind turbines investment figures (absolute levels) have faced 
decreasing growth levels since the mid-1990s. This is attributed to congestion of 
suitable sites. Fifth, the realized spin-off from the fiscal and financial measures 
varies widely over both time and space, but it is difficult to obtain a consistent 
pattern here. 
   A major limitation of the study is rooted in the available data. First, the 
annualised national wind turbine data did not allow for testing a very extended 
model, due to the limited variation in the dependent variable. Second, the absence 
of company-specific data did not allow for testing the effect of ‘barriers to 
investment.’ 
   It proved very difficult to come up with an unambiguous criterion for checking 
whether there has been ‘underinvestment’ in the investment in wind turbines. 
Though theoretically, phase diagrams could do the job, it appears to be extremely 
difficult to come up with such a diagram in practice. I have tried to overcome this 
limitation by means of transcending the technical, economic relationship between 
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Tobin’s Q and investment, and focus on the amount of public good a national 
government receives through the investment in a wind turbine. This I labelled the 
‘desirability criterion’. Two problems arise with that approach. First, though a 
desirability criterion sheds a completely different light on the ‘generosity’ of 
government support for the private provision of public goods, it does not offer a 
sound theoretically supported benchmark. As a consequence, it is difficult to 
assess whether governments offer sufficient support, too little, or even too much. 
A second drawback is that even if one would go unhindered by a burden of 
theoretical knowledge, and ‘let the data speak for itself’, then still it is difficult to 
draw a pattern. 
   If it proved very difficult to test for underinvestment, does that mean this chapter 
has failed to contribute to answering the problem statement of this study? 
Definitely not. The literature on the private provision of public goods emphasizes 
the funding problem, and is sceptical about government support. For example, in 
the case where the private provision of public goods relies on voluntary donations, 
government support would ‘crowd out’ these donations. I have shown that in a 
market where firms are price-takers and where the provision of the public good is 
coupled with the provision of a private good (the latter combination being a 
popular setting for most research in the private provision of public goods) 
government support does encourage firms to invest. Using a framework based on 
Tobin’s Q, my results suggest that for Qs bigger than unity investments are 
boosted. Even though this result does not inform whether the private sector 
underinvests or not, it is very informative on the possibility for governments to 
intervene in the private sector investment process. In addition, my results suggest 
that it is the financial attractiveness of that government support which matters, and 
not so much the mixture of instruments applied. 
 
Appendix 4.A Data and statistical appendix 
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Table 4.9: Individual OLS regressions 
Model: ititii
it
q
k
I HED  ¸
¹
·¨
©
§ ~  
 Ei t-statistic standard error 
Germany 0.04 0.111 0.317 
Denmark -1.62 -1.265 1.281 
Spain 1.66 8.719 0.191 
The Netherlands -0.39 -0.430 0.901 
Italy 0.21 2.215 0.094 
UK 0.26 4.196 0.063 
Sweden -0.02 -0.025 0.719 
Greece 1.95 20.128 0.097 
Ireland 1.53 8.932 0.171 
Portugal -0.20 -0.384 0.528 
Austria -5.06 -1.365 3.708 
France 0.96 8.232 0.117 
Finland -1.45 -3.382 0.429 
Belgium 0.23 6.231 0.037 
Luxembourg 0.83 9.89 0.083 
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5 THE JOINT OWNERSHIP DILEMMA: INVESTMENT AND 
EFFICIENCY INCENTIVES IN PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS127 
 
 
 
In the previous chapter, the emphasis was put on generic measures. Nevertheless, 
governments can also enter into more specific non-coercive instruments. Public-
private partnerships (PPPs) are amongst these arrangements. Although PPPs can 
be observed in the empirical reality for quite some time and at a considerable 
scale, our knowledge on the dynamics underlying PPPs is surprisingly limited. 
This chapter analyses the status quo of the literature, and then focuses on the 
investment and efficiency incentives provided by the ownership share in PPPs. I 
have labelled this dilemma the Joint Ownership Dilemma. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are a means for governments to let the private 
sector participate in areas that used to be the exclusive domain of public 
investment. The applications of PPPs range from areas where the theory of 
incomplete contracting applies (such as prisons or hospitals) to areas where 
naturally monopolistic elements would make pure private ownership undesirable 
unless heavily regulated (e.g., infrastructure projects as roads). The involvement of 
private sector participants in these areas may stem from different reasons. Take the 
UK ‘Private Finance Initiative’ (PFI) programme as an example. As Hall (1998) 
describes, in the early phases of the PFI programme, PPPs were particularly 
considered an additional means of income. This approach reduces PPPs to a 
financing vehicle. It was not until the later phases of the PFI programme that the 
main rationale for the active involvement of entrepreneurs shifted towards an 
efficiency argument. Assuming that entrepreneurs have superior knowledge and 
skills regarding efficiency issues, and given that traditional procurement does not 
necessarily encourage them to fully exploit that knowledge, PPPs may offer new 
forms of contracting where different incentive structures should induce 
entrepreneurs to ‘realise more for less’. The first part of the chapter summarises 
the status quo of the literature on PPPs; the second part focuses on the technical 
efficiency argument for private sector investments in PPPs. In that second part, we 
first analytically develop a nested optimisation model where governmental utility 
maximisation of the PPP’s output is conditional upon the expected entrepreneurial 
                                                      
127 The second part of this chapter draws extensively from Huisman and Mulder (2004). 
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behaviour. Such model floats on the neo-classical corporate investment model in 
the Hall-Jorgensonian spirit, combined with efficient production frontier models 
based on technical efficiency (Leibenstein (1978), or Leibenstein (1983)), and on 
the incentives of the contractual arrangement of the PPP (inspired by, e.g., Laffont 
and Martimort (2002), Gibbons (1998), or Salanié (1997)). 
 
5.2 An overview of PPP arrangements 
Figure 5.1 gives an overview of the most popular contractual arrangements of 
PPPs. In brief,128 PPPs can be classified according to the lifespan of the concession 
(finite or infinite time period), or to the type of investment (greenfield or 
rehabilitation). A major difference between finitely lived concessions and 
infinitely lived ones lies in the incentive structure provided by the salvage value of 
the entrepreneur’s investment at expiration of the concession. The incentive given 
by a fixed transfer price dramatically differs from a price conditional upon the 
project’s output quality or quantity, just as there are major differences between 
contracts where the end-of-period transfer price is prespecified (conditionally or 
not) and the ones where the transfer price is determined by a bidding process. By 
the same token, there are major differences in the incentive structure between an 
infinitely lived concession and a finitely lived one. Consider, for example, the 
                                                      
128 For more information on PPP contracts, see for example Kahn and Parra (2003: 30-2). 
See also an extensive glossary and forms of existence of PPPs at the Worldbank Internet 
pages: 
www.worldbank.org/privatesector/ppi/ppi_database.htm, which also includes an 
impressive project list with almost 3,000 projects. 
Supply-Operate-Transfer (SOT)
Build-and-Transfer (BT)
Build-Lease-Transfer (BLT)
Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT)
Build-Develop-Operate-Transfer (BDOT)
Build-Operate-Own (BOO)
Rehabilitate-Operate-Transfer (ROT) Rehabilitate-Operate-Own (ROO)
Finite concession period Infinite concession period
Greenfield 
investment
Rehabilitation 
project
 
 
Figure 5.1: A PPP contracts typology 
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hold-up problem of investments, as noticed by Vickers and Yarrow (1988) back in 
1988 in the light of privatisation concessions: 
 
 ‘The numerous problems of asset valuation and handover 
perhaps suggest that investment decisions should be left to 
public authority and that the competition should be simply for 
an operating franchise. However, operating franchises allow 
market forces to act only to a limited extent, and the divorce of 
investment and operating decisions can lead to undesirable 
losses of coordination.’ (p.113, emphasis in original) 
 
Even if the entrepreneur were guaranteed a fixed end-of-concession amount for its 
sunk investments, the question arises how to value specific investments as 
knowledge, managerial practices, etc. 
   Not only does the lifespan of the concession matter, also there is a major 
difference between a start-up and a restart. To our belief, rehabilitation is closer to 
privatisation than to our interpretation of a PPP. With a PPP both partners are 
assumed to interact on the specifications of the project design. With a 
rehabilitation, it may well be that the entrepreneur is the only party busy with the 
organisational restructuring, while the goals of the organisation at stake and its 
embeddedness in society have already been determined in the past. This is 
important for issues as geographic location, the choice of output and customers, 
etc. 
There are two extremes in the roles of public and private parties in PPPs. The most 
naked version is close to ordinary procurement: government roughly decides what 
should be done, the private sector develops and builds, and the assets remain or 
soon become public. This form is often indicated as the Build-Operate-Transfer 
(BOT) form of PPPs. On the other extreme, both public and private parties are 
engaged in the design, building, and maintenance and operations of the project—
here, the ownership of the assets remains mixed. That form is often indicated as 
the Build-Operate-Own (BOO) form of PPPs. Without designing a one-
dimensional continuum for the in-betweens, and without trying to be complete, the 
following varieties are often mentioned in the literature (Kahn and Parra (2003)): 
x Supply-Operate-Transfer (SOT): The equipment manufacturer for the project 
builds and operates the project, which is transferred to government after a 
specified time period. 
x Build-and-Transfer (BT): A construction firm finances and constructs the 
project. Following completion and acceptance, the project is transferred to 
government. 
x Build-Lease-Transfer (BLT): A private sector firm is authorised to finance and 
construct a project. Upon completion and acceptance, the ownership is 
transferred to government, after which the entrepreneur enters into a sales and 
leaseback construction of the project for a fixed time period.  
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x Build- Operate-Transfer (BOT): A private sector party delivers a complete and 
operational project that will be publicly owned.  The goal of turnkey 
contracting is to conserve public funds and lower project costs by overlapping 
design and construction activities (therefore saving time), and minimising 
contract change orders (since design and construction activities are contracted 
with one party only, responsible for all specified tangibles and intangibles). 
x Build-Develop-Operate-Transfer (BDOT): The private sector party is allowed 
not only to design and deliver the naked (infrastructure) project, but also to 
beautify it with additional economic activities. For example, the design and 
construction of a toll road is not commercially attractive. If, however, some 
restaurants, advertisement space, etc. are added and operated by the same 
private sector party, the project may become commercially viable. 
x Rehabilitate-Operate-Transfer (ROT): An existing asset is sold to a private 
sector party in order to rehabilitate it, after which it operates and maintains it 
during a franchise period. 
x Rehabilitate-Own-Operate (ROO): As in the ROR, an existing asset is 
transferred to a private sector party. A major difference, however, is the 
concession period, which is in principle settled in perpetuity. 
x Build-Operate-Own (BOO): Similar to a BOT contract, albeit that there is no 
transfer of the project at the end of the concession period. The interesting 
feature of a BOO contract for governments is that they are released of some 
part of the liabilities and responsibilities, whereas they remain a stake (and 
thus a say) in the project. 
 
For all of the abovementioned forms, the owner bears all the risks associated with 
the assets. For example, in a BOT, the private developer builds, owns and operates 
a new facility at his own risk, whilst government usually offers a revenue 
guarantee during the concession period. In a BLT, on the other hand, the private 
sector party builds a facility at its own risk, but as soon as the leasing begins, 
government bears the risks of the assets. 
   With a large gamma of forms of existence of PPPs, it is difficult to come up with 
a uniform criterion for evaluating PPPs on cost efficiency, or on the adequacy of 
government stimuli to encourage private sector involvement. In addition, it 
appears that different financing schemes exist, and therewith different costs of 
capital. Before turning to a more detailed analysis, I will discuss some common 
misunderstandings surrounding the phenomenon. 
 
5.3 Some common misunderstandings about PPPs 
In public works projects as infrastructure investments, the general consensus is 
that governments face lower capital costs than private sector entrepreneurs: since 
taxpayers provide an unlimited collateral to government, government has the 
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ability to diversify downside risks for these projects over a large group, whereas 
private sector participants have a limited liability. In fact this reasoning only holds 
if the aforementioned taxpayers are not remunerated for bearing these risks (see 
Klein (1997)). Since the true economic costs are not included in advocating 
government funding, the comparison uses apples and oranges. So, if the project’s 
risks determine the premium, there is no reason a priori to assume that 
government’s role would ideally be a funding one. Let me illustrate the discussion 
by means of the following example. Grout (2003) assumes that government can 
choose between public provision and a PPP. Let bt,g be the project benefits for 
government at time t, bt,p the benefits for the private sector party in a PPP, c are the 
costs for the indicated party, and r is a discount rate. A simple cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA) would dictate that if the net benefits of public provision outpace 
the net benefits of the PPP, government would choose the former. In continuous 
time, a CBA for a project with an infinite lifespan would compare: 
(5.1) ³³³³
f

f

f

f
 !
0
,
0
,
0
,
0
,
,, dtecdtebdtecdteb trpt
tr
pt
tr
gt
tr
gt
pcbgcb  
 
If government provision resulted in the same quality of the project as a PPP, then 
from a government perspective the costs of public provision should not exceed the 
costs of supporting the private sector in case of a PPP (for example, the costs of 
subsidising, a soft loan, or a revenue guarantee). Hence, the service quantity qt 
times the unit price of support pt in case of a PPP should be less than direct 
government provision: 
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where the discount rate rx has still to be determined. Grout (2003) now imposes 
some restrictions on any competition between public and private parties, i.e., no ex
ante excess profits such that ³³
f

f
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,
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xgc , as well as on the quality 
of the output delivery, i.e., an equal product is delivered such that bt,g=bt,p, and that 
the discount rates of costs and benefits should not differ between public and 
private parties, i.e., rc,g=rc,p and rb,g=rb,p, but also that a single discount rate should 
be used for rx=rc,p. Under these assumptions, (5.1) simplifies to: 
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such that: 
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(5.3) ³³
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The assumption that public and private sector investors should apply the same 
discount rates (rc,g=rc,p) is perfectly justifiable. The idea, however, that the 
discount rates for government costs under public provision and under a PPP 
should equal (rx=rc,p) is highly doubtful. As Grout (2003) also states (p. C66): 
 
‘There is no reason to suppose that the risk characteristics are 
equivalent for these two cash flows; indeed there is every 
reason to suppose that they are not.’ 
 
Another peculiarity of Paul Grout’s formalisation is the decision rule that—given 
equal quality—if the costs of public provision are smaller than the costs of the 
wealth transfer to the private sector in case of a PPP, then public provision should 
be preferred. This is strange. From a pure egocentric perspective, the decision rule 
might be correct, but for a welfare analysis, the total costs of providing the good or 
service should also be considered. Suppose the total investment costs of a project 
under public provision are 100, whereas under a PPP, government would invest 40 
and the private sector 70. The aforementioned decision rule of Paul Grout would 
let government prefer the PPP since such is cheaper for government. In reality, 
however, we can seriously question whether the PPP (costing 110 instead of 100) 
could deliver the same output quality at the same price, and still be financially 
sustainable. The most likely outcome is that either the quality is inferior, or the 
user price is higher, or the profitability is lower. Assuming that public provision 
occurs at cost price, the latter outcome means the PPP would be loss giving unless 
the productive efficiency of the PPP is significantly higher than public provision. 
When assessing the empirical literature on privatisation, the results are mixed. In 
their extensive survey, Megginson and Netter (2001) show how in some cases 
privatisation leads to efficiency improvements, but most literature underscores that 
it is the combo of privatisation, liberalisation and regulatory reforms that boost 
efficiency. For a more profound discussion, see Chapter 1 of this study. 
   Grout uses the Gorman polar form as the indirect utility function to illustrate 
how costs and benefits are related for PPPs. I would like to dedicate some space to 
his reasoning (including the maths) since it provides a good illustration of the 
confusion surrounding PPPs. Let the demand for the PPP’s output be described by 
the Gorman polar form: 
 
(5.4) iii mpbpaq )()(  , 
 
where i denotes the individual consumer, p denotes price, ai is price elasticity, mi is 
the income (wealth) of the individual, and b(p) is the wealth coefficient. Since b(p) 
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lacks the subscript i, aggregate demand does not depend on the distribution of 
income (wealth). The choice for this utility function probably stems from its 
attractive aggregation properties, but it seems a highly unrealistic representation of 
reality. A PPP usually provides a private good or service with significant net 
positive externalities. For example, infrastructure, ports, but also health care and 
education can be listed under the header ‘PPP’. In each of these cases, individuals 
consume the private good for which they are usually asked to pay immediately. 
For example, using a toll road can be priced per kilometre. The externalities of the 
road may include social inclusion of distant rural areas, the economic development 
of some areas, etc. These externalities are also consumed, but not paid for in the 
Gorman polar form. In fact, even without using the road (and hence paying for it) 
consumers can benefit from the externalities if their local economy is boosted. My 
critique to many economic analyses of PPPs is they assume the production of a 
private good in a naturally competitive market. In reality, however, they usually 
produce mixed goods or pure public goods in a naturally monopolistic market. In 
addition, the consumption of the public good by the individual consumer is usually 
set exogenously. 
   Given a demand function,129 one can express the costs and revenues of the 
project. Grout establishes the revenues  (based on the Gorman polar form) as: 
 
(5.5) ¦ ¦ 
i i
ii mppbpapR )()( , 
where p is the price specified in the PPP contract. The costs of the project can 
similarly be expressed as: 
 
(5.6) ¦ ¦ 
i i
ii mpcbpacFC )()( , 
where F is a fixed cost component. What do these expressions say? First, the 
revenues of the project are limited to the pecuniary ones. This is counterintuitive, 
because why would government agree on a wealth transfer to the private sector as 
in (5.2) if all the benefits can be priced and collected? The project generates 
significant positive externalities, which form the rationale of a wealth transfer in 
the private provision of public goods. The same argument holds for the costs. 
Compare electricity production by means of two technologies. The base case 
technology uses fossil fuels, and hence causes natural resource depletion and toxic 
emissions. The alternative technology uses wind power, and lacks the negative 
externalities of the base case technology. Strictly speaking, wind turbines thus 
provide a pure private good (electricity) that can be priced and collected for. In 
addition, however, the turbines ‘produce’ a public good, being the omitted 
emission. The production of the public good comes at a price, for wind power 
                                                      
129 See the appendix to this chapter for an analytically worked out version. 
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technology is still more expensive than traditional power generating technologies. 
Governments willing to fight the global warming problem may encourage 
technologies as wind power, and have a good economic rationale for a wealth 
transfer via subsidies, tax incentives or other, in order to stimulate the private 
sector to produce the public good as well. 
   A full cost-benefit analysis of the project would either require an estimation of 
the pecuniary value of the externalities, or a sound justification for the choice of 
the discount rate. Under public provision, government may use a lower discount 
rate in order to compensate for the externalities. Under a PPP, however, the 
discount rate has to reflect the opportunity costs of the capital invested.  
   Given costs and revenues, the riskiness of the project’s profitability can be 
expressed in terms familiar from the CAPM framework. In CAPM, the ratio of the 
covariance between the expected returns on an individual investment j and the 
market portfolio, and the variance of the market portfolio yields: 
 
(5.7) 
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where Ej measures the relative riskiness of the jth investment. The attractiveness of 
CAPM lies in the fact that Ej can now readily be used for determining the discount 
factor associated with investment j, by using the security market line (SML): 
 
(5.8) )()( fmjfj rRrrE  E . 
According to the SML, the expected return on investment j should be E(rj). Since 
both the market premium (Rm-rf) and the risk free interest rate rf are expressed in 
percentages, E(rj) is also a percentual discount rate. Professor Grout aims at 
establishing a similar framework, but does so in a different way. Given the 
Gorman polar form and linear payments, Grout (2003) establishes:130 
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This result is striking, for the following reasons. First, mathematically speaking, 
this result can only be obtained if p is independent from m. The economic intuition 
behind that assumption is difficult to find. I recall that most PPPs have positive 
                                                      
130 To be precise, Grout only writes (p. C66): ‘It is easy to show that the beta for the 
revenue cash flow is: ¦  
i
R pbpm
mR
)(
)var(
),cov(E .’ Without showing the 
intermediate steps, he obtains his result. I have simplified the last summation term, since 
summing over i does not change b(p). 
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externalities. If these spin-off effects take place, then the externalities should boost 
m, and hence demand qi. Consequently, R should increase. If we consider a case 
without positive externalities, then still we can question what p is really about. If p 
is a marginal wealth transfer from government to the private sector partner, then 
any increase in domestic wealth may increase demand q. When demand increases, 
so should p. If p is not marginal but a lump sum payment, then still increased 
demand will raise the costs (if only the maintenance of a toll road). A higher 
demand intensity than the contracted one will lead the PPP to ask for a larger 
government support. 
   A second peculiarity is the independence of p from c. In any case, the marginal 
price (government support or user charge) should reflect the underlying costs. In 
many naturally monopolistic activities, where PPPs are often found, the profits are 
capped by means of a rate of return regulation. Hence, C
CR )(   is restricted to, 
say, 5 per cent per annum. 
   A third peculiarity of (5.9) is the fact that both R and m are expressed in levels, 
not in increments. If (5.9) is to represent a measure of riskiness like (5.7), then one 
should use increments expressed as percentages. The intuition of the CAPM 
framework is based on opportunity costs: one evaluates the return on an 
investment with the average market risk, the return on a risk free investment 
(treasury bond), and investment j. If investment j perfectly replicated the market 
portfolio, its return should be equal. If it were more risky (indicated by a beta 
bigger than one), it should earn a higher return. In the contexts of PPPs, one might 
think that government can either invest in ‘average’ public works (yielding a 
standard return), or in project j. If it invests in j, the return should reflect the 
premium associated with the riskiness of that particular project. Let an average 
public works project yield the benchmark ‘Rm’. This is the increase in wealth due 
to an average investment, including all non-pecuniary benefits as spin-off effects. 
What is government would suffice with an ‘Rm’ equalling the risk-free interest 
rate? In the CAPM framework, it would imply that it would accept any project of 
any level of riskiness (indicated by any beta), and still the required rate of return 
for an individual project would be rf. Actually, this notion is in line with Baumol 
(1968), who noted: ‘There is substantial obscurity and divergence of views in 
discussions of the implications of differences (if indeed there are any) in the 
degree of risk that is occurred when a given project is undertaken by a private firm 
on the one side and by government on the other’ (p. 788). 
 
5.4 What do we know about PPPs? 
Section 5.3 has illustrated that it may be difficult to recklessly apply standard 
microeconomic reasoning to PPPs. In the previous chapters, I already indicated 
how difficult it is to come up with an unambiguous valuation of the public good. 
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Since analysing what we do not know may help us forward in setting a research 
agenda, this section gives a brief overview of the status quo of the literature on 
PPPs. Three issues will be discussed: (1) What do we know empirically about 
PPPs? (2) How can we decide who should own the project? and (3) What can be 
contracted upon, and what should be left to ex post mechanisms? 
5.4.1 Empirical ‘evidence’ on PPPs 
The literature on PPPs is divided into two extremes: the advocates on the one 
hand, and the opponents on the other. It seems there is hardly any intermediate 
position imaginable. The advocates seem to be concentrated in the (supra-)national 
institutions as the EC, the OECD, and the World Bank, whereas the opponents are 
often found in the sectors or even organisations where the PPPs have been 
introduced. Academic research seems to be hampered by a sound theoretical 
framework for assessing the empirical evidence, and for understanding the 
underlying dynamics of this particular organisational form. For example, to quote 
Flinders (2003): 
‘[…] PPPs represent a Faustian bargain in that forms of PPP 
may deliver efficiency gains and service improvements which 
are, at best, described as minimal and yet involve substantial 
political and democratic costs. The short-term benefits of PPPs 
may therefore be outweighed by a number of long-term 
problems’ (p. 2). 
 
This conclusion comes pretty close to the rigorous analysis of the privatisation of 
the British power sector by Michael Pollit. He concluded that—using various 
econometric models—in the most ‘favourable model’, the efficiency of the power 
generating companies increased by 5 per cent (Pollit (1995)). Given then, he 
concluded, the enormous costs associated with the transition of the economic 
system, one might wonder whether that money would not have been better spent 
on improving the management practices of the public servants. It seems that a 
similar argument can also be made for PPPs. For example, that the UK Institute 
for Public Policy Research (IPPR) showed that the realised gains of PPPs relative 
to public provision yielded the largest efficiency gains in prisons, whereas areas as 
health and education the results were disappointing (Kelly (2001)). The IPPR 
concluded that such may have been due to the restrictive nature of the contractual 
arrangements, but could not be firm on this matter (ibid.). A brief analysis of the 
realised efficiency gains in the prison ‘sector’, however, shows the dramatic result 
of efficiency gains varying from ‘negligible’ to a 4.2 per cent maximum.131 In the 
                                                      
131 The report of the UK ‘Public Private Partnerships Working Group’ shows that the cost 
saving potential is very low indeed (ranging from negligible to a 4.2% saving, whereas 
these disappointing results are attributed to the contractual arrangement used, see 
http://www.ofmdfmni.gov.uk/ppp/mainreport/experience.htm). 
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absence of a sound theoretical framework for assessing all benefits of PPPs, it is 
difficult to conclude whether these efficiency gains justify the costs of writing 
complex contracts. 
   It would be interesting to see, for example, whether the contracts listed in figure 
5.1 fits with certain product-market conditions. For example, it would be 
interesting to analyse whether BOO contracts are typical for, e.g., infrastructure 
projects whereas BOT might better suit with non-infrastructure projects. 
Unfortunately, this distinction cannot easily be derived from the empirical 
observations. Two difficulties arise. First, there is the often-heard complaint of 
interest groups that PPPs often lack an obligation for information disclosure. In the 
grey area of public-private, information is often lacking on the exact 
organisational structure, the contractual arrangement, the financial performance, 
but also on the operational performance.132 Due to the limited information, a 
thorough analysis is virtually impossible. A second obstacle relates to the apparent 
‘randomness’ observed in the areas where the various PPP contracts are found in 
the empirical reality. Although one would expect a pattern, a closer look at these 
arrangements suggests a serious randomness in applications. For example, the 
World Bank provides an extensive database with thousands of realised PPPs in 
developing countries (see section 5.2). In that database, the build-own-operate 
(BOO) appears in the sectors of telecommunications, electricity, natural gas, 
sewerage, drinking water provision, seaports, and airports. Though many BOO 
projects seem to be on an infrastructure nature, the database also shows that the 
build-own-transfer (BOT) contract overlaps with these areas. In the database, BOT 
contracts appear in telecommunications, electricity, natural gas, sewerage, 
drinking water provision, seaports, airports, toll roads, and railways. All BOT and 
BOO contracts were labelled as greenfield investment projects. Even the private 
sector ownership percentages vary from 10 per cent to 100 per cent in the case of 
BOO projects, and from 25 per cent to 100 per cent in the case of BOT projects. 
5.4.2 On the proper scope of government or ‘who should own the 
project?’ 
For an economist, the fundamental question on the proper scope of government 
must be answered in terms of costs and benefits.133 Given the difficulty of valuing 
the public good, such cost-benefit analysis runs the risk of becoming very stylised 
and hypothetical. In addition, section 5.4.1 showed that even without valuing the 
public good, it turned out difficult to compare the different contractual 
arrangements in PPPs. Still, however, two important contributions can be observed 
in the literature. First, there is the paper of Hart (2003), that takes the impossibility 
                                                      
132 See, for example, the complaints raised by Auerbach (2002). 
133 See the classical paper of Becker (1968) here, who revived the economic analysis of 
prisons. 
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to contract a task as the justification for public provision or government 
involvement in the case of a PPP. A second paper, by Besley and Ghatak (2001), 
focuses on the provision of a public good. Besley and Ghatak depart from the 
relative valuation of the public and private sector parties of the public good, in 
order to determine who should own the project. Both papers are discussed below. 
 
An incomplete contracts approach 
From an incomplete contract’s approach, government should provide the good if it 
is very difficult to specify the task or investment in an ‘outsourcing contract’ to the 
private sector. Hart (2003) distinguishes between ‘bundling’ and ‘unbundling’ of 
the investment in the case of PPPs. This notion is important in dynamic games, as 
the Nash bargaining game proposed in this study. After all, if an investment or 
activity is homogeneous, inseparable, non-stageable, and can be specified, then the 
dynamics of a Nash bargaining game become relatively simple. The wind turbines 
discussed in chapter 4 of this study form a good example of this matter. As soon, 
however, as the investment (or outsourced activity) becomes more complex, the 
responsibilities—particularly in PPPs—of all parties must be scrutinised. For 
example, suppose a government and a firm decide to jointly build, operate, and 
own a hospital. Who constructs the building? Who runs the personnel? Suppose 
the firm arranges the delivery of qualified personnel, whereas government takes 
care of the building. It is obvious from the start, that the payoff of the investments 
of each party is dependent upon the completion of the investment of both herself 
and its counterpart. 
   In the case of investments yielding private goods only, the unbundling problem 
can still be solved in a mechanic fashion (see Grossman and Hart (1986), and Hart 
and Moore (1990)). Even if the investment were inseparable, the presence of 
externalities in general (or more specifically, the production of a public good) 
inevitably yields a different bargaining game between two parties.134 If the two 
parties anticipate on each other’s possible opportunism in this light, it can easily 
be shown there exists a severe risk of underinvestment (Hart and Moore (1990)). 
In PPPs, this issue is far from worked out. A recent attempt by Oliver Hart 
explicitly mentions ‘[…] I use [an incomplete contracts, AM] model to understand 
the costs and benefits of public-private partnerships. […] [T]his model is 
extremely preliminary’ Hart (2003). 
 
                                                      
134 It may seem easy to complicate matters even more. What would happen, for example, if 
not only the investment were separable, but also the externality? This debate was spurred 
by Davis and Whinston (1962) who argued that if technological externalities are separable, 
the classical tax-subsidy prescription may not yield optimal welfare solutions. Baumol 
(1976), however, showed that even though all sorts of cases approximate separability, they 
are irrelevant because they fall outside the feasible region of production possibilities. 
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A relative valuation approach 
Besley and Ghatak (2001) show how ownership matters in the provision of public 
goods—if contracts are incomplete, then the ownership of the project yielding a 
public good should lie with a party that valuates the benefits generated by that 
project more than its counterpart. Although their conclusion may seem natural, the 
reasoning that yields it deserves some explanation.   A first step in determining 
optimal ownership consists of a bargaining power framework in the light of a non-
contractible investment. Following Grossman and Hart (1986), and Hart and 
Moore (1990), ownership improves investment incentives. When analysing 
investment that yield public goods, however, the free-rider problem complicates 
matters. Following the incomplete contracts literature reviewed in Hart (1995), it 
follows that if neither the investment itself can be specified, nor can the benefits of 
such investment easily be contracted on. Thus, Besley and Ghatak assume that in a 
Nash bargaining game, two parties may renegotiate their interests in order to find 
the optimal owner. Anticipating ex post bargaining affects the ex ante investment 
incentives for both parties. Also, the disagreement payoff of each player (that is, 
the payoff when the negotiations are terminated) influences his or its relative 
bargaining position. To make their point, however, Besley and Ghatak assume 
initial ownership lies at one of the two parties. If the bargaining game is 
terminated, ownership returns to the original owner, which might make both 
parties better off. Therewith, ex ante ownership provides some form of credible 
commitment to maintain the ownership structure ex post. Changes in the 
ownership commitments then only occur if such is beneficial for both parties. 
Besley and Ghatak (2001) then state: ‘Even if the investment of one party is more 
important for the project than that of the other party, so long as she has a lower 
valuation she is not optimally the owner’ (p. 1352). 
   Although valuation and bargaining are at the heart of the Besley and Ghatak 
paper, they also include an efficiency argument. After all, it may well be that one 
party is capable of running the project more efficiently than the other. Since 
ownership is assumed to give investment incentives that in turn may affect the 
efficiency of the project, there exists another rationale for determining the optimal 
ownership. When combining these two determinants, and when skipping the maths 
here, figure 5.2 schematically combines the two determinants. 
  On the horizontal axis, the difference in investment productivities (ae-ag) 
indicates whether the entrepreneur e or government g should own the project. 
Thus, at the right-hand side of the graph, the entrepreneur is able to run the project 
more efficiently. Nevertheless, it may well be that government attributes a higher 
value to the project, and should own it due to the bargaining position approach. 
Therefore, at the vertical axis, the graph shows the difference in valuations 
ge TT  . 
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    To illustrate the logic of the graph, consider the following example. Suppose an 
entrepreneur attributes a high value to clean air in a region polluted by NOx. The 
municipality may not value avoidance of the smog (due to NOx) very high, since it 
comes from a flourishing local transport business that boosts the local economy. 
The entrepreneur is willing to pay for the project, but realises government may be 
able to realise clean air at lower cost. In figure 5.2, such situation occurs at the 
North-West quadrant. Initially, it would be logical if the entrepreneur owns the 
project, for it has the highest valuation of the output. It is not logical that 
government would own it, since it has a much lower valuation of the project. 
Nevertheless, once the project would be realised, government would free ride on 
it. The fact that government attributes a low value to clean air need not say it 
derives negative utility from it. Therefore, there may still be an incentive for 
government to participate in a jointly owned project. 
5.4.3 On the nature and contractibility of the co-operation 
Even if it were utterly clear from the start that an entrepreneur could deliver the 
same investment project at a lower investment cost and even run it at lower cost, 
e ownership e ownership
g ownership g ownership
joint ownership
joint ownership
 0,0 0,a  0,a
ae-ag
 T,0
 T,0
ge TT 
 
Figure 5.2: PPP ownership 
Source: taken from Besley and Ghatak (2001). 
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still there exists a dilemma for government whether to ‘contract out’ the project to 
the private sector. Hart et al. (1997) show in their seminal article on prisons how it 
may still be undesirable for governments to ‘outsource’ sudden activities to the 
private sector. In the US, following the general strike of prison guard in New York 
State (see Zimmer and Jacobs (1981) for an analysis), the capacity for prisoners in 
privately owned houses increases rapidly from about 1200 prisoners in 1985 to 
almost 50,000 by the end of 1994.135 Initially the debate on private prisons tended 
to focus on the question whether they could be more efficient at all, but following 
the first experiences proving they were, critics argued ‘you get what you pay 
for’,136 and this is exactly what Hart et al. (1997) wish to underscore. Since it is so 
difficult to define ‘quality’,137 it is also difficult to write a contract on this matter 
(cf. Grossman and Hart (1986)), and there exists a serious risk that the 
entrepreneur sacrifices quality for improving efficiency. Prisons are but one 
example, and the analysis can easily be extended to health provision,138 
education139 and so on. 
  In the case of detention, a prison not only keeps somebody off the street, but—
whenever possible—should also try to correct somebody’s behaviour as a 
preparation to his or its return into society. In the case of privately run prisons, this 
latter correctional task is very difficult to specify. When are inmates ready to 
return? Let exhibit 5.1 serve as some anecdotal evidence for the opponents of the 
private provision of public goods in the case of prisons. 
 
                                                      
135 Data from the testimony by Charles W. Thomas, Director of Private Corrections Project 
at the Univ. of Florida in Gainesville, before the subcommittee on crime of the US House 
Committee on the Judiciary, June 8, 1995. 
136 Op. cit. 
137 See the novel Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance by Robert M. Pirsiq. 
138 In Canada, many hospitals are run on a PPP basis, with mixed results. For the UK, see 
section 5.4.1. 
139 See here the scandal raised in the media on the ‘dual grading system’ at Harvard 
University: since students paid such a high price for tuition fees, they also ‘expected’ A-
grades. So, as former Harvard professor Janine Bempechat said, ‘Students have come to 
expect if they pay a great deal of money for the education at Harvard, they deserve to have 
very high grades.’ Harvard professor Harvey Mansfield openly declares that since spring 
2001, he has been handing out two sets of grades: ‘ironic grades’ (the marks that will go on 
public record, replete with A’s and A minuses) and ‘private grades’ (the marks, generally 
lower and, he says, more accurate, which he gives the students for the same work but 
which only they and he will ever know). (see ‘Grades row at Harvard’, 14 January 2002, 
article on BBC World Internet pages). 
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    The example shows that on paper, the prisoners are taught some skills, which 
would facilitate their return into society. In reality, however, there is very little 
chance they will ever be able to bear the fruits of these skills, since ‘the skills they 
learn are arguably out-dated’ (Quek (1999)). In addition to recognising the 
difficulty of contracting all tasks (and therewith the risk of deterioration of 
quality), Hart et al. (1997) emphasize that problems with corruption and contract 
enforcement are also severe. Overall, Hart et al. conclude that particularly due the 
Exhibit 5.1: How a privately run prison is made profitable 
 
‘For 21 months, at 7:30 every morning, David Harpster would walk, together with about 
100 men, onto the assembly floor of Lockhart Technologies Inc (LTI), and start work on 
computer and electronic components. What was unusual is that this factory is located inside 
a prison, and Harpster, like all the other men he worked with, were inmates. “It’s like any 
other job,” says Harpster, “except that all the men are in the same uniform.” 
   LTI, a subsidiary of U.S. Technologies, is the company that contracts the labor from the 
prison, as well as work from companies such as Dell, IBM, and Texas Instruments. About 
100 of the 500 inmates at Lockhart work with LTI. As prison labor moves into the high-
tech industry, both prison labor advocates and ex-prisoners disagree over the effectiveness 
of such an option. Though prisoners are taught technical skills and work for high-tech 
operations while incarcerated, the skills they learn are arguably out-dated and the salary is 
little. Meanwhile, other corporations that do not use such low-cost labor may have unfair 
competition to deal with. Typically, inmates in work programs make license plates for cars 
or manufacture clothing. But at the Lockhart Work Facility, prisoners learn to build relay 
cards, upgrade motherboards, make computer cables, circuit boards and other electronic 
components. The facility also provides the manpower for Chatliffe, a company based in 
Buda that makes control systems and air-conditioners. 
   The Lockhart facility is owned and run by Wackenhut Corrections Corporation, a 
subsidiary of Wackenhut Corporation – one of the nation’s largest firms dealing with 
security. Wackenhut also has private prisons in other countries including the United 
Kingdom, and has secured contracts providing security for domestic nuclear power plants. 
   The state contracts with private companies like Wackenhut to house and feed the 
prisoners. U.S. Technologies employs about 100 of the 500 inmates housed at the Lockhart 
facility, paying the minimum wage to the prison. Lockhart Warden James Black said the 
prisoners are allowed to keep up to 20 percent of what they make, about $1 per hour. The 
rest of their income goes to pay for court fees, outstanding loans, Social Security, taxes, a 
restitution fund for crime victims, child support and to the prison for their stay there. The 
idea was started to get prisoners to pay for their own incarceration, Black said. Harpster 
says that he got to keep $2,000 for the time that he was there, and he calculated that 
prisoners were allowed to keep up to 14 percent of what they earned. A portion of the 
salary of LTI inmates is paid back to Wackenhut, Black confirms, though he would not 
comment on the amount. Harpster says that he believes it comes out to between eight to 
nine percent of their gross salary.’ 
 
Source: taken from Quek (1999), emphasis added. 
179
difficulty of writing a contract (for activities as the above-described preparations 
to return to society, but also the clauses for using violence against prisoners) 
privatisation (in the broad sense) of prisons is undesirable. 
 
5.5 Incentives, investment, and entrepreneurial ability: A model 
The previous sections have shown that the private sector may be more efficient 
than the public sector in the provision of a public good.140 This would be a 
principal added value of the entrepreneur in her venture with a government. Given, 
however, the problems with some existing PPPs or the cases of full private 
provision of a public good, the question rises how much ownership should be 
transferred to the private sector in case of a PPP. That question has not been 
addressed in the literature yet.141 For example, Besley and Ghatak (2001) do show 
how ownership matters, but in their analysis there exist but three cases: full 
governmental ownership, full private ownership, and joint ownership.142 
   Also, we address the question under what circumstances the PPP may add value. 
We investigate this matter by means of developing a base-case of public provision, 
after which some alternative scenarios are presented. 
   The theoretical literature on public-private partnerships, or partnerships in 
general is limited in amount. Apart from PPPs, there are two categories of studies 
focussing on collaborative ventures: those on business start-ups (investigating the 
co-operation between a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur, and assess the 
                                                      
140 The privatisation literature shows that there may exist cases where—on the basis of 
comparative statics of performance— private sector enterprises outperform public sector 
organisations. Though in theory there is a strong case for preferring private sector 
provision in many areas, the empirical evidence is much weaker. The reasons given for this 
discrepancy differ per study, and are not discussed here. 
141 We focus on the rationales for and applicability of entrepreneurial qualities in PPPs. 
Shleifer (1998), for example, emphasizes that ‘[…] private ownership is the crucial source 
of incentives to innovate and become efficient […]’ (p. 135). This matches well with the 
key rationale for private sector involvement in investment projects: eliminating 
inefficiency through incentives associated with ownership. In this light, Hart et al. (1997) 
discuss two classes of investment incentives that can be given to the private sector party: 
those that reduce costs, and those that innovate or improve quality. 
142 Section 2.4.3 already indicated that ownership alone is not a sufficient incentive for 
making investments (see Holmström and Roberts (1998)). It was argued that 
overinvestment or underinvestment also depended on, amongst others, the relative 
importance of the investment to either party (see Hart and Moore (1990)). This matches 
nicely with the analysis of Besley and Ghatak (2001). They show how the choice for 
public, private, or joint ownership is affected by the relative importance each party assigns 
to the project. 
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complementarities in ‘entrepreneurial abilities’)143 and those on team production, 
varying from analysing factory workers to medical group practices.144 Both 
categories float upon strong assumptions regarding the unobservability of effort, 
and the difficulty of individual performance verifiability. Inevitably, the 
interaction and interdependence problems yield very complex contracts, where 
signalling seems a core activity for both partners. The common solutions offered 
nail down to game theory, emphasizing the risk of free riders, and apply complex 
statistics for tracing unobservable variables. 
   In our study, we face one tremendous simplification. If the cost inefficiency of 
the investment project can be eliminated at all, the entrepreneur must do it. 
Therewith, both parties are complementary in their abilities. Giving an ownership 
share to the entrepreneur in a PPP clearly streamlines the interests of both partners, 
but we will show that ownership is not the panacea to eliminating all possible 
problems. 
5.5.1 A model 
Consider a government that intends to set up a public-private partnership (PPP) 
vehicle for the production of a private good X, and a costless continuous public 
good Y, which is the spin-off of the private good. For this PPP, government invites 
a private sector participant to buy a share D in the PPP. It is government who 
determines this fraction D. Government’s primary interest is in the realisation of 
the public good, but she also enjoys the additional income on the sales of the 
private good. Private sector participants are only interested in joining the PPP if 
the return on their investment is nonnegative. For government, it is attractive to 
invite an entrepreneur in the PPP vehicle—the entrepreneur, after all, is often 
praised for possessing superior knowledge and skills to manage and operate an 
investment project more efficiently than government. Suppose this efficiency 
argument holds, as supported by numerous comparative and longitudinal studies 
on privatisation and on the relative performances of public and private enterprise. 
The optimisation problem here then becomes one of eliminating inefficiencies. 
These inefficiencies can be both technical and allocative inefficiencies. If the 
optimal situation is one where the PPP vehicle operates efficiently (both in a 
technical and allocative sense), whereas pure public provision would be one 
characterised by inefficiency, then a first crucial step is to find the efficient 
frontiers of production and cost functions. The ideal PPP should meet these 
                                                      
143 For example, Amit et al. (1990) analyse entrepreneurial ability in the light of venture 
investments, where both the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist have their specific 
abilities. 
144 For example, Chi (1996) analyses collaborative ventures, where both business partners 
interact in their setting of effort levels; Lynk (1993) analyses joint production between 
multiple privatised water authorities; and Gaynor and Pauly (1990) analyse intra-group 
dynamics in medical teams. 
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frontier conditions, and any deviation can be attributed to a suboptimal 
exploitation of the entrepreneur’s abilities. 
   The model applied in this chapter differs from the ones used in chapters 3 and 4 
with respect to the assumptions regarding time dependencies. In chapters 3 and 4, I 
assumed a setting where the value of the entrepreneur’s investment was 
maximised by means of maximising every slice of the integrals applied. Of course, 
if every slice of an integral is maximised, so is the total integral. In this chapter, 
such maximisation method is not applied, for it would eliminate all dynamics that 
are of interest for out analysis. 
5.5.2 Base-case: Public provision 
Consider a project that yields a private good X, and a public good Y. The public 
good arises at zero additional cost as a spin-off effect from the production of X.145 
In our base-case, a government sets up a project individually. We follow the 
privatization literature here, suggesting the public provision may suffer from some 
degree of technical or cost inefficiency. Let the cost of public provision of the 
private good be denoted as  XCgov . Demand for the private good,  pX , is 
downward sloping in price (hence,   0ww pX ). 
   Government may now either set the monopolist output (maximising her profits 
on the sales of X) or decide to serve the entire market and maximise the production 
of Y (taking for granted that the pecuniary income stream is suboptimal. We 
assume government is particularly interested in the provision of the public good, 
and is less interested in the pecuniary income stream deriving from X.146 Since Y is 
defined as a spin-off effect of X, government utility maximisation of Y is 
essentially equal to maximising the output level of X. End-user price p is the only 
instrument available to government for this utility maximisation problem, so that 
(in a one period setting): 
(5.10)          0,   max IXCppXYUYXUp  , 
where I0 is the initial investment. The only solution for this government is to set px 
close to nil, accept the cost inefficiency included in C, the foregone income stream 
on X*p, and accept the loss on the initial investment I0. This base-case setting is 
frequently observed in ‘the real world’. For example, motorways provide a private 
good (usage kilometres of transport) as well as a public good (e.g., the 
accessibility of regions, or the economic attractiveness of an area). All ‘losses’ 
identified above are collected through general taxation. 
   An alternative setting would be that government sets such a price for X that the 
proceeds of the sales of X cover the initial investment, and enjoys the utility of Y 
                                                      
145 In its most simple form, Y=X, for which C(Y)=0, whereas C(X)>0. 
146 Thus, one could say U(Y)>U(ʌ(X)), where ʌ are the pecuniary profits from the sales of 
X. 
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for free. In such situation, the restriction      00   IXCppX  is imposed to 
(5.10), after which U(X) becomes zero (government neither looses on the proceeds 
of X, nor does she gain a penny). As a consequence,    YUYXU  , , and since 
   pXYU , the ‘optimisation’ is a single-shot (that is, setting p such that the 
restriction is met), for which: 
(5.11)    XCpX
I
p  
*
0*  
 
The maximum possible output for this price is      **
0*
pXCp
I
pX

 . 
Assuming that government approximately sells at marginal cost, i.e. Cp p , then 
foX . For any price higher than the marginal costs of production, government 
is ready to accept a lower output quantity (otherwise she would be making profits). 
   Although many governments may be happy with this base-case scenario, they 
may enter into a partnership with the private sector for two distinct reasons. First, 
the private sector may use her superior efficiency skills and the project’s costs. 
Second, the private sector may take over some part of the initial investment I0, and 
hence reduce the financial burden for government. 
   The first argument (on efficiency) is inspired by the privatisation literature. 
Though the empirical results on post-privatisation efficiency are mixed (see 
Megginson et al. (1994), Megginson and Netter (2001), or Dewenter and 
Malatesta (2001) to name but a few), the economic incentives literatures suggests 
that ownership may work as an incentive to cutting costs. For example, opposed to 
traditional procurement (see Laffont and Tirole (1993)), giving away a ‘share of 
the pie’ gives the incentive to increase the pie (see Laffont and Martimort (2002)), 
and thus streamline the private sector participant’s interests with the interests of 
the project’s principal: government. Although the literature on economic 
incentives is massive in amount, we do not know how these should work in a co-
operative agreement between a private and a public sector participant. Neither do 
we know how they would apply in the specific economic areas where PPPs 
emerge. 
   The second argument (on sharing the costs) is a straightforward one. Not only 
may governments be short in cash (as in developing countries), but also may their 
budget be constrained for other reasons. For example, the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) restricts the participating countries with respect to their spending 
on, e.g., infrastructure projects. Even though a government might be willing (and 
financially able) to invest in new infrastructure projects, she may not spend more 
than, say, 5 per cent per annum on infrastructure. PPPs may provide an alternative 
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here. Also, when assessing the contracts depicted in figure 5.1, one can imagine 
leasing contracts enter into this ‘gap’. 
   In our model, we initially focus on the efficiency argument as the rationale 
underlying a PPP. Therewith, the question rises whether ownership provides 
sufficient incentives for the entrepreneur to make the PPP more efficient than 
under public provision. Hence, we will first analyse whether the provision of the 
public good benefits from the entrepreneurial effort of improving the project’s 
efficiency. 
5.5.3 Alternative scenario: Unregulated PPP 
In our first scenario alternative to the base-case, we analyse an ‘unrestricted’ PPP 
in the sense of neither price not output quantity being regulated. Based on the 
assumption that ownership provides an incentive to improve efficiency, 
government thus has an alternative steering variable as compared to her 
maximisation problem proposed in (5.10), being the transfer of some ownership 
share Į, which yields:147 
(5.12)           > @01,   max IXCppXYUYXU  DD . 
 
Since the entrepreneur cannot privatise the public good Y, its utility can be fully 
received by society. Since we assume a one-to-one relationship between residual 
rights and residual control, the entrepreneur buys some share Į in the project 
vehicle, for which she receives an equal share of the net benefits of it. Returning to 
the added value of the entrepreneur, we presume the entrepreneur can make an 
effort İ that helps to reduce the inefficiencies of the PPP project. 
   Based on the economic incentives literature, government hopes that ‘giving 
away’ some share Į in the PPP provides an incentive for the entrepreneur to raise 
effort İ. Thus, we implicitly assume İ(Į). If such is true, then PPPs can be made 
efficient by transferring an ownership share only. As chapter 4 suggested that 
subsidizing the private provision of public goods in a market where firms are 
price-takers can readily be reduced to a pecuniary transferral problem, the proof of 
existence of İ(Į) would have the same implications. In fact, the question of how to 
run a PPP in a most efficient fashion would boil down to the question of how 
much ownership share Į should be sold to the entrepreneur. That problem is a 
typical nested optimization problem: government should first analyse how high the 
entrepreneur is likely to set her effort level (given some Į), and then offer that Į. 
Thus the choice for the optimal Į from a governmental perspective depends on the 
optimal effort level İ from the entrepreneur’s perspective. 
 
 
                                                      
147 Note that p is no longer concerned a steering variable, since that would imply a price-
regulated PPP. 
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The entrepreneur’s profit maximisation problem 
The entrepreneur maximises the profits on her investment ID , minus the value of 
her disutility Q of effort H that she must issue in order to improve the project’s 
efficiency. The entrepreneur chooses that effort level that maximises her 
instantaneous after-tax profits. Also, since we initially assume the PPP not to be 
regulated, the entrepreneur sets the optimal output quantity. After all, the 
privatisation literature is clear about the fact that if privatisation is successful, then 
it must have been accompanied by liberalisation and deregulation. Although most 
PPPs arise in monopolistic settings, we initially ‘let the market do the job’, and 
obtain: 
(5.13)       > @   0
,
,1   max IvXCppXTV pppcp DHHDH  . 
The next step in making a straightforward trade-off was inspired by Gaynor and 
Pauly (1990). First, the entrepreneur will set her optimal effort level for which the 
f.o.c. is (ignoring any discount factor, using a one-period setting): 
 
(5.14) 
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Figure 5.3: Entrepreneur’s optimal effort level 
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The optimal effort H* the entrepreneur puts in the PPP is set such that the marginal 
disutility of increasing effort equals the net reduction in costs for the entrepreneur. 
In a graph, this is shown as follows.148 
   In figure 5.3, the entrepreneur faces decreasing marginal earnings on her effort, 
which is represented by the line EE’. Also, by (5.14), she faces increasing 
marginal disutility of effort, represented by the line CC’. The optimal effort level 
is then given by the intersection of the two lines. 
   In addition to setting an optimal effort level, the entrepreneur also sets an 
optimal output price: 
(5.15) 
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In words, the optimal price exceeds the marginal cost price C, increases up to the 
point of optimal scale of production, as well as with the optimal output regarding 
the price elasticity of demand. 
   Recalling (5.11), this price the entrepreneur would equal the governmental price 
if: 
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Here, some interesting cases arise: 
x The PPP operates at equal cost as government:    XCXC govppp  H, . The 
PPP’s mark-up (determined by the optimal scale of production, as well as the 
price elasticity of demand) then would equal the naïve governmental mark-up, 
XI 0 . 
x The PPP applies the same mark-up, but operates at lower costs: 
   XCXC govppp H,  
 
For investigating either case, it is important to first be clear about the base-case. 
Given the assumptions there, we can explore the circumstances under which a PPP 
can add value (i.e., either produce more at the same cost, or produce the same 
quantity at lower cost). Section 5.6 makes a first attempt. 
                                                      
148 Note that—in the absence of a functional form of v— the exact shapes of the lines may 
differ. The graph should hence only be seen as a support to the formalisation in order to 
help the intuition. 
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   Note that both D and Tc show up in the above equations for the optimal effort 
and price levels. This implies that the government is able to influence the efforts of 
the entrepreneur by adjusting the share of the PPP given to the entrepreneur and 
corporate taxes. As effort influences the per-unit costs of X, government indirectly 
influences the output by the incentives it gives to the entrepreneur through D and 
Tc. Therefore, the response functions of the entrepreneur for effort and output price 
both depend on D and Tc, that is: 
 
(5.16)  cTgp ,* D     cTjpX ,   * D   
and: 
 
(5.17)  cTh ,* DH   
 
Therewith, as Į does affect the optimal effort level İ*, and as the cost function is 
determined by the entrepreneur’s effort level, output X (and therewith the public 
good Y) is indirectly set by Į via price. 
 
Government’s utility maximisation problem 
We assumed that the government established the PPP to produce a public good Y
that can be obtained by producing a private good X, where Y was a direct spin-off 
effect of X. Let the amount of Y equal a fraction ș of the amount of X (i.e., Y=șX, 
for which T ). The utility for the government derived from the PPP equals 
the sum of Y and the financial revenues. The maximisation problem is essentially 
reduced to the question of how much ownership share D the government transfers 
to the private sector participant. The utility for the government from the PPP 
yields: 
(5.18)       0**** )1()],([))1(1(, IXCppXTpXYXU c DHDT   
The first part of the right hand side is the total utility derived from the public good, 
which we assumed to be șX, the second part is the share of the profits from the 
PPP for the government plus the corporate taxes paid by the entrepreneur over her 
part of the profit, whereas the third part is the share in the investments paid by the 
government. Government chooses D to maximise the utility from the PPP given 
the expected response of the entrepreneur. The first order condition yields the 
following expression. 
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which rewrites to: 
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If both sides of the latter equation are multiplied by D we obtain the following 
result: 
(5.20) 
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The left-hand side of the equation equals the total share of the financial income of 
the PPP ‘given’ to the entrepreneur. The right-hand side relates to the increase in 
utility for the government from an increase in production of X and Y due to an 
increase in the share Į transferred to the entrepreneur and the cost reduction due to 
the incentives given to the entrepreneur to increase effort. That is, the optimal 
share transferred to the entrepreneur, D*, is set such that the marginal increase in 
utility from the public good Y plus the marginal decrease in costs for the 
government equals the part of the project profits given away to the entrepreneur. 
Any further worked out version now requires a specific setting. 
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5.6 When would a PPP be preferred over public provision? 
5.6.1 PPP minimally produces the base-case output quantity 
By the above entrepreneurial profit maximisation problem (see (5.15)) we may 
express the PPP’s optimal output level as 
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Recall that by (5.11), government would have delivered: 
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Suppose government requires the PPP to minimally deliver the same output 
level: govppp XX t . This restriction requires the PPP to set a lower  price (due to 
the downward-sloping demand curve), and hence to cut costs. Thus, govppp pp d .
 
Base-case:  XCp govgov !  
If government would sell X at a price higher than marginal cost, govX will be 
finite. In this case, Xppp may exceed govX , which implies that: 
 
(5.21) 
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The right-hand side of this expression clearly gives the ‘room for manoeuvre’ for 
the PPP: prices, Cgov, and I0 are nonnegative real numbers, whereas pX ww is 
negative. Therewith, the right-hand side de facto expresses the governmental 
mark-up. On the left-hand side, now, the PPP not only faces the marginal costs of 
production as such, but also the scale economies effect related to output. By 
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setting pppp, also X is determined, and therewith the scale economies effect in the 
cost function Cppp. 
   In addition, note that in this equality, the larger the price elasticity of demand, 
the less room for manoeuvre the PPP has. Also, consider the impact of a constant 
cost of production: if   0 ww XC , then the PPP’s output is demand-driven. 
 
Base-case:  XCp govgov p  
Suppose that in the above sketched governmental ‘optimisation’ problem 
government would have sold X slightly above marginal cost (i.e., 
 XCp govgov p , resulting in an infinitesimal mark-up). In that case, output must 
be maximal to compensate for the initial investment I0 (hence, foX ). In such 
base case, Xppp can at most equal govX , which implies that: 
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Since, however,  XCp govgov   is infinitesimal, the right-hand side of this 
equation tends to infinity. When transposing the price elasticity of demand from 
the left to the right-hand side (as in the above exercise), the mechanics of finding a 
solution become pretty meaningless unless pX ww is very large. Thus, only when 
demand is very sensitive to changes in price, (5.22) has a finite solution. 
   Also, recall that if  XCp govgov p , and if the PPP is required to minimally 
produce the same output quantity, it can only make a profit if it is able to cut costs. 
Stated alternatively, the PPP may only recuperate investment, and minimally 
produce the same output quantity, and meet the entrepreneur’s profit maximization 
purpose in the absence of any investments for the PPP (which suggests the 
entrepreneur should only take over the managerial role of the project, and ensure 
the project is run more efficiently). 
5.6.2 PPP produces the same output quantity at lower cost 
One of our crucial assumptions regarding the entrepreneur is that she is able to 
produce at lower costs, due to her superior efficiency skills. Let government’s 
production costs be denoted by  XCg , whereas—due to the entrepreneur’s 
efficiency improving effort—can realise a cost function  H,XC ppp , for which: 
   XCXC gppp dH, . Since the output quantity sold is assumed to be the same 
for the PPP and the base-case here, we can readily assume prices are equal as well. 
Thus, govppp pp  , and therewith    govppp pXpX  . We would now basically 
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derive (5.21), which would probably reduce to the following problem: 
 
(5.23)         HQHD t XCXCXT govpppc ,1 , 
 
which is no more than a participation constraint for the entrepreneur to exert cost-
cutting effort. 
5.6.3 Wrapping up 
Suppose  YYU , and Y=X. In this specific case, we can make the following 
comparisons. First, consider the value of the project vehicle. Under public 
provision, the value created is nil, assuming price equals marginal cost plus a 
mark-up to recuperate the initial investment (see (5.11)). The PPP, on the other 
hand, has a value equalling: 
 
(5.24)    0, IXCpXV ppppppppp  H  
 
Therewith, if Vppp is to exceed Vgov, then it immediately follows that: 
 
(5.25)  H,0 XC
X
I
p pppppp t  
 
Meanwhile, when assessing government’s utility of the provision of the public 
good, she would have received (under public provision):    govgov pXYYU   . 
In case of a PPP, this would have been:    pppppp pXYYU   . Now 
   YUYU govppp t  if and only if    govppp pXpX d , due to a downward-
sloping demand curve for the private good. 
   Combining this (obvious) result with the above requirement for the PPP creating 
a positive value, it follows that govppp pp d , which can only be achieved if 
   XCXC govppp dH, . Thus, in our model, the PPP must produce at lower cost 
than government, and must sell at a lower price than government in order to add 
value. In sections 5.5 and 5.6 we have shown some implications. 
   The ultimate question remaining is, ‘if PPPs must operate more efficient than 
under public provision, and if entrepreneurial effort is the key to achieving that 
target, does the ownership share of the entrepreneur in the PPP determine the 
entrepreneur’s effort level?’ To answer this question, recall (5.14), which set the 
expression for the optimal effort level by the entrepreneur. Given (5.14), the idea 
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now is to analyse the impact of altering D, which yields the following comparative 
statics:149 
 
(5.26) 
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When analysing this expression, we immediately see DH ww  has an impact on: 
x The profits for the PPP via 
2
2
Hw
w C
. This implies that if 
2
2
Hw
w C
=0, then the 
impact of DH ww on profits is nil (i.e., transferring ownership does not 
provide any incentive for the PPP to operate more efficiently in case  H,XC  
is a straight line relationship between C and H.  
x The disutility for the entrepreneur via 
2
2
H
Q
w
w
. 
In the absence of specific functions regarding the various costs and benefits of the 
project, it is difficult for each of the cases to come up with more specific 
interpretations of the effect of alpha on effort. This is a clear drawback of trying to 
keep the analysis at a general level. Hence, further analysis needs to restrict to a 
number of specific functions. 
 
5.7 Discussion 
Following the first waves of privatisation, PPPs seemed an attractive alternative 
for governments to involve the private sector in the provision of public goods. The 
initial benefits of this new organisational form must have been promising: the 
private sector could add value by means of taking over risks, improving efficiency, 
and providing additional funds to tight government budgets. Meanwhile, since 
government maintained a stake in the project vehicle, PPPs might be attractive in 
those areas where the investment or output are hard to specify—after all, the more 
traditional forms of encouraging the private sector (as with subsidies or fiscal 
measures) can only apply to contractible economic activities. Since changing these 
regulations is a costly and time-consuming process, PPPs might be interesting 
since governmental ownership opens the floor for ex post governance mechanisms 
                                                      
149 For notation purposes, the arguments  *,HX  of C have been dropped here. 
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through the residual control rights. The empirical evidence on PPPs, however, 
shows that public-private partnerships are not the panacea governments might 
have hoped for. 
   This chapter has analysed the literature and some experiences with PPPs. It 
appears that, although PPPs exist from the 1990s onwards, the academic literature 
is very limited. The following ‘gaps’ can be identified. First, it seems unclear 
under what conditions the various contractual arrangements work best. Though 
one might expect certain contracts to be designed for specific product-market 
combinations, the empirical evidence shows that multiple contracts are observed in 
the same areas. Second, the economic analysis of PPPs seems to ignore 
fundamental characteristics of the vehicle. Section 5.3 took the paper by Grout 
(2003) as a dramatic example. Third, it appears that the efficiency gains of realised 
PPP projects are limited in amount, though this is sometimes blamed to the fact 
that the specific contractual arrangement puts a cap on the entrepreneurial ability 
to improve that efficiency. Fourth, though there seems to be a clear case that 
ownership does provide an incentive to the private sector party to improve 
efficiency, it is unclear how much ownership the entrepreneur should have in the 
vehicle in order to improve its efficiency. Given the status quo of the academic 
literature on PPPs, one can seriously doubt whether it is reasonable at all to expect 
PPPs to operate smoothly. 
   Sections 5.5 and 5.6 try to spur the literature on PPPs by addressing the question 
of division of ownership. The model presented in section 5.5 may easily be 
extended to, for example, analyse the effects of price regulation, zero 
governmental valuation of the private good, or the effect of a minimum output 
level for the PPP project. Each of these extensions, just as the basic model 
proposed in section 5.5, should be perceived as determinants of the feasible set of 
outcomes for a PPP contract. This is a clear added value of the model, for it 
enriches our understanding of what an efficient PPP should look like. Section 5.6 
shows some conditions under which PPPs can add value relative to a base-case of 
public provision. Having found some feasible sets for PPPs to operate, however, 
does not guarantee entrepreneurs will add value indeed. Therefore, for 
governments to hedge themselves against undesired behaviour, one may explore 
the impact of additional regulation. For example, the impact of price caps or rate-
of-return regulation could be studied, just as the impact of imposing additional 
non-coercive measures (i.e., governments may try to shift the PPP’s cost curve, or 
the entrepreneur’s profit curve by relaxing corporate tax rates, awarding 
productivity or production incentives, and so on). Such extensions, however, are 
still to be worked out. The question how much ownership should be transferred to 
yield an optimal entrepreneurial cost-reducing effort depends on the impact of 
DH ww  (see last part of 5.6.3). A precise answer requires the study of a specific 
case, specified by explicit (and hence less generalisible) functions of costs and 
benefits.  
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Appendix 5.A Mathematical appendix 
 
 
 
The demand for a PPP’s output 
Some authors suggest a PPP may produce Pareto efficiently, since it would be 
possible to set the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) equal to the marginal rate 
of technical transformation (MRT). Apart from the fact that it is counterintuitive 
for the consumer to determine the level of Y to be consumed (such is set 
exogenously), most of the utility functions applied in the literature also require 
some rate of substitution (i.e., the MRS) between Y and X. Amiran and Hagen 
(2003) have made a fine note on this issue of hyper-substitutability, by 
investigating the limits to ‘willingness to pay’ and ‘willingness to accept’ in the 
light of public goods provision. With public goods, Amiran and Hagen argue, 
‘[…] the additional income can provide full compensation only if the market 
goods that can be purchased with the additional income are adequate substitutes 
for the public good whose quantity has been exogenously reduced’ (p. 463). In 
their article, they illustrate their point by considering a simply asymptotically 
bounded utility function—without violating any axiom of the neoclassical 
consumption theory, it becomes possible to show that the hypersubstitutability 
may yield an allocation that is outside the bounded utility set. 
   Without replicating the whole point and proof of Amiran and Hagen (2003), I 
will only use some part of their maths as an input to derive the demand functions 
for both the public good Y and the private good X. After all, if we have the demand 
functions, then we know when the public good should be produced (i.e., when the 
willingness to pay exceeds the costs of provision).150 
   The purpose of these derivations is to show that the PPPs analysed by Grout 
(2003) are a dramatic simplification since they ignore an explicit utility of Y. 
Neglecting the utility from the public good (which is at the heart of a PPP) implies 
neglecting the non-pecuniary benefits of that project vehicle, which was at the 
heart of the analysis of Besley and Ghatak (2001). Let me consider a Cobb-
Douglas utility function of the following form: 
                                                      
150 I deliberately enter into the analytical solution in the appendix to this chapter (since I 
believe it is fruitless). Although it would be great to obtain an analytical solution, it is far 
from our empirical reality. As a consequence, there are numerous articles available on how 
to reveal the WTP for a public good in a both pragmatic and theoretical sense. See, for 
example, Lockwood (2003), Gary-Bobo and Jaaidane (2000), or Rondeau et al. (1999), as 
some theoretical contributions, and see Propper (1993), or Bohm (1983) as some empirical 
applications. 
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where X is the private good consumed, Y the public good, and D, E, a, and b are 
real positive numbers. If there would exist a competitive equilibrium for providing 
goods X and Y, then at the optimal level of Y, the marginal utility would at most 
equal the marginal costs, whilst the total net utility would be maximised. Let the 
MRS be determined as follows. If U(Y,X) is a constant, k, then marginal utility 
becomes: 
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This is equal to expressing the MRS as: 
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which yields the MRS at constant utility.151 Let now pi be the market price for Xi, 
and Si be the theoretical price for ‘consuming’ Yi. Total income w can then be 
divided over the private and the public good as ¦¦
  
 
I
i
ii
I
i
ii pXYw
11
S . Suppose 
all market clearing conditions are met, then: 
 
                                                      
151 The constant utility explains the negative sign: Let      YUXUYXU  ,  be 
constant, then an infinitesimal change in Y yields: 
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The demand functions for Y and X can now be found as follows (using the fact that 
the MRS equals p/S ,152 and substituting for X): 
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and in a similar fashion: 
 
(5.33) 
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152 The MRS represents the slope of the highest possible indifference curve of the 
consumer(s). The price ratio p/S  represents the budget line. Utility maximisation now 
occurs at the point of tangency between the budget line and the highest possible 
indifference curve. 
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These are the demand functions for the public good Y and the private good X. 
Given now these demand functions, one should realise that together they form 
‘the’ demand function Grout (2003) uses for output q of a PPP. Not only could we 
question the hyper-substitutability of X and Y (as Amiran and Hagen (2003) did), 
but also we should be aware of the explicit demand function for the public good Y. 
After all, if we would indeed have a demand function, we have a criterion 
justifying production (that is, if demand at least equals the costs). Even though the 
literature on public goods shows that there is very little incentive for people to 
reveal their true preferences, and to contribute up to the point of their individual 
demand, we might use it as a rule for setting a uniform tax level. Still, then, the 
PPP would be assured of this income stream fuelled with taxes, and it should be 
given a different discount factor than the income stream derived from the sales of 
the private good output. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
In an era where governments increasingly withdraw from the market place as 
active providers of goods and services, this study has analysed some governmental 
dilemmas concerning the private provision of public goods. Since the mainstream 
literature on the private provision of public goods suggests that the funding 
problem is most severe, one might expect that the biggest governmental dilemma 
is a pecuniary one: How much money should be transferred to support the private 
sector? This question, however, embodies some problems and assumptions that are 
not easily overcome. First, by opting for a support mechanism, governments 
choose for so-called non-coercive instruments. These have the theoretical 
advantage that they are better able to yield Pareto-efficient outcomes than coercive 
instruments, but their effects are less predictable. Second, calculating a support 
scheme is not equal to designing or selecting policy instruments. Third, not all 
non-coercive instruments are alike. In this study, for example, the fiscal and 
financial measures studied in chapter 4 must clearly be distinguished from the 
public-private partnerships analysed in chapter 5.  
 
6.1 Four dilemmas 
In section 1.5, I have specified four governmental dilemmas concerning the 
encouragement of investment in the private provision of public goods by means of 
non-coercive instruments. Each of them represented a research question, addressed 
below. 
6.1.1 The Influenceability Dilemma 
Perhaps the biggest fundamental dilemma underlying the use of non-coercive 
policy instruments is the unpredictable nature of these instruments. Though the 
game-theoretical literature on incentives provides a logically sound framework for 
predicting behaviour of one’s counterpart when offering an incentive, there may 
well exist other factors at work that prevent firms from making the actions targeted 
by governments. In chapter 2, I have analysed these ‘barriers to investment’ at the 
level of the firm, industry, and macro-level context. At each of these three levels 
of analysis, it appears that the theoretical literature readily provides reasons why 
firms would not invest even if the investment decision were economically 
attractive. 
   Therewith, the economic attractiveness of an investment decision reduces to 
being a necessary condition, instead of being a necessary and sufficient condition. 
If governments wish to use non-coercive instruments, then it would be wise to 
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analyse any potential barrier to investment beforehand, and eventually try to 
eliminate these in order to increase the predictability of the outcome of the chosen 
policy. 
   The analysis of barriers to investment has important implications for an analysis 
of underinvestment. For example, it may well be that firms are willing to invest, 
but do not invest sufficiently (in the perception of government) due to the 
aforementioned barriers. It may well be that eliminating these barriers is more 
effective and even efficient than providing additional support schemes. In the 
debate on underinvestment, chapter 2 has shown that this is a concept that is 
difficult to operationalise. Of all empirical studies on underinvestment, multiple 
interpretations exist of the benchmark (i.e., ‘optimal investment’), so that it 
becomes very difficult to come up with clear-cut policy prescriptions here. 
6.1.2 Smart Governance Dilemma 
Given an analysis of all potential barriers to investment hindering the effectiveness 
of non-coercive instruments, the fundamental question rises how much 
encouragement a government should provide. I have labelled this the Smart 
Governance Dilemma, which deals with the efficiency of government policies—if, 
after all, it appears to be possible to encourage firms to invest with less support 
than intuitively thought, why should a government be too generous? Chapter 3 has 
analysed the possibility to ‘design’ or determine an optimal wealth transfer that (a) 
is sufficiently generous to encourage the private sector to invest, but also (b) 
minimizes governmental expenditures in order not to deviate too much from a 
Pareto efficiency.  
   The mainstream economic literature on government support for the private 
provision of public goods would first try to calculate the optimal valuation of the 
public good in order to then determine an optimal wealth transfer through the 
support scheme. As shown in section 1.3, however, there are numerous objections 
to this approach, for government would not be able to include the individual 
preferences in determining the value of the public good, as well as the difficulty to 
unambiguously valuate the public good at all. Therefore, I have proposed an 
alternative framework that uses a nested optimisation model in order to achieve a 
Nash equilibrium. In that framework, government anticipates the entrepreneurial 
response by evaluating the latter’s participation constraint. I have proposed to use 
a framework based on Tobin’s Q and the neoclassical investment model of Hall 
and Jorgenson. Given the fact that the present value of governmental support for 
private sector investment facilitates the participation constraint of the private 
sector, government can minimise her expenditures. 
   Given a standard type of technology, government can assume the role of a 
private sector investor, and analyse the costs and benefits of the investment 
beforehand. In my proposed framework, I assumed a technology that is not only 
‘standard’, but also yields both a private and a public good. The market then 
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values and rewards the output of the private product, whereas the public good is 
often not rewarded for—particularly if the investing firms are price-takers in an 
existing market for the private good. 
   So government learns the costs and benefits of an investment, and may calculate 
the ‘Q’ I proposed in section 3.1. Given Q (which reflected the economic 
attractiveness of the investment), government can predict or anticipate on the 
response of the private sector in terms of investment. If Q is smaller than unity 
(see section 3.1, or the mathematical appendix to chapter 3), private sector 
investment is unsustainable in the long run. Government, however, can increase Q 
through non-coercive instruments (as subsidies or tax measures), so that it does 
become economically interesting to invest (read: the participation constraint has 
been met). 
   Apart from wishing to encourage private sector investment, governments would 
not wish to be too generous. If, after all, they would exaggerate the wealth transfer 
(that has to be financed through taxation) to the investors, the policy instruments 
are unlikely to yield a (Pareto) efficient solution. Thus, governments also face an 
expenditure minimisation problem. The literature suggests that Q equalling unity 
should do well. 
   When returning to the question of governmental valuation of the public good, we 
can now revert it—by anticipating the private sector’s participation constraint 
(through offering such a support that the Q for the investment equals unity), 
government can now relate the present value of that support to the amount of 
public good the investments should yield. The ratio then reveals the governmental 
‘willingness-to-pay’ for the public good. 
6.1.3 Policy Portfolio Dilemma 
Chapter 4 consists of a multi-case study on government support for investments in 
wind turbines, analysing the green policies of the EU(15) countries in the 1985-
2000 period. In each of these cases, governments used non-coercive instruments 
(i.e., fiscal and financial measures) to encourage investment in a standard 
technology that yields both a private good (electricity) and a public good (avoided 
emissions, or ‘clean air’). Contrasting with ‘the lighthouse in economics’ by Coase 
(1974), investors in wind turbines are price takers in the market for the private 
good, and need additional support in order to deliver at the wholesale market. In 
the empirical test it appears that investments are realised for all nonnegative values 
of Q. 
   This result is a clear relaxation of the existing literature, which prescribes Qs 
exceeding unity. As an explanation, I have used the following reasoning. If Q 
exceeds unity, the economic attractiveness of the investment meets the long-run 
sustainability restriction imposed on the investment’s NPV. In other words, the 
investment not only yields sufficient money to payback itself, but also to buy new 
equipment at the expiry of the economic lifespan of the current asset. There is, 
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however, no reason a priori that investors in wind turbines all have the intention to 
stay within the industry for an infinite time period. Therewith, it may well be that 
they are happy with a nonnegative NPV (yielding a nonnegative Q), but do not 
care if they cannot stay in the wind power business forever. Nevertheless, for Qs 
exceeding unity, investments spurred up. 
   Another striking result of the wind power case study is that it seems that the 
exact policy instrument mixture is not important. Even though various mixtures of 
fiscal and financial instruments have been observed for the 15 countries over a 16 
years’ time period, the results suggest that the economic attractiveness of the 
investment is the main trigger. Unfortunately, I have not been able to include any 
of the barriers to investment (as surveyed in chapter 2) in this analysis. Also, the 
data were not sufficiently rich to isolate any effects of individual instruments. 
Nevertheless, the overall results of this empirical test were very promising for 
governments in stable economies that wish to support private sector investment in 
standard technologies. 
6.1.4 Joint Ownership Dilemma 
The fourth and last dilemma analysed in this study is how governments can 
encourage private sector participants to invest in joint ownership projects, also 
referred to as public-private partnerships (PPPs). Whilst the more traditional non-
coercive instruments as fiscal and financial measures encourage investment in 
standard technologies at a large scale, PPPs have the potential to operate in 
‘atypical’ areas—e.g., in cases of natural monopolies or where the economic 
activity is hard to contract. Chapter 5 has shown that PPPs occur in many areas, 
varying from infrastructure (the bulk of the natural monopolies) to hospitals and 
even prisons (where not all details can easily be specified). In spite of the fact that 
PPPs would particularly be interesting in the areas subject to the ‘theory of 
incomplete contracts’, empirical evidence shows that the largest efficiency gains—
if ever realised—are observed in infrastructure projects. The disappointing 
performance indicators are often attributed to the specific contractual arrangement 
of that case study, which would hamper the entrepreneurs to fully exploit their 
efficiency skills and experience. 
   Apart from these suggestions, chapter 5 has emphasized that not only the 
number of realised PPPs is very small, also very little is known on the dynamics of 
the interaction of the two parties. Though the game theoretical literature offers 
some avenues for solving the problem of the design of an incentive structure, it 
appears that particularly the provision of the public good—which is at the heart of 
a PPP—causes the problem for a sound theoretical analysis. Recent attempts in the 
literature can at best be considered ‘first steps’ towards a more rigorous analysis. 
For example, the works of Hart (2003), and Hart et al. (1997) underscore the 
importance of the theory of incomplete contracts. They clearly show that—as soon 
as we relax the assumption of an unbundled, homogeneous investment—the 
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negotiations become suspect to opportunism of either side. Given this notion, 
Besley and Ghatak (2001) include the relative valuation of the project’s output by 
each party as a key determinant of who should have the ownership. Though that 
paper highly enriches the debate, it does not provide an answer to how much 
ownership should be transferred to the counterpart. Section 5.5 proposes an 
incentive contract that balances the benefits of transferring ownership to the 
private sector with the foregone income for government of the project vehicle. 
This model gives a nice trade-off for either party: the entrepreneur must decide an 
optimal effort level in order to improve the PPP’s efficiency, whereas 
government—anticipating that optimal effort level—must decide between the 
efficiency of the PPP vehicle and giving away both some part of the residual rights 
and claims. 
 
6.2 A proposal for designing non-coercive policies 
By analysing four dilemmas, it appears that designing a policy based on non-
coercive instruments is more than calculating a wealth transfer. Throughout the 
study, I have proposed elements for building a framework that goes beyond the 
current literature on economic incentives. Since one PhD study is probably not 
enough to validate all building blocks of that framework, this section proposes 
some testable hypotheses that can be used in further research. 
6.2.1 A proposal for a conceptual model: Hypotheses 
Figure 6.1 gives a first step in proposing a model. It outlines the building blocks 
proposed in the current study. Given this conceptual model, I will try to integrate 
the results of the previous chapters through discussing the various relationships or 
arrows in the figure by means of formulating hypotheses. 
Investment Capital stock
Amount of 
public good
Economic attractiveness 
of investing
Utility derived 
from the 
public good
H
yp
ot
he
si
s 
6.
4
Hypothesis 6.5
Hypothesis 6.6
Non-coercive 
government instruments
D
ef
in
it
io
n 
1.
2
Definition 1.1
Hypothesis 6.1
Barriers to 
investment
H
yp
ot
he
si
s 
6.
2
Hypothesis 6.3
 
 
Figure 6.1: Proposed conceptual policy design model 
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Hypothesis 6.1: The investment decision is largely influenced by its economic 
attractiveness, also in the case of providing public goods. 
 
In the mainstream economic literature, no single agent would invest if it were 
economically unattractive (usually indicated by a negative NPV). Glaeser and 
Shleifer (2001), however, showed how ‘not-for-profit entrepreneurs’ might invest 
for ‘the warm glow’. In environmental economics, agents might invest in project 
initially loss-giving (or yielding foregone profits in the current time period) as 
some form of intergenerational altruism. Particularly the empirical results of 
chapter 4 in this study show how nonnegative NPVs (or Qs, in terms of chapters 3 
and 4) hardly match with positive investment levels. Therefore, whilst definition 
1.1 could be interpreted as a necessary condition only, it may be that—even in the 
case of public goods—the economic attractiveness of the investment decision is 
both a necessary and sufficient (‘if and only if’) condition—given that the barriers 
to investment have been overcome. 
 
Hypothesis 6.2: ‘Barriers to investment’ existing at various levels of analysis potentially 
decrease the effectiveness of non-coercive policy instruments. 
 
Apart from the question whether incentives work at all, there exists a debate on 
their effectiveness.153 Usually, economists attribute the ineffectiveness of 
incentives to ‘market failures.’ As Hubbard and Skinner (1996) recognise in 
analysing the effects of an incentive policy to stimulate household savings: 
 
‘[…] even cost-benefit analysis […] does not allow one to 
judge whether saving incentives are a success, by which we 
mean an improvement in welfare. To make this judgement, 
one must first isolate potential market failures that cause 
people to save too little in the first place.’ (p. 74) 
 
Chapter 2 of this study has analysed multiple ‘market failures’ at three levels of 
analysis. I have labelled these ‘barriers to investment.’ Though much of the 
barriers to investment have a sound theoretical justification, the empirical research 
analysing the underinvestment phenomenon (which arises due to either a low 
payoff of investing or due to barriers to investing) only uses a few. Moreover, it 
appears that the empirical research on underinvestment (as a specific case of 
assessing the effectiveness of policy instruments) is hampered by another problem: 
not only should the ‘market failures’ be investigated, but also it is very difficult to 
select an unambiguous benchmark. 
                                                      
153 See, for example, Hubbard and Skinner (1996), Jensen and Murphy (1990), or Bond 
and Guisinger (1985). 
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Hypothesis 6.3: All investment that increases the capital stock increases the amount of 
public good 
 
At a first glance, it seems obvious that investment in the provision of public goods 
increases its output. Nevertheless, Uzawa (1969) has made clear remarks 
regarding the so-called capital stock adjustment cost function (see figure 3.1). By 
recognising this installation function, we can distinguish between gross and net 
investment, where only the latter is the ‘productive’ investment. 
 
Hypothesis 6.4: Government’s marginal utility of a public good is declining as the capital 
stock that yields the public good increases 
 
Although this hypothesis may appear odd for its obviousness, its consequences are 
far reaching (see the next hypothesis). First, as the private sector responds 
positively to the investment incentive, the policy may be called successful. 
Nevertheless, with each instalment of capital stock yielding the targeted public 
good, government’s marginal utility decreases, and therewith her willingness-to-
pay (see the argumentation below the next hypothesis). Suppose the support 
scheme offered by government does not put a cap on the number of eligible 
projects, and that it is sufficiently interesting for the private sector to invest. What 
occurs if the private sector responds massively? Once investments have been made 
(which were economically unattractive without the government support scheme), 
the private sector has become dependent upon that support. This dependence may 
be compared with James Buchanan’s ‘Samaritan’s Dilemma’ (see the reprint of 
the original 1972 paper in Buchanan (1975)): the Samaritan tries to do good and 
help people in need, but once the donor’s action increases the amount of need the 
painful dilemma arises whether to continue helping or to quit.154 
   A second consequence of this hypothesis is immediately related to the first one, 
and deals with technological change. In chapter 4, I have analysed the effects of 
investment policies on private sector investment in wind turbines. The target group 
of the green policies predominantly consists of (independent) power-producing 
companies, and chapter 4 has analysed their response (albeit at the aggregated 
industry level). Nevertheless, the green policies must have had another impact as 
well: if, after all, the Samaritan decides to gradually reduce her aid (say 
argumentation below), then there is an increasing pressure on the producers of the 
targeted technology—in the case of chapter 4, the wind turbine producers—to 
improve the commercial viability of the equipment. Once investors are ‘locked in’ 
into a certain market, but government’s subsidies are gradually being reduced, 
                                                      
154 See also Coate (1995). 
206 
then the suppliers of the technology are asked to compensate for the reduced aid 
(see the bargaining relationships in Ruigrok and Van Tulder (1995)). This 
innovation process—which is confirmed by the rapidly declining cost price of 
wind turbines, see figure 4.2—is an economic activity in itself. Schmookler (1965) 
lamented on this issue, and claimed that ‘[…] the production of new technology is 
[…] in essence the mobilization of society’s creative energies to relieve the 
scarcities which existing resources and products cannot’ (p. 335). Though in the 
short-run, the Samaritan may increase the recipient’s reliance on support, it may 
escape from that dependence relationship in the long run by indirectly shifting 
some of the ‘responsibilities’ to the suppliers of the technology. 
 
Hypothesis 6.5: Assessing government’s utility of the public good gives a better 
understanding of the ‘generosity’ of the non-coercive measures
 
One important concept related to declining marginal utility is risk aversion. Take 
an example of a government providing a €1m subsidy for the private clean-up of a 
lake currently contaminated with phosphates. Suppose furthermore that the current 
PO4 concentration is 2 p.p.m., which is labelled as ‘excessively high’. Though 
there is no guarantee at all the €1m investment is sufficient to bring back the water 
quality to acceptable levels, this government is urged to ‘do something’, and 
accepts the risk. Having invested €1m, suppose the concentration of PO4 drops 
from 2 p.p.m. to a 0.1 p.p.m., which is considered ‘moderate’. Suppose, lastly, an 
additional investment of €1m may either reduce the concentration of phosphates to 
>0.05 (which would be classified as ‘low’), or it could stay at the moderate level. 
Since the water quality in the lake is not urgent anymore, it may well turn out that 
this government becomes risk averse in the sense of the payoff diagram. As a 
consequence, the Nash bargaining solution of a more risk averse government 
shifts, and it will be less likely to provide ‘generous’ support (see Gintis (2000) for 
the implications of risk aversion in Nash bargaining). 
   Chapter 4 provides some first support for this hypothesis—not only did the 
present value of all government support for wind turbine investments decline after 
the first serious peak (see figure 4.4) as did the economic attractiveness of 
investments including that support (see particularly figure 4.9), but also the air 
emissions declined over time (see figure 4.13). Based on these data, I calculated 
the implicit governmental valuation of additional investment in the public good 
(see figure 4.14). Though it turned out very difficult to interpret that valuation, it is 
clear that the price of further air quality improvements increases as the level of 
pollution drops. 
   In addition to a decreasing generosity or willingness-to-pay, one may think of 
the consequences for the choice of policy instruments. If a government becomes 
more risk averse, but is still destined to increase the level of the public good, will 
it still opt for non-coercive policy instruments? After all, although the economic 
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theory shows they are probably more efficient, they are also less predictable than 
coercive instruments. It would therewith be a logical consequence that the choice 
for a type of policy instruments may vary over time, whilst coercive instruments 
may come after non-coercive ones as soon as the marginal governmental utility of 
the public good declines. This notion has not been investigated in the current 
study, but is very interesting for future research. 
 
Hypothesis 6.6: For public goods being the spin-off of a private good, increases in the 
capital stock put a downward pressure on the market price for the private good, lowering 
the economic attractiveness of the investment 
 
This hypothesis is based on the standard downward sloping demand curve for 
private goods (see Mas-Colell et al. (1995)). If the investors in the targeted 
technology are price-takers in the market for the private good, whereas that market 
is competitive,155 then the increased supply must lower the market price. What, 
however, would happen in the case of price-making firms? Consider ‘the 
lighthouse in economics’ by Coase (1974). The investors in lighthouses (the public 
good) could not collect income for that investment directly. Nevertheless, they 
could add a mark-up on the harbour fees, since they also owned sea harbours. 
Clearly, if the ‘market for harbours’ had been competitive, with non-lighthouse-
owners in the market for harbours only, then this mark-up should vanish over time. 
Suppose companies compete in offering ferries or other pieces of infrastructure. 
Since it would be irrational for a monopolist to offer multiple competing ferries as 
long as there is ‘insufficient’ traffic congestion, each additional ferry operating on 
the same line puts a downward pressure on the ticket price. By the same token, 
each additional budget airline departing from some local airport increases the 
economic attractiveness of the local area (the public good) but also decreases the 
airfares. 
6.2.2 A proposal for a conceptual model: Towards empirical testing 
However valuable it may be to propose hypotheses, they themselves do not 
necessarily help the decision-maker in a pragmatic sense.156 Probably the most 
difficult question is how to make things operational. Of all the ‘building blocks’ of 
figure 6.1, there are tree decision variables that might be measurable: (1) the 
economic attractiveness of the investment (as the impetus of the whole process); 
                                                      
155 In the case of the French electricity market, dominated by state-owned EDF, 
independent power producers may indeed be price-takers. Nevertheless, since their market 
share is insignificant opposed to EDF’s, their investment can hardly be considered a 
downward pressure on the wholesale price. 
156 See also the comments of Sutton and Staw (1995) and Eisenhardt (1989) on the role of 
hypothesis. 
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(2) the investment and resulting capital stock (as the response function); and (3) 
the utility government derives from the public good (justifying the support she has 
given to the private sector). The amount of public good depends on its nature, and 
cannot be easily captured on a single dimension. The two remaining blocks (the 
type of instruments and the barriers to investment) are of a more categorical 
nature. 
 
Economic attractiveness 
Given definition 1.1 (and hypothesis 6.1), the naïve NPV rule would do fine as a 
first intuitive evaluation criterion describing the economic attractiveness of an 
investment decision. Chapter 3, however, showed how the NPV rule lacks a long-
run sustainability criterion. As a consequence, it is well imaginable that investors 
obtaining a nonnegative NPV on their project are unable to save money for 
replacing their capital stock following depreciation. In chapter 3, I proposed to use 
an alternative evaluation criterion, based on the naïve NPV rule, but subject to a 
long-run sustainability restriction.157 That model, based on Tobin’s Q and the 
neoclassical investment model of Hall and Jorgenson, is theoretically superior to 
the NPV rule. Also, it is measurable—that is, as long as the theoretically derived 
‘marginal Q’ equals average Q. In chapter 3, I have followed Hayashi (1982) on 
this matter, who merely used two simple but very powerful conditions. First, firms 
had to be price-takers in their market, for a monopolist would not necessarily face 
the downward-sloping demand curve that lowers the marginal benefits of 
additional investment after some optimum. Second, the technology must be 
characterised by constant returns-to-scale. For both in- and decreasing returns-to-
scale, it is impossible to measure the marginal benefits of additional output or 
capacity. 
   For standardised technologies as the wind turbines analysed in chapter 4, this 
framework seems to work fine. Once, however, we enter into a more complex 
setting as PPPs (often operating in naturally monopolistic areas or being price-
makers in their ‘market’), the modified version of Tobin’s Q cannot be measured 
anymore. In fact, it appeared that with the specific case of PPPs the academic 
literature is still too limited to propose a concrete evaluation criterion for this kind 
of arrangements. This is considered an avenue for further research. 
 
Investment and capital stock 
Throughout most of the chapters, I assumed that investment would yield capital 
stock. Implicitly or explicitly, I have assumed that these investments were 
                                                      
157 Note that although sufficient economic attractiveness of the investment (e.g., NPV>0) 
might even be both a necessary and sufficient condition in the short-run, there is no 
guarantee at all that firms remain in the industry once their investment has been written 
off. 
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indivisible, observable, specifiable, and unstageable.158 Nevertheless, chapter 5 has 
shown that the provision of public goods may sometimes need more complex 
investments. As soon as that complexity only increases slightly, the (economic) 
analysis explodes in terms of additional assumptions and formulae.159 In the 
anecdotal example of ‘outsourcing’ prisons to the private sector, I wanted to 
illustrate how difficult it is indeed to define certain tasks, and even a joint 
ownership solution need not be the panacea here. Again, this is an issue that 
deserves further attention in future research. 
 
Government utility from the public good 
Despite decades of research in public economics or, more specifically, 
environmental economics, there is still no unambiguous valuation criterion for 
public goods. In the absence of such a criterion, I have proposed to use a more 
pragmatic approach (see section 4.6), in which one simply divides the amount of 
public good by the provided support (yielding a public good per € figure). Though 
such approach may work well for justifying government expenses ex post, it 
clearly lacks the precision of the analytical valuation models that attempt to find 
some optimum. At least in the short run, it is unlikely that further research will 
yield a commonly accepted, unambiguous answer to the valuation of public goods; 
therewith it is very difficult to propose any general measurement tool here (other 
than the pragmatic one). 
 
6.3 Overall conclusions 
The overall problem statement for this study was how governments can encourage 
investment in the private provision of public goods by means of non-coercive 
instruments. In order to answer that problem statement, I have formulated some 
research questions, each representing a dilemma a government faces when 
deciding to ‘outsource’ the provision of public goods to the private sector, using 
non-coercive policy instruments. The individual dilemmas have been discussed in 
section 6.1; what remains are the overall conclusions. 
   First, it seems that in relatively ‘standard’ settings (as the standardised 
technology of the wind turbines analysed in chapter 4), the entire problem for 
governments largely reduces to determining the height of a wealth transfer. A 
thorough analysis of any potential barriers to investment (‘market failures’) is a 
crucial step here, in order to particularly improve the effectiveness of the policy. 
   Second, in this ‘standard’ setting, the results of chapter 4 cautiously suggest that 
the exact mixture of policy measures does not matter. Of course, this result is 
difficult to generalise, but it seems in the standard setting, investigated in 
                                                      
158 In sum, I focused on first-best solutions. 
159 Read: one finds a second-best solution. 
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developed countries, that investment is a straightforward response to economic 
attractiveness. 
   Third, given a declining marginal governmental utility of the public good, 
governments might well be suspect to risk aversion. In that case, the fundamental 
question rises whether the choice for policy instruments depends on the ‘life cycle’ 
of the particular public good—that is, if a government has already obtained a 
certain threshold level of the public good, she might become reluctant to lose 
‘wealth’ (in the broad sense), and prefer coercive instruments over non-coercive 
ones. 
   Fourth, as soon as the investment decision or the economic activity to be 
performed is more complex, it seems that the analytical framework must be 
sacrificed in order to obtain a pragmatic solution. Given the status quo of the 
academic literature (e.g., on PPPs), there is still much to be done before 
governments can optimise (at least, from an academic point of view). 
   Firth, if we still know so little about the more complex situations as PPPs, then 
these arrangements form risky strategies from a welfare maximising perspective. 
 
6.4 Limitations of the study and avenues for further research 
Despite all effort one can dedicate to a study, there will always remain interesting 
themes that have been left unexplored. On the one hand, one may even argue that 
the more we know about a theme, the more we become aware that our knowledge 
is limited. On the other hand, however, the more we know about a theme, the more 
sophisticated will be our diagnosis. The limitations of the study presented here can 
be perceived as invitations for further research. 
6.4.1 How versus why 
The most difficult issue in any scientific research is to make the step from 
descriptive to normative research. As Heiner (1983) pointed out in his seminal 
article, ‘[a]ll sorts of behavior is consistent with or plausibly suggested by 
optimization models, yet still not predicted by them’ (p. 561). 
   Of all dilemmas analysed in this study, I am convinced any investigation of the 
‘Influenceability Dilemma’ dramatically increases our understanding of the ‘why’ 
question. The fact, however, that I could not test for this issue in chapter 4 was a 
data limitation—wind turbine investments are only reported at national level.160 
                                                      
160 Nevertheless, I have tried to obtain some national breakdowns. For example, for the 
Netherlands these can be obtained through the ECN (Energy Policy Research Centre), the 
energy and environmental subsidies provider NOVEM for the Dutch Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, etc. For most other countries, however, this was extremely difficult. 
Now I might have conducted an in-depth analysis of the ‘case of the Netherlands’, but 
unfortunately, these investments were by far outpaced by the German, Spanish and Danish 
turbine investments, and provided little variation in the period observed. 
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The ‘Smart Governance Dilemma’ and the ‘Policy Portfolio Dilemma’ are clear 
examples of optimisation techniques that float on assumptions and evidence 
regarding the ‘why’ question. Now one may raise Heiner’s critique here, but I 
have explicitly proposed an investigation into the barriers to investment in section 
6.2. 
   The only study where Heiner’s critique must be taken into account is the ‘Joint 
Ownership Dilemma’, analysed in chapter 5. At present, we neither know about 
the dynamics underlying PPPs, nor do we know why firms engage in these 
partnerships. Chapter 5 has shown that the most sound reason for governments to 
invite entrepreneurs in a PPP are the efficiency skills of the latter, but still other 
arguments may apply as well (particularly the lack of cash by governments). If the 
reasons why governments want to start a PPP must affect the contractual 
arrangement chosen (e.g., a government short in cash may enter into a financial 
lease construction even though such is more expensive in the long run), then there 
must exist a similar rationale at the side of the entrepreneur. For example, if a 
property broker wishes to obtain a strategic position in some part of town, whereas 
the municipality wants to construct a new shopping centre by means of a PPP, then 
it is well imaginable the property broker accepts a zero profit on the PPP while 
anticipating positive spin-off later on. 
6.4.2 Data limitation  
In the case study conducted in chapter 4 (on the impact of fiscal and financial 
incentives), I could only obtain the IEA/OECD data on wind turbine investments. 
These data had the drawback that they were annualised (implying very little 
variation, which hampers regression analysis), and that they were at the national 
aggregate level only (which made it impossible to discriminate between various 
categories of investors, who might have different preference structures and 
therewith different responses to economic instruments). It appears that this 
limitation is far from unique in analysing public policies (see e.g. the limitations 
mentioned by Pearce and Palmer (2001)) or investment data in capital stock in 
general. Though it might have been possible to conduct a study at the micro-level, 
incorporating company data only, such would have gone at the expense of the 
cross-sectional insights provided by the comparative analysis amongst multiple 
countries. Given that it would have been too time-consuming if not impossible to 
collect micro-level data for a longer time period for multiple countries, I suggest 
such micro-level analysis might be conducted additionally to the more generic 
analysis used in the current study. 
   Originally, I wished to conduct an empirical analysis on public-private 
partnerships (PPPs) in chapter 5. Though many aggregate, and often superficial 
data are available on PPPs, so little is published at the level of the individual 
project. I have considered an in-depth analysis of a specific case-study, but I 
concluded that the theoretical literature on PPPs was too limited in both amount 
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and depth to come to a precise analysis. Here, I believe an empirical test would be 
very instructive, but requires a careful selection of the projects to be analysed. 
6.4.3 Other avenues for further research 
Of all themes analysed in the current study, public-private partnerships deserve 
our most urgent attention. We know so little about this organisational form that 
one may wonder why they have been realised in practice at all. The limited 
empirical evidence regarding PPPs show that the efficiency benefits are limited, 
which is often claimed to be the effect of a restrictive contractual arrangement. As 
long as we cannot discriminate situations as product-market combinations that 
determine the ‘ideal’ type of contractual arrangement, it will be impossible to 
optimise welfare. We may then treat PPPs as alternative sources of cash for 
governments (realising projects otherwise never started up), but the benefits of 
these projects being realised must be corrected for the welfare losses that occur 
due to inefficient or ineffective contracts, or the mere socialisation of risks and 
privatisation of benefits. 
   A second theme that deserves attention in future research is the question whether 
there exists some sort of ‘life cycle’ in policy instruments, based on the marginal 
utility a government faces of some public good. I have suggested that governments 
must face declining marginal utility of a public good, which cannot be decoupled 
from the game-theoretical ideas of risk-aversion. Since the non-coercive 
instruments investigated in the current study inevitably embody some degree of 
uncertainty with respect to their outcomes, it may well be that this class of 
instruments works best up to a certain level of public goods provision—beyond 
some threshold, that very same government may become risk-averse and opt for 
more predictable instruments, shifting towards the coercive ones. That move may 
occur with an equal preference structure of that government, but spurred only by a 
declining marginal utility. 
   A third theme that deserves more attention deals with the operationalisation of 
the ‘economic attractiveness’ of the investment decision. In chapters 3 and 4, I 
have used a modified version of Tobin’s Q as the evaluation criterion. That Q, 
however, could only be measured in case of price-taking firms using a constant 
returns-to-scale technology. For all other cases, whether it concerns price-making 
firms or industries with increasing returns-to-scale, only marginal Q can be 
derived analytically, but it remains immeasurable. For PPPs, often operating in 
some (naturally) monopolistic setting, the Q proposed here is typically 
immeasurable. 
   Virtually any study focusing on the impact of Tobin’s Q on investment treats the 
processes and variables in-between Q and capital stock as a black box. Though I 
acknowledge the presence of intervening variables (see the research model in 
chapter 3, as well as figure 6.1), I have used these variables as possible 
explanatory variables for any pitfall in the relationship between Q and k. Since my 
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data were too limited in amount and richness, I could not put these variables into 
operation, and try to include them in a regression model. Others (e.g., Hubbard et 
al. (1995), Abel and Eberly (2002), or Hennesy (2004)) have tried to come to a 
deeper understanding of the dynamics underlying the relationship between Q and 
k. Empirical tests for the functional forms of these interferences, however, require 
more high-frequency data than applied in the current study. 
   Though the literature on incomplete contracts is still emerging, it has not come 
to a point yet where it can tackle the contracting of complex investments—typical 
caveats are unobservability, stageability, and heterogeneity. Given the typical 
information asymmetry arising in these situations between government (as the 
principal) and some entrepreneur (as the agent) can at best yield second-best 
solutions, which are of course less attractive than first-best ones. Again, 
particularly in the case of PPPs these types of investments are at the heart of the 
contractual arrangement, which raises just another question mark with respect to 
the existing PPPs. 
   A last remark for future research concerns the (governmental) valuation of 
public goods. As long as there is not an unambiguous valuation criterion, welfare 
maximisation must work with the abstract U(Y) which is very difficult for 
pragmatic analysis. This issue has received much attention over the last decades 
already, but remains difficult to tackle in the near future. 
 

7 BEYOND THE STUDY 
 
 
 
Two decades of privatisation, liberalisation, and regulatory reforms have clearly 
enriched the ‘palette’ of policy instruments. As governments have massively 
withdrawn from the market place as active providers of goods and services in 
many areas (varying from telecommunications to sewerage), privatisation initially 
seemed the panacea—of course, the sales of former state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) has resulted in an enormous cash injection for many governments, but also 
it was widely claimed that privatisation would positively contribute to welfare (see 
the comments of Kay and Thompson (1986) in this light). Unfortunately, the 
current empirical evidence on the benefits of privatisation can at best be classified 
as ‘mixed’ (that is, there are just as many opponents as advocates, see Megginson 
and Netter (2001)). If privatisation ‘works’, then it must be accompanied by 
liberalisation of trade and investment, as well as regulatory reforms directed at the 
promotion of competition. Kay and Thompson (1986) argue that privatisation may 
increase allocative efficiency (producers satisfying the needs and wants of 
consumers, while prices equal the marginal costs of production), whereas 
liberalisation (of trade) may increase productive efficiency (minimising the total 
costs of production of the entire output vector of an industry). Combining 
allocative and productive efficiencies yields the so-called Pareto efficient 
production, which is often considered the ultimate goal in economic analyses. 
   When analysing some product-market combinations, one may seriously doubt 
whether each combo is suitable for this Pareto efficient production—after all, if it 
is impossible to measure the marginal consumption of each individual, let alone 
the marginal utility of individual consumers, then marginal pricing becomes 
impossible, which is crucial for entrepreneurs to fully exploit their efficiency 
skills. For example, markets for ‘standard’ consumer goods as jeans, beverages, or 
household electronics, producers can ‘cream skim’ a market by introducing top-
line products first, and then downscale the product (at lower sales prices) in order 
to maximise the sales market. The various contracts for mobile phones form an 
ideal example of this logic where the wants and needs of each individual 
customers is met: heavy consumers may pay a higher fixed cost (monthly 
subscription) but low variable cost (price per minute), whereas the occasional 
consumer who pays a lower value to mobile telecommunications pays zero fixed 
costs (by means of a prepaid system) but a high variable cost instead. 
   Can this mainstream mechanism work in any setting where governments were 
active for so long? In section 1.5, I have expressed my concern for one particular 
class of goods in the economy—public goods. As opposed to private goods, pure 
public goods in a Samuelsonian sense are not exclusive (I cannot be excluded from 
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enjoying the benefits of a national defence system), the marginal consumption of 
the individual cannot be measured (when do I pass a streetlight?), let alone his 
marginal utility (who says people living in the highlands care for a clean sea).161 
Nevertheless, the aforementioned withdrawal of governments from the economy is 
definitely not restricted to the ‘private good/contestable market’ (see figure 1.5) 
product-market combination for which the private sector would probably possess 
superior efficiency skills as compared to governments. In fact, in many of those 
areas nowadays ‘outsourced’ to the private sector, public goods play an important 
role. 
   It is in this discipline referred to as ‘the private provision of public goods’ where 
I am reluctant to embrace the free market dogma I would enthusiastically support 
in so many other situations. The literature on the private provision of public goods 
(see section 1.3) has identified the funding problem as the biggest obstacle to be 
tackled. Therewith, it would be tempting to assume that government support for 
the private provision of public goods is a matter of calculating a wealth transfer, 
changing the payoff structure of the investment decision. As Baumol (1990) 
showed, changing the costs and benefits of an existing choice set for entrepreneurs 
need not change their preference structures, and let them operate in line with the 
policy goals. Having analysed some governmental dilemmas associated with the 
private provision of public goods (see chapter 6 for a recap), the question rises 
what governments should do. 
   Although of all the possible arrangements I have only analysed a few, it seems 
that the private sector may indeed be more efficient in markets where the public 
good is coupled or bundled with the production of a private good. The wind 
turbines analysed in chapter 4, form a good example of a standard technology 
where the private good output is sold at a competitive market, and the investors 
receive support for the public good. However specific this multi-case study may be 
(constant returns-to-scale homogeneous technology, firms are price-takers), its 
implications may be transcended and apply to more areas. To make that 
translation, much depends on what we classify as the public good. For example, a 
railway connecting a harbour with a remote industrial area clearly boosts the 
attractiveness of both locations for firms to settle. This spin-off effect of an 
                                                      
161 Although the literature on the private provision of public goods floats on this 
Samuelsonian interpretation of a ‘public good’, note that some authors have advocated a 
rival view. Amongst them was the former Nobel laureate James Buchanan, who despised 
the ‘pure public goods’ interpretation and suggested to classify all goods (even private 
goods in the sense used in this study) provided by government as public goods (see, e.g., 
Buchanan (1965), Buchanan (1978), or Buchanan and Kafoglis (1963)). In the current 
study (and the mainstream contemporary literature) these would, however, be classified as 
‘publicly provided private goods’, or ‘publicly provided public goods’. Although I favour 
the Samuesonian classification, I am aware that the interpretation of Buchanan remains 
vivid in the debates on ‘what we should consider as public goods.’ 
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affordable railway connection may well be considered a public good, for which 
local governments are willing to pay. The recent April 2004 case of the EU 
antitrust authorities against budget airline Ryan Air (accused of paying too little 
for local landing rights, which was considered as illegal subsidising, so that the 
difference between Ryan’s landing fees and its competitors had to be paid back) 
illustrates not only that governments have a positive WTP for the public good, but 
also that this type of private provision fundamentally differs from the more 
traditional forms of procurement (see Laffont and Tirole (1993)), including the 
consequences for competition. 
   This issue of competition (or in fact, antitrust) is highly topical in the case of 
public-private partnerships. At the heart of any public-private partnership lies an 
investment project with positive spin-off effects for society. Though there are 
many forms and labels for public-private partnerships (PPPs), they all share one 
important characteristic that distinguishes them from other forms of governmental 
investments in the private sector investment decision—under PPPs, both entities 
co-operate in the entire project lifecycle. This is a clear contrast with, for example, 
the case of subsidies, fiscal stimuli, or concessions, where government typically 
designs the project and the private sector is invited or encouraged to realise it 
given an existing outline. EU internal market commissioner Frits Bolkestein 
clarified matters as follows. 
 
‘The phenomenon of public-private partnerships confronts the 
EU procurement law with a major challenge. EU procurement 
law does not define a public-private partnership, nor does it 
provide for a specific set of rules covering the procurement of 
PPP projects. […] In the context of procurement, the 
terminology ‘public-private partnership’ is commonly used in 
order to mark the difference with more traditional forms of 
procurement. In traditional procurement, the government 
identifies and finances an asset or a service entirely through its 
own efforts and resources. In PPP, the private partner assumes 
a much greater role than is the case in traditional forms of 
procurement, and stays involved over a longer period of time. 
Typically, the private partner assists the government in the 
planning and design of the project. Further, the private partner 
may arrange for the financing of the project, by having 
recourse to financing techniques available on the private 
market. Finally, the private partner usually assumes the 
operational responsibility for the asset or the service involved 
over a set period of time. […]’ 
(Speech delivered at the 3rd annual Public-Private Partnership 
Global Summit, 08 November 2002, Noordwijk, the 
Netherlands). 
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As with PPPs, cases as Ryan Air may suspiciously look like cases of unfair 
competition. Suppose it would be necessary to bypass competition for an effective 
design of a partnership (in the broadest sense), would productive efficiency be 
served with these arrangements? To me it seems quite difficult to implement a full 
PPP, starting from scratch, where both partners co-operate in the design, 
construction, and operations and maintenance without violating antitrust laws. The 
more novel the project, the higher the uncertainties and risks associated with that 
project, and the more the individual and mutual payoffs of the two partners 
requires a close form of commitment. Also, the privatisation literature teaches us 
that following privatisation, the new owner immediately starts with a 
reorganisation in order to improve the efficiency (see Zhara et al. (2000), Barberis
et al. (1996), Boardman and Vining (1989), Brada (1996), Clark and Soulsby 
(1995), Jenkinson and Mayer (1988), or Megginson et al. (1994)). Apparently, 
governments are incapable of designing organisations that allow a full exploitation 
of the private sector’s superior efficiency skills. That, however, in itself suggests 
that if a PPP should be more efficient than traditional procurement or public 
provision (and this is exactly suggested in chapter 5), then some entrepreneur must 
be involved in the early stages of the project—when there may be too little known 
to write a competitive tender. 
   A last note concerns the dependence relationships of the different contractual 
arrangements between public and private parties. It is very intuitive to draw a 
dependency scale (cf. Ruigrok and Van Tulder (1995)) with on the one extreme 
public provision, closely followed by regulation. Under these coercive measures, 
government is independent of the private sector in case of provision through 
SOEs, but already becomes slightly dependent on them in the case of regulation. 
In case of non-compliance, government may fine firms, but then still that does not 
provide the good or activity. Shifting to the other extreme, non-coercive measures 
as fiscal and financial measures, but also PPPs can be found. In this category, there 
exists and interdependence, for example illustrated by the Samaritan’s Dilemma in 
chapter 6. Lastly, and this is the opposite extreme of public provision, one can 
place voluntary provision by the private sector. Here, government is completely 
dependent, and the private sector independent. According to the mainstream 
economic theory, there is no doubt the coercive measures are most predictable for 
government in terms of outcomes, but the voluntary ones are often the most 
efficient ones. 
   Bearing in mind the various dilemmas analysed in this study, and accepting that 
some organisational forms and processes have been practiced long before the 
academic literature has come to a full understanding of these phenomena, it seems 
there is one overall fundamental dilemma governments face in the private 
provision of public goods: the choice between economic efficiency and 
predictability. 
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ABOUT THE COVER ILLUSTRATION 
 
 
 
On one occasion, I wanted to explain a colleague what ‘productive’ meant to an 
academic. As an illustration, I wanted to show him the CV of William J. Baumol, 
one of the economists I admire most. When searching for his homepage on this 
colleague’s computer, we ended up at NYU. What amazed me most was not the 
fact that Professor Baumol had written over 500 articles, books, and chapters—
after all, I had read some limited amount of this material, and knew there were 
good reasons for his nomination for the 2003 Nobel Prize in economics. What 
stroke me, was the bright illustration in lovely vivid colours that lightened up the 
homepage, accompanied by the invitation ‘To see my paintings click Art Gallery’. 
   In 2001, an interview with William Baumol appeared in the Journal of 
Economic Perspectives. In that interview, Alan Krueger (2001) sketched such a 
sympathetic impression of a man who was not only brilliant but also a normal 
person, in some sense maybe a self-made man. Now this person, born in 1912, had 
not only changed our ideas about Pigouvian taxation, changed our thinking on 
natural monopolies and contestability, or heavily contributed to public or welfare 
economics in general, but also he had started painting. Now I must recall I have 
never seen the original panels, neither do I know the techniques used (in the 
interview by Alan Krueger, William Baumol declared he did not only scarf wood 
and paint in the traditional sense, but also used ‘computer painting’), but when 
going through the ‘Art Gallery’ at his NYU homepage, this man appeared to have 
developed a style so lovely, that he deserves to be praised for this as well. Friends 
and colleagues to whom I showed the gallery without telling them the name of the 
painter came up with all kinds of Spanish and French modern artists, but nobody 
thought of a brilliant economist. 
   Of all paintings, I thought ‘Prophet 3’ would make a nice match with the current 
study. I cannot tell what the artist had in mind when making this painting, but I 
find the seated figure a nice concretisation or personalisation of a government 
puzzled with a dilemma. Then the object he or she is staring at. Here, I return to 
the title of the painting, referring to some prophetic scene. Though prophets may 
tell about the future, it seems this one has a hard nut to crack telling something 
about the object in the Northwest corner. That is what I liked, for I think the 
dilemmas described in the current study cannot easily be solved. I might have 
opted for a Samaritan, but a prophet might also do well. Now William Baumol has 
painted multiple prophets, given the fact that this one was number three. Actually, 
number one was also on his website, but I thought the colours of this one made a 
nicer match with the frame within which the illustration had to fit (all theses 
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published by our research school ERIM have the same banner on the left, and use 
a uniform style in the layout). 
   Having found a lovely potential cover illustration for my thesis, I have been in 
doubt for some time whether or not to bother this person with a request to use his 
painting on my thesis. First of all, I realised somebody with the status of William 
Baumol, a thesis must be just another thesis, and why would he do some unknown 
PhD candidate a favour? Second, I might receive no response since my request 
would come from the R.O.W. (on my first visit to an annual conference of the 
American Economic Association I learnt that the Urbi et Orbi thinking still exists, 
albeit that Urbi has shifted to another continent). Nevertheless, I did like the 
painting very much, and I also had the feeling it could be a nice sort of ‘tribute’ to 
this emeritus professor to see one of his paintings on a book. So, I decided to write 
him an e-mail, and asked for his permission to use the painting, and I explained 
that if he would agree, whether I could please get a high resolution version. Within 
six (!) hours I received his permission by e-mail and a 1.5mb TIF file in the 
attachment. Now somebody may take this for normal, but I was flabbergasted. We 
talk about a world famous economist of 82 years old, still active within the 
academia, making lovely paintings, and responding e-mails within a few hours 
(and then still, he might have broken his record if we correct for the time zone 
difference). There was only one condition for Will Baumol to have me using his 
painting: He insisted on receiving a copy. Sir, it is both my pleasure and big 
honour! 
Note: The entire gallery can be viewed at: http://www.econ.nyu.edu/user/baumolw/ 
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Government Dilemmas in the Private Provision of
Public Goods
The private provision of public goods is a much debated topic, both
in the academic and the ‘real life’ literature. From an academic pers-
pective, numerous potential pitfalls exist with respect to funding,
willingness-to-pay, and the free rider problem. The logical solution
to these problems has therefore always been government provision
of public goods. In an era where governments withdraw from the
market place as active providers of goods and services, however,
there is a renewed interest in the private provision of these activi-
ties. This thesis takes a governmental perspective, asking how
governments can encourage investments in the private provision of
public goods. Since from an economic perspective the so-called
‘coercive’ measures (most noteworthy: regulation) are by definition
inefficient, I focus on the non-coercive measures. Therewith, a trade-
off is introduced between the efficiency and effectiveness of the
government intervention–coercive measures are most predictable in
their outcomes, but less efficient, whereas non-coercive measures
are most efficient, but less predictable. The choice for non-coercive
intervention instruments yields a number of dilemmas, illustrating
the complexity of the choices to be made. The four dilemmas
discussed are the Influenceability Dilemma, the Smart Governance
Dilemma, the Policy Portfolio Dilemma, and the Joint Ownership
Dilemma.
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